If there is one silver lining to the current extreme market volatility, it is that it will hasten the Eurozone’s demise and put an end to this political and economic agony. This is the moment when Germany must choose whether to take the path of assuming the debts and economic instability of the periphery, or, on the contrary, to jump off the bandwagon. And should it decide not to continue sharing this burden, it could also choose to uncouple carriages rather than jumping off itself. I hope you enjoy the article we’ve published on GurusBlog: «The End of the Countdown«
El BCE ha negado que se haya opuesto al plan del Gobierno español para capitalizar Bankia con deuda española. Simplemente ha enviado una breve nota oficial a los medios de comunicación, explicando que el BCE no ha sido consultado sobre los planes de recapitalización (de bancos) españoles. Pero lo que ha sucedido unas horas antes es más que curioso. (more…)
John Mauldin nos deleita esta semana com otro análisis realista («Thoughts from the frontline») del porvenir de la Eurozona. Y lo hace mostrándonos gráficos recopilados de fuentes y colegas de conferencias con los que comparte análisis de este New Normal o Nuevo Paradigma en el que nos ha tocado navegar financiera y patrimonialmente. Comienza recordando en el siguiente gráfico que la deuda total, privada y pública, conviene también analizarla desde la perspectiva del endeudamiento corporativo no financiero (ex-banca). Y aquí vemos como el tejido empresarial español, está proporcionalmente mucho más asfixiado de deuda que en el resto de países hiperendeudados.
There are many fears that France will not follow the path of austerity and budgetary rigour, should the socialist Hollande win the elections. But the harsh reality is that the colour of the elected president and his electoral programme are not so relevant. Nor does it seem likely that in the second round Sarkozy will win the support of Le Pen's extreme right-wing voters, but even if Hollande were to win the Elysée, his capacity for manoeuvre would be very, very limited. (more…)
En muchas tertulias y medios escritos estamos escuchando voces que proclaman la insensatez y el delirio de los Mercados respecto a la situación de la economía española. Se argumenta que, el hecho de que antes de hacer públicos los presupuestos más austeros de la democracia española Mr. Market penalizase los intereses españoles, y que después del tijeretazo también lo hagan, es una prueba irrefutable de la demencia de los Mercados. Dicen que esa es la prueba de que las directrices económicas de este país deben marcarse al margen de lo que los Mercados puedan opinar. Que «la dictadura de los Mercados» es algo que debemos obviar y contra lo que hay que luchar… Pero no. Veamos algunas de las razonas por las cuales no debemos ni podemos obviar a Mr. Market: (more…)
Ya es un secreto a voces que la banca española debe ser rescatada con fondos europeos. Pese a que oficialmente aún se niega, altos dirigentes europeos son los que han empezado a hacer declaraciones ante los medios, quitando hierro a la estigmatización que supone el hecho de que los bancos españoles deban ser rescatados como Grecia, Irlanda o Portugal. Los fondos provendrán de los tristemente conocidos Fondo Europeo de Estabilización Financiera (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Y parece que la banca española no puede ya maquillar por mas tiempo su insolvencia.
That exceptional measures should be taken in exceptional situations is pure common sense. And the State of Emergency is a regime that can be declared by the government of a country in special situations. It is a temporary mechanism contemplated in the constitutions of countries in the event that a government determines that an extraordinary situation exists, such as a natural catastrophe, serious disturbance of internal order, foreign war or any other danger considered sufficiently serious, in order to deal with it adequately. A state of emergency usually involves the suspension or restriction of certain fundamental rights, and implies temporariness, until the exceptional situation is regularised. It is also known as a state of alarm, siege or emergency.
This week I came across an article published in FundsPeople titled «Client risk in private banking management«. These are obviously arguments put forward by bankers and former private bankers, which already distorts considerably the reality of what wealth management in general and financial investment in particular should be, as we said back in 2008 in «...".«The unbearable lightness of management»(private banking). We advance this warning because the FundsPeople article only deals with the management of bank investments, i.e. money invested in bank investment products, shares handpicked by the bankers and ex-bankers on duty and other investment funds listed in the bank's sales catalogue. We want to make it clear that there is a fundamental deviation from the way we should treat families' money, which should include investments in unlisted companies (private equity), real estate investments and other assets in which, in order to invest, the money must come out of the bank's account. Obviously, private banks do without such investments, as their mission is to keep their clients' money in the bank that generates their income at the end of the month.
Knowing which types of assets or which companies’ shares are going to skyrocket in the coming months is the pipe dream of those who, rather than investing, speculate. Of those who are hoping for a windfall to bail them out of the financial difficulties they have got themselves into through their own foolishness. But even if Lady Luck were to smile on them, their poor judgement would remain just as bad. Consequently, they will believe themselves to be shrewd investors rather than merely lucky, and their cycle of financial difficulties, windfalls and further difficulties will repeat itself, at best. In the long run, the result for most of them is that their forays as speculators (even though they describe themselves as investors), far from supplementing their income, cost them a significant portion of the wages they have earned through the sweat of their brow over the years. And if at any point they were to make an objective calculation of their gains and losses—something they consciously or unconsciously avoid doing—the balance sheet would reveal the harsh reality: that throughout their investing lives, a large part of their own and their families’ well-being has been taken by Mr Market. (more…)
Como dijimos ya hace un par de semanas en «El Eurobono ha venido y nadie sabe cómo ha sido (2)», el crédito ilimitado del BCE con vencimiento a 3 años (LTRO) ha cambiado radicalmente el escenario europeo. La primera ronda de estas Operaciones de Refinanciación a Largo Plazo, y la segunda prevista para Febrero, han disipado el riesgo de colapso inminente del sistema financiero de la UE. No obstante a nadie se le debe escapar que la eliminación de la inmediatez del colapso no supone solución alguna al problema de fondo, pero sí es cierto que sirve para rebajar algunos grados el infierno en el que vive el la banca europea. (more…)