
We look after your interests
Torres Sarrià, Carrer de Can Ràbia, 3-5, 4ª Planta BCN 08017
Pº de la Castellana, 93 2nd floor MADRID 28046


La Historia nos demuestra que ante un problema la opción que se acaba aplicando es la menos dolorosa para la mayoría a corto plazo, a pesar de que no sea la mejor solución ni la más simple o racional. En cambio, las opciones que perjudican y son más dolorosas para la mayoría, a pesar de que sean las mejores o únicas soluciones, difícilmente acaban sucediendo. Por ello, un desenlace más que posible para el callejón sin salida en el que se han -nos han- metido los bancos centrales con su creación de dinero y deuda hasta el infinito y más allá, bien pudiera ser un masivo y jamás visto write-down o default diseñado de dicha deuda. Veamos los detalles. (more…)
Putting their clients' interests first. Something so obvious but at the same time so difficult to find among financial advisors and bankers is what a new law promoted by the US Department of Labor is going to regulate, for the time being only advisors who specifically recommend investments for their clients' old age (retirement investments and 401k). Perhaps in time this law will also be extended to all other non-specific advice for old age or retirement, although it seems unlikely that one day we will see something similar for all other advisors/bankers/real estate salesmen, home insurance, etc. (more…)
Las políticas de tipos cero que se han venido sosteniendo desde los Bancos Centrales del mundo más desarrollado para evitar el colapso de la deuda, han distorsionado por completo el sistema financiero. Los efectos colaterales de regalar el precio del dinero y la barra libre para evitar que los hiperendeudados (todo el mundo desarrollado) quiebren, son letales para los que deben generar rentas. Es un escenario amable con los insolventes pero muy hostil para los inversores, que se ven abocados a prestar su dinero a cambio de míseros rendimientos ofrecidos por emisores cada vez más peligrosos e insolventes.
A medida en que el dinero de los inversores se desplaza hacia la deuda más insolvente buscando desesperadamente unos puntos de rendimiento, la burbuja en los precios de toda la deuda, tanto desarrollada como emergente y en toda su curva, se hincha más y más. Los emisores más solventes o con bancos centrales dispuestos a comprarlo todo, tienen buena parte de sus curvas de tipos ya en negativo, o sea que los inversores deben pagar por prestarles su dinero. De igual modo los emisores menos solventes viven en una nube de liquidez que les permite endeudarse más y más pagando tipos como si fuesen grandes nombres multinacionales solventes. (more…)

However, there is no shortage of conjecture pointing to other motivations of a less financial or political nature, as suggested by this article from ElConfidencial,this one from lasfinanzascambian.com or such an authoritative voice as Javier Cremades, chairman of Cremades & Calvo-Sotelo and president of the International Financial Litigation Network (IFLN) in this devastating article. In fact, it is strange, to say the least, that the report of the Sepblac to remain in Minister De Guindos' drawer The report had already warned of indications of various laundering offences before the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, which had not been processed until the USA demanded that action be taken. We are not therefore dealing with crimes or malpractice that have gone unnoticed until today, but rather with suspicions and indications that the competent bodies detected as early as June last year, but which they surprisingly ignored until the US financial police have come forward. (more…)

To begin with, the ordinary investor should analyse his or her asset situation and determine whether, in addition to purely financial advice, he or she also needs tax, legal, commercial, corporate or real estate advice. In other words, they may need to put their companies/businesses in order, their real estate investments or divestments, the administration of these properties, inheritance and family matters, their investments in the stock market and in unlisted companies, the generation of the necessary income for their family or projects, optimising the taxation of all of this, etc. (more…)

Thus, the manifest insolvency of the southern states of the Eurozone is the gigantic elephant in the room of the Troika (now renamed «the 3 institutions»: EU, ECB and IMF) that all these creditors ignore without the slightest blush. The most surreal case is that of Greece, which with Syriza at the head of its government is causing panic among its European partners. And this panic is not caused by the Greek state's inability to repay its massive debt - they have known that for years - but by the new government's willingness to publicly and openly acknowledge its insolvency.. Why? Simply because recognising that Greece will never be able to pay means having to write off losses on its creditors' balance sheets. And that really panics them, since neither the European banks nor the indebtedness and budget deficits of the other Eurozone countries are in such a state that they can count not a single euro of additional losses at the moment. (more…)
It was to be expected that central bank intervention would not be innocuous. We warned a little more than a year ago and its effects are already blowing up in some people's faces. If to this massive intervention never seen before we add a couple of other ingredients (Madonna, Madonna, just a couple...) such as OPEC's plot to push down the price of oil, the conflict in Ukraine or the radicalisation of the alleged Islamic State in the Middle East (which affects even Paris itself), the amplification of the side effects of central bank intervention can and will be uncontrollable.
Today we are already witnessing brutal price movements, which do not correspond at all to a healthy financial system, nor to corrections or adjustments of excesses, but rather to the delusions of a system that has been in place for years. frankeinsteinian capable of anything. Let us look at some very significant examples in recent weeks which, however, have paradoxically had rather localised devastating effects until today: (more…)
Antes de enumerar algunos riesgos a los que nos enfrentaremos este año, definamos lo que entendemos por «inversores tradicionales». Como tales pueden calificarse la inmensa mayoría de inversores particulares e incluso muchos institucionales. Y son aquellos que invierten su dinero en productos clásicos de renta fija y renta variable comercializados habitualmente por la banca. O sea, bonos y acciones cotizadas y fondos de inversión de todo tipo que invierten en esos mismos activos, pagando jugosas comisiones a los comercializadores (bancos) para que los coloquen entre sus clientes. Activos que han funcionado bien años atrás, cuando el sistema financiero no estaba desbordado por la deuda y la actuación de los bancos centrales.
No debemos perder de vista que el caldo de cultivo para que la mayoría de inversores tengan un año aciago está servido: (more…)
We care about transparency both in management and in our own way of working. Leading wealth management and family offices company
Torres Sarrià, Carrer de Can Ràbia, 3-5, 4ª Planta BCN 08017
Pº de la Castellana, 93 2nd floor MADRID 28046