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Category: Actualidad

The side effects of Central Banks are already here.

various-central-banks

It was to be expected that central bank intervention would not be innocuous. We warned a little more than a year ago and its effects are already blowing up in some people's faces. If to this massive intervention never seen before we add a couple of other ingredients (Madonna, Madonna, just a couple...) such as OPEC's plot to push down the price of oil, the conflict in Ukraine or the radicalisation of the alleged Islamic State in the Middle East (which affects even Paris itself), the amplification of the side effects of central bank intervention can and will be uncontrollable.

Today we are already witnessing brutal price movements, which do not correspond at all to a healthy financial system, nor to corrections or adjustments of excesses, but rather to the delusions of a system that has been in place for years. frankeinsteinian capable of anything. Let us look at some very significant examples in recent weeks which, however, have paradoxically had rather localised devastating effects until today: (more…)

Have you won the lottery jackpot? The first 5 decisions you need to make.

Most lucky lottery winners end up losing their entire fortune within a few years. This is a quasi-universal law that affects the vast majority of lottery winners, as bad decisions start as early as the first minute after the draw. Let's see how bad decisions can be avoided in the first days or weeks after being chosen by the goddess Fortune. We will summarise them in 5 essential decisions and present them to you in the usual chronological order in which they should be taken.

The first The golden rule would be maximum discretion. The fewer people who know that we have won the jackpot or any other lottery, euromillions, etc., the better, much better. Not only for security reasons, but also to avoid, as far as possible, becoming a tempting lure for fraudsters, tricksters and unscrupulous and unscrupulous investment hunters. And bankers should also be included in this bag, as they will immediately be on the lookout for their prey as soon as they smell the blood of the nouveau riche and its irresistible liquidity. However, some bankers will have to be told, since the winning tenth or tenths must be deposited in a bank for collection and the corresponding 20% withholding, in other words, the first tax bite from the State. But be careful, (more…)

El timo de los fondos perfilados

Esta es la última moda en las técnicas de abuso comisionista de la banca, y parece que llegó hace unos meses para quedarse entre los inversores más cándidos. Los fondos perfilados en definitiva son fondos de fondos cuyo criterio de selección es mantener una combinación de aproximadamente media docena de fondos que en su conjunto se adecuen al perfil inversor tipo: Agresivo, moderado, dinámico, conservador, etc. O sea, que en lugar de que el asesor de la entidad bancaria de turno recomiende a sus Clientes tener en cartera 4, 6 u 8 fondos determinados, sustituyendo unos por otros cuando lo considere necesario, le va a proponer comprar sólo uno, el perfilado. Y serán los gestores de éste quienes compran y vendan los que quieran en cada momento, sin que el inversor ni se entere. (more…)

Fixed Income 2.0

La renta fija tradicional, en forma de bonos emitidos por Estados y empresas, está pasando por momentos muy complicados. El abuso de endeudamiento por parte de los países desarrollados -y cada vez más también los emergentes-, junto con la fabricación de dinero por parte de los bancos centrales a niveles jamás vistos, hace que la renta fija sea cada vez menos fiable en general. Si fabricamos dinero de la nada sin anclarlo a nada, la deuda se convierte en meros dígitos cuya solvencia queda cada vez más en entredicho, ya que los ingresos y la capacidad de generar flujos de dinero para devolverla quedan cada vez más ridículos respecto a la cantidad debida. Y eso ocurre tanto a las empresas como a los Estados de los llamados países desarollados.

Si además añadimos a ello una política sostenida durante años de tipos de interés a prácticamente cero, y unas facilidades de recompra de activos por parte de bancos centrales demenciales, tenemos como resultado que la deuda más solvente (sic) como la alemana o la estadounidense está en tipos negativos. Y como consecuencia, el resto de deuda de países paradójicamente hiperendeudados, también goza de unas primas de riesgo mínimas, es decir que pagan extraordinariamente poco por recibir dinero prestado. (more…)

Accounting traps to inflate GDP.

Accounting creativity« is nothing more than a euphemism for falsehood, for cheating in accounting so that it reflects a distorted reality, to suit the interests of those in power. And today those in power are an EU that at all costs needs to simulate solvency and growth in the countries of its periphery, so that investors do not flee those economies. If they did, there would not be enough money - or will - in northern Europe to avoid bankruptcy and the collapse of Eurozone unity.

It seems, therefore, that it is in nobody's interest that the reality of the economic miseries of the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain... and some others such as France...) becomes evident and scares away national and international investors. That is why the ECB keeps the risk premium at floor level through all kinds of quantitative and pseudo-covert facilities to banks and states. It is also in charge of keeping alive the profits of banks that have their warehouses full of rotting real estate on the basis of free liquidity bars. And European and Spanish regulators look the other way when financial institutions value these properties above their market price on their balance sheets to avoid obvious bankruptcy. Anything goes to feign stability, for the good of all (sic). Accounting engineering or creativity« is also being used in Spain. when it comes to handling unemployment and other macro figures, on the demand of electoral needs and balancing with the impositions overseen by the Troika. (more…)

What is really happening in Iraq?

Los noticieros se encargan de informarnos en estos últimos días de que el gobierno iraquí está luchando dentro de sus propias fronteras contra un enemigo que abraza el más sangriento yihadismo: El Estado Islámico de Irak y el Levante (ISIL). Es decir, la deriva violenta radical del salafismo que ampara el gobierno saudí, país que por su parte defiende la lectura más literal y puritana del Islam. ISIL, que conquista territorio día a día en Irak y que lucha también contra Bashar Al Asad en Siria (de ahí que añadieran a su acrónimo la palabra «Levante»), es tan sangriento que incluso su antaño aliado Al Qaeda dejó de apoyarlo, al menos directamente.

Sería pues pecar de simplista relacionar directamente el gobierno de Arabia Saudí con el yihadismo de ISIL, que está tratando de tomar el poder en todo el territorio iraquí. Pero si a esta ecuación le añadimos que étnicamente los dirigentes saudíes y los guerrilleros de ISIL son sunitas, y enemigos seculares de la etnia chiíta que gobierna Irak desde la evacuación de las tropas americanas, las piezas comienzan a encajar algo más. Resumiendo mucho, los chiítas de todo oriente medio vienen siendo el pueblo pobre que se extiende alrededor de los pozos petrolíferos que están bajo dominio sunita, es decir propiedad de los emiratos y países como Arabia Saudí, Bahraín, etc. Y ante la radicalización de los yihadistas suníes, occidente es ahora proclive a apoyar la etnia chiíta, que gobierna en Irak. (more…)

How to invest when equities are highly variable and bonds are no longer fixed.

We are already seeing evidence of a new paradigm in the world of finance. The New Normal of which so much we have spoken at repeatedly It is here and it is here to stay. So we have a very uncertain outlook ahead of us. With an influence of central banks that has never been seen before and that distorts everything, but be careful: an intervention that tends to be reduced in the USA and increased in Europe.

Let's take it one step at a time. As far as equities are concerned, it should not escape anyone's notice that stock prices in the US and even in many Eurozone countries are expensive. It is true that the influence of exceptional measures by the respective central banks can keep company prices well above their fair value for a long time. And that this is a desire that every ruler usually embraces, as it improves, at least in appearance, the financial state of the population and its consequent consumption, optimism, voting, etc. But we should not forget that QE in the US is on its way to drying up and that rates are close to a rationalisation in the form of a rally. Therefore, the US stock market has anything but fundamental appeal. And the universal law of the market is implacable, so investments in expensive stocks relative to the fundamentals of these businesses will only lead to disappointment - permanent losses - in the medium to long term. (more…)

Peripheral bubble: The perfect storm.

Philippe Legrain is the author of several books, such as «Open World: The truth about globalisation«He has also been and is a very influential person in EU economic policy. Not for nothing has he been a senior advisor and head of the analyst team of the Bureau of European Policy Advisers for the President of the European Commission José Manuel Durao Barroso. And as such, has led the team that has directly advised the EU's strategic economic policy.

Well, from his privileged perspective, Legrain has recently published an article in the Financial Times entitled «.«Investors are ignoring eurozone risks«This is in line with our opinion, which we have reiterated in several articles about the mirage of bonanza that the markets are quoting with respect to the European peripheral economies: «...the European Union's peripheral economies are in a state of crisis.«Mátrix and the green shoots«, «The double standards of bubbles«and many others.

Below is a free translation and commentary of Legrain's article:

Peripheral bond yields are reaching bubble proportions. Markets awash with liquidity both camouflage and exacerbate long-term economic problems and insolvency. Investors and policymakers should have learned that lesson in the pre-crisis bubble years. Yet they have gone from hysterical panic to short-sighted complacency in less than two years. (more…)

The double standards of bubbles

We all shudder (or should shudder) when we contemplate the possibility that our money is invested in assets whose prices are at what is known as a «bubble», i.e. at levels far higher than their real intrinsic value, the result of unfounded speculation. Investing in bubbles is the mistake we all want to avoid at all costs, because if they burst, the losses will be irrecoverable or, at best, it will take decades to recover the value lost. Because, if the capacity of those assets to generate Value does not increase considerably, those prices at which we buy wildly will not occur again without the help of a new bubble on that same asset, which may never happen or take more years than our own investment life. Therefore, the losses we risk are permanent and not temporary. And the time it takes for our investments to recover from temporary price declines (which can occur in virtually any asset). is inversely proportional to the intrinsic value of those assets. Y is the big difference between investing well and investing badly.

(more…)

Confiscación única sobre la riqueza.

Hace casi un año que ya advertíamos que el consejo de sabios alemanes, que asesoran a la Cancillera Merkel, recomendaba a los gobernantes del sur de Europa confiscar una parte del valor de los inmuebles a los propietarios de la periferia de la UE para evitar la quiebra del Sistema financiero periférico. En aquel momento, ese organismo conocido como los «cinco sabios» argumentaba que cuando fuera necesario un rescate de los bancos o Estados del sur, se realizase de manera interna (bail-in), o sea con dinero de los propios ciudadanos residentes en los países en apuros. Y que confiscar una proporción del valor de los inmuebles era la manera más fácil, práctica y sencilla de obtener el dinero necesario para evitar la quiebra de Estados y sistema financiero periférico. Porque hacerlo al estilo chipriota, confiscando una parte de las cuentas bancarias, generaba una mayor alarma social, y además era más fácil para «las presas» evitar la confiscación transfiriendo el dinero fuera del país (com hicieron los chipriotas mejor asesorados). En cambio los inmuebles están cautivos, no se pueden transferir de la noche a la mañana a Luxemburgo, Suiza o Alemania, y a la vez está mejor visto robar confiscar a los propietarios de inmuebles -a los que se les supone un mayor patrimonio- que a los ahorradores/inversores que viven de alquiler. (more…)

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