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Cluster Family Office Blog

Realistic Coronavirus figures and the opportunities of an unfortunate crisis.

It is not a question of being tremendists but simply of having a minimum of critical sense in the face of the barbarities that media, politicians and other official agencies in many Western countries proclaim according to their own interests and/or ignorance. For example, the 2% coronavirus mortality figure that is being bandied about is simply not realistic. And to realise this you just need to know how to multiply and divide as well as to know the reality.

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Although it may come as a surprise to many, the Wikipedia (graph below) is one of the sources with the most up-to-date and up-to-date data on the progression of the pandemic. We will take for granted the figures officially published by China to see that the mortality rate is probably much higher than the 2% mentioned, because if we think that the real figures are even worse (what other reason would the Chinese authorities have to manipulate them), the situation and the outlook would be even more terrifying. In the daily updates of those infected by the new or novel coronavirus we see a significant slowdown in the last few days, with the percentage going from over 30% to 7.7% in the last 10 days.

The same is true for the number of deaths, whose increase is also seen to slow down from levels above 35% to the current 12%. Obviously the mortality of an epidemic should be calculated as the number of deaths relative to the total number of infected, and this is what those who claim that the mortality rate of the new coronavirus (2019-nCoV) is around 2% are miscalculating. But it should not escape anyone's attention that they are making a gross error in calculating deaths to date with those infected to date, since many of those infected counted today will, unfortunately, die in the next few days. In other words, the mortality rate should be calculated when the epidemic has already passed, because if we do so during the (current) expansion period, we will be assuming that none of those currently alive will die. Such a basic error can hardly be attributed to the ignorance of those who use the 2% mortality rate as an argument for the inhabitants of the planet to remain unconcerned and live a normal life. The death toll today already exceeds the death toll from SARS. This epidemic only infected 8,000 people in 9 months, while in China alone there are already more than 37,000 officially infected in barely 2 months, and with a real mortality rate that we will now try to guess.

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It is obviously very difficult to guess how many of those infected today will die in the next few days, and even more difficult to guess how many days they will survive. But just thinking that a fifth of the seriously ill (with altered vitals, i.e. really very sick), who currently account for almost 17% of those infected today, may end up dying in the next 4 days, let's say, and adding those who have already died, the calculation of the mortality rate shoots up to levels above 4%. And that is not counting the fact that none of those infected during the next 4 days will die in the following 4 days... We are therefore facing a pandemic whose mortality rate can only be calculated in retrospect, but which all indications are that it will probably double the 2% proclaimed by most of the media. Remember that the death rate from influenza is much lower than 1%, there is a relatively effective vaccine, and yet it still causes hundreds of thousands of deaths each year worldwide. If we add to this realistic mortality rate of this new coronavirus the chilling ease of contagion it is demonstrating and the fact that the vaccine has yet to arrive, the explosive cocktail is served. Moreover, imagine how this infection will behave in societies adjacent to China such as, for example Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc., with 1.5 billion inhabitants whose hygiene, sanitation and epidemiological control systems are far more precarious than those of today's China. There, the proliferation of the virus cannot be controlled, as it is happening in China according to the official figures of the last few days, but only an accessible and timely medication or vaccine would prevent extravagant mortality.

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It is worth reading the very interesting analysis by Tyler Durden on Zerohedge, The report rightly points out that in a country like the US itself, the situation could also become very complicated due to the high cost of the health system for the population that cannot afford good private insurance. This would lead the infected Americans to avoid using health services, with the consequent lack of control of the epidemic, despite being one of the societies with the highest per capita income on the planet. Moreover, in most Western democracies, governments would be far more reluctant than the Chinese government to harm their domestic economies to try to control the epidemic. By definition and unfortunately, most Western democracies would be more concerned about bowing to their lobbies and taking populist measures that would not jeopardise their re-election, the economy, or their partisan interests, than they would be about ordering courageous but unpopular measures. We see daily examples of health ministers and mayors downplaying the risks and calling for business as usual so that nothing disturbs the fragile economic balance in southern Europe. Without going any further, it is shameful that it is the companies themselves who have to suspend their participation in the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, while the local authorities continue to insist on convincing them not to cancel their reservations for hotels, restaurants, chauffeurs and other unmentionable expenses.

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That said, we should obviously not pin our hopes on controlling the pandemic globally, but on effective treatments and subsequent vaccines that can be made available to the world's population in the coming weeks. Because if we do not have those drugs for several months, the pandemic could reach our own neighbourhoods and claim millions of victims, especially in Asia. But it is not enough to discover an effective drug or vaccine; we must also be able to produce it on a mass scale and at a cost that is affordable for the vast majority of the world's population and/or states.

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Health sector companies such as Inovio, China, a leader in research into viruses such as Ebola, MERS and Zika, is already testing potential vaccines for 2019-nCoV in animals. And probably the criticised «shortcuts» in international clinical trial protocols that China is surely taking will accelerate the achievement of an effective treatment that will save millions of lives around the world. Because given the extremely high rate of spread and mortality of this coronavirus, time is more than gold, it is Life.

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But how is this pandemic affecting the global economy? Well, we are just seeing the tip of the iceberg of the destructive effects on economic growth. Obviously the first on the list to be affected is China's economy. But the cascading effect can be devastating because of the interconnectedness between Chinese products and those of the rest of the world. Just look at the Chinese components (often internal and invisible parts) around you, and think that they are already materially temporarily no longer being produced.

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That word, the temporality, is the key to turning an unfortunate global health crisis into an opportunity. Because even if the treatment or vaccine arrives in time to prevent the global epidemic, the crisis in China is already an inevitable fact. But the fact that a large part of the country has already collapsed, with businesses closed, transport blocked and people locked in their homes, does not mean that this situation cannot be reversed in the coming quarters, but precisely means that China's resurgence is closer. Because, unlike other crises such as a trade war, an economic embargo, a military war or any other geopolitical conflict, this epidemic is not a crisis that can be reversed in the coming quarters. has an expiry date. This is not only because the infection will generate a natural peak and will eventually control itself, but also because any vaccination or medication will drastically shorten this period and the mortality it entails, minimising its effects and invigorating recovery.

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Assuming that such medication or vaccine arrives in time to prevent a pandemic severely affecting Europe and America, what will be the post-epidemic scenario in Asia? Natural epidemiological timing indicates that a return to normalcy in China may come much sooner than in its neighbours. Moreover, China has far more resources, discipline and health structure to effectively medicate its population when the time comes. The Chinese state's strong political will and economic capacity to recover its economy through financial stimulus, which may even dwarf the QE carried out by Western central banks, will also be decisive. We should therefore expect a massive post-epidemic response from Xi Jinping's government. No effort will be spared to help the Chinese economy make up for lost time, which, let us remember, will not last more than a couple of quarters, given that the treatments (Chinese or Western) will not take long to appear and will be available to whoever pays for them. It is therefore foreseeable that during the second half of 2020 (or even earlier) the recovery of the Chinese economy will be underway, and it will be a matter of state and national pride to return to the path of dominance of the world economy to which the Chinese seem to be destined. Moreover, the trade war with the US has not spilled blood into the river, as we have already predicted almost a year ago, so there is even less reason for pessimism about China's economic recovery.

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Therefore, in addition to preparing ourselves and our environment for the worst-case scenario of the pandemic (remember that the more than likely current mortality rate is much higher than 2% as we have seen), we would do well to position our investments to take the best advantage of this textbook black swan called the coronavirus. We should therefore take advantage of possible falls in the Asian markets - especially the sector healthcare Chinese- to buy shares in companies that will rise from the ashes of this epidemic with a strength and pride that we are unlikely to see in the West. Significantly, however, share price falls to date have been surprisingly modest, perhaps in anticipation of such a stunning economic recovery, or perhaps the result of Mr. Market's chronic schizophrenia, who knows.

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We have long seen Asia's growing economies as the only robust economic growth niche on the planet, and so we are now looking to Asia's growing economies as the world's only economic growth niche. we have said it repeatedly. Only there are the two indispensable factors for economic growth: high productivity; and a demography with a majority of productive young people and a minority of extractive retirees. It is no coincidence that a good number of funds in which we invest are managed in Asia and by local managers. That is why this unfortunate black swan comes, like all of them, accompanied by an opportunity that is rare in the course of an investment life. For the moment the Asian markets seem oblivious to the blockade in the making, and if the pharmacological solution arrives before the stock markets fall, so much the better. But if we see significant price declines in the coming weeks, it will certainly be an opportunity to buy and overweight Asian companies, especially in China, with huge potential in the coming semesters and years.

 

Paula Leyes, the young Spaniard admitted to the best universities in the world.

Paula Leyes obtuvo un 10 en Bachillerato y estudia un doble grado de Matemáticas e Informática en la Universidad de Harvard. Tiene 18 años y es una de los cuatro alumnos españoles que se han matriculado en Harvard este curso. Todo un récord, ya que jamás antes tantos españoles habían accedido iniciar sus carreras en esta prestigiosa universidad estadounidense, que cada año admite solo a unos 1.6oo nuevos estudiantes de todo el mundo. Sólo un 4% de los candidatos acaban siendo admitidos, y creedme si os digo que el 96% restante también son estudiantes excelentes y fuera de serie, la mayoría de los cuales obtienen también la nota máxima durante el rigurosísimo proceso de selección. Pero además, a Paula, nada menos que otras 14 universidades prestigiosísimas de Estados Unidos también le han ofrecido sus respectivas cartas de admisión, entre ellas Stanford, Princeton, Columbia y Georgetown.
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Paula es evidentemente un caso de éxito excepcional pero ¿significa esto que solamente los chicos y chicas con notas excelentes y/o con mucho dinero pueden ir a estudiar a universidades norteamericanas? NO, en absoluto. Tan solo un escalón por debajo de esas universidades elitistas existe un abanico de centenares de universidades magníficas donde cualquier alumno con promedios de 6, 7 u 8 y un presupuesto razonable puede acceder, si así lo quiere realmente y dispone del asesoramiento adecuado para estudiar en los Estados Unidos.
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Por tanto, ya tenemos a nuestros hijos aclimatados, integrados y motivados para querer estudiar sus carreras universitarias en los EE.UU. Ahora es el momento de hacerse la pregunta del millón:

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The Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression, a century later.

Financial analyst and writer John Mauldin has christened the beginning of 2020 as the decade in which we will live dangerously. In this article we will translate and comment on the arguments and analyses published by this author under the same title. Readers will be able to see the coincidence in some aspects with respect to what we have been saying in the past. publishing on this blog for more than 4 years.

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Hyman Minsky taught us that stability, perhaps because of the abuse we tend to make of it, sooner or later leads to instability. But that abuse is as unconscious as it is harmful, and we humans like to dabble in concepts like «reasonable», «manageable», «conservative» or «prudent». That's why we feel safe seeking more and more performance until we go too far to avoid disaster.

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To think that somehow central banks are capable of eliminating recessions and risk is crazy, despite the fact that most investors fall into this trap time and again. Yes, it is true that, as we have said many times before, with infinite liquidity no one is insolvent and therefore their debt is virtually devoid of default risk. But at some point gravity will do its work again and the insolvent will collapse as God -or the elementary fundamentals of economics- commands.

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Debt seems harmless at first. And with sufficient cash flow, capital repayments are not a problem, let alone ridiculous interest rates. Besides, debt will be used wisely and profitably to increase growth, won't it? Well, it won't, because human nature always leads us to denaturalise goodness, and lenders will insist ad nauseam that we get into debt far beyond what is necessary for economic growth, and we start getting into debt simply to consume today what we should be consuming tomorrow. So the goodness of indebtedness is corrupted along the way.

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Personal debt, though often excessive, is not the most serious problem. Corporate and public debt are the main challenge for which Mauldin predicts a dangerous decade ahead. And let us not forget that all this public and corporate debt ends up as personal debt, since most of us are after all taxpayers, shareholders or both.

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The calm on the markets, however, may last a few more years (2020, 2021, 2022, 2023...). But beneath the surface of the central banks' cheerful free bar, the pressure is increasing every year. Slowly, almost imperceptibly, but at some point it will explode.

Ben Hunt, a personal friend of Mauldin's, has developed the concept of the «The Long Now«. Something like an endless today that swallows up the income of the future. Or as Hunt defines it: «Everything we bring to the present of our future and that of our children».». The Long Now is the realisation of the stark reality of Fiat money or fiat money, without anchorage to any tangible and finite value. In other words, trust in an abused and uncontrolled system is what makes us choose bread for today. And that system is the one that tells us that inflation is virtually zero, that wealth inequality, low productivity and negative savings rates are just a circumstantial fact of life. We are also told that we must vote for ridiculous candidates to be a good and politically moderate citizen, that we must buy ridiculous funds and stocks to be a good investor, or that we must take ridiculously unpayable loans to be a good parent or child.

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Debt is future consumption brought into the present. But to pay that money back we or our heirs will have to consume less in the future, unless our economy grows sufficiently. And that is the problem, that today's debt is not being used to gain growth but we live in a world where the economy is driven by consumption. Furthermore, Ben Hunt observes that society tends to procrastinate in solving problems. We tend, with surprising skill, to postpone the inevitable (rather than avoid it indefinitely). And when it comes to over-indebtedness, it is also a three-way game, as neither debtors, creditors nor regulators are in the mood to end the game. It is in the interest of none of them to recognise that the debt is a dead letter and unpayable and to write off the losses on their balance sheets. The traumatic consequences of recognising insolvency and the resulting bankruptcies.

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A game of Monopoly would never end if the bank refinances the debts of the players infinitely.. The million-dollar question is, as a spectator of this distorted game of Monopoly, to which player should we lend our money in exchange for reasonable returns? To the players who owe astronomical amounts to the banks, but who nevertheless continue to play and play? Or to the few players who owe nothing and are meritoriously sustaining themselves in the game by their own means? An infinite game would make no sense at all and would call into question the very market system we have known since the beginning of civilisations. Therefore, at some point not necessarily far away, the game will end and there will have to be losers. Many of them.

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That said, Mauldin predicts that we will be comfortable and relatively safe along the way. That at any given moment, analysts will look at the data and think we have avoided the worst. We will have some passing recessions and some financial crises, but they will seem «manageable» when we get into them. And we will indeed come out of them. But what we will not see is the magnitude of the expansion that the system will need to continue to finance our debt, which will continue to grow and grow throughout this Long Now. So the debt burden will become heavier, and there will come a time when it will be unsustainable even for this trust-based system of infinite money.. Then the fan will blow more than just air in everyone's face.

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Mauldin defined the inevitable process in 3 phases: An initial seemingly manageable instability, perhaps initially caused by high yield debt, but easily contagious to other parts of the system that are also unstable. Secondly, a drying up of liquidity that will force banks to reduce lending, thereby reducing the capital available to productive businesses and thus reducing economic growth, leading to recession. This second episode may be recurrent, with drying up of funding and intermittent renewed flows based on emergency measures by central banks, but increasingly unmanageable. And finally, a third phase of global political instability, where artificial intelligence - among other factors - will make a lot of intermediate jobs redundant. The shrinking voter will vote for governments that promise to maintain a welfare state that provides for his or her needs and comfort as in past decades, and those governments will of course raise taxes (remember that infinite liquidity dried up in phase two) to the point of economic suffocation, deepening the recession. Mauldin does not expect to see the start of this process until the second half of the new 20s.

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Perhaps the whim of fate is leading us into another decade of the Roaring Twenties like 100 years ago. But a new Great Depression will hardly be mitigated by central banks with depleted ammunition.

Why don't large international investors invest in the same funds as you?

In the EU more and more alternative investment fund managers are becoming more and more -are governed by the AIFMD (Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive). The alternative investment nomenclature includes all European investment vehicles that do not meet the requirements to be considered UCITS (Undertakings for Collectible Investment in Transferable Securities). If, in addition to being non-UCITS, their managers comply with the above-mentioned directive, they will be considered AIFMD funds. UCITS funds are those usually sold by Spanish banks to their retail and private banking clients. However, it should not escape anyone's attention that on the other hand alternative investment funds are the funds of choice for major investors worldwide. In other words, although for the vast majority of Spanish retail and private banking investors their investment universe is limited to the 10,000 or so UCITS funds marketed by banks in Spain, for professional investors and the world's wealthiest individuals, alternative investment funds and hedge funds make up the vast majority of their portfolios. In other words, most of the world's best funds in history (some even closed to new investors as they do not accept any more money) are not UCITS and are not marketed in Spain, but alternative management funds, which can be invested in jurisdictions that are much less restrictive than Spain.

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Let us remember that there are more than 100,000 investment funds in the world. And the million-dollar question is, how can a Spanish retail investor access this universe of 90,000 non-UCITS funds that are not marketed in Spain? The answer is not so simple, as it is not enough to open an account in a bank abroad. There are additional difficulties The most common problems encountered by the ordinary Spanish investor, such as taxation, which is linked to the jurisdiction where the fund is domiciled, are as follows. As we will see below, funds do not necessarily have to be domiciled in the same country as the management company. Most of the world's alternative investment management companies, domiciled in the USA, Asia, etc., have their headquarters in the same country as the fund management company. have local funds for investors in their own country, but they also have replicas of these funds in offshore jurisdictions for large international investors.

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The reason why fund managers create these mirror funds or feeder funds for international investors in offshore jurisdictions, where taxation for the investor is zero, is not so much so that they do not pay taxes, but so that they are not harmed by the taxation of the country where the fund manager is located in addition to their own taxation. In other words, if they invest directly in local funds, they would be subject to double taxation: That of the country of origin of the fund manager and that of their own country where the investors reside. It is true that in some cases such double taxation could be fully or partially recovered if there is a treaty between the two countries to avoid it, but not in all cases. Moreover, even in those cases where such treaties would be beneficial, it is still an inconvenience that adds to the investor's fiscal discomfort and uncertainty.

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This is why large international investors often use offshore and non-EU mirror funds, mirror funds or feeder funds domiciled offshore and in non-EU countries. OECD to invest in funds from American, Asian, etc. fund managers. In this way a Spanish investor who invests in a US hedge fund, for example, should not be taxed in both the USA and Spain, but only in Spain, without the need to resort to bilateral treaties to avoid double taxation.. The problem is that Spanish taxation penalises investors resident in Spain who invest in funds domiciled in these offshore countries, where the aforementioned replicas aimed at international investors are usually located (we will explain later how this penalty can be avoided).

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Let us look at an example of a benchmark fund manager with the aforementioned duplicity of funds, aimed at investors according to their country of origin: The manager of the legendary fund Medallion (already closed to new investors since 1993) is the prestigious Renaissance, of which we have already we spoke at length and explained our visit to their bunker in this article. Well, this fund manager, like so many other world leaders in management, has funds for domestic institutional investors (US-investor), domiciled in the USA; and funds domiciled in Bermuda for foreign investors (non-US investors). As we have already said, the distinction is made so that the international investor does not suffer the taxation of the funds domiciled in the USA and so that they only have the effects of the taxation of the respective countries where each investor resides.

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However, there are also other reasons for fund managers to domicile their funds for large international investors in non-OECD/offshore jurisdictions. In addition to avoiding double taxation for the international investor and saving taxes for the fund manager itself, those jurisdictions do not entail any restrictions in terms of trading platforms or geopolitical vetoes when it comes to underwriting funds. For example, most international investors would find it very difficult to subscribe to funds in countries such as China, Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Russia, etc. In some cases because of political/economic sanctions imposed by certain countries, and in others simply because the markets are still technically, politically and/or regulatory unwilling to allow international money into their domestic funds.

 

The fact is that, whether by hook or by crook, large international investors use these channels created ad hoc for them. And either they are not penalised fiscally by their respective countries if they invest in these jurisdictions, or they have investment vehicles and structures that legally exempt them from these penalties. The loser, as always, is the ordinary Spanish investor, who is condemned to invest in the UCITS environment and the few retail hedge funds domiciled in Spain, in short, condemned to the fish that our banking system sells them.

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It is true that some American or Asian fund managers, eager to attract retail funds from the European market, set up their own UCITS vehicles in Ireland or Luxembourg and register them for marketing in various EU countries. But unfortunately they are often not the brightest but the most voracious.. And they do not seem to mind giving up much of their alternative know-how and assuming the restrictions on portfolio concentration, liquidity, restriction of hedging and/or restriction of operational freedom in general that the UCITS label entails, in exchange for inflows of money from small European investors. The result is that these UCITS funds are very different from the original ones and with much lower returns.

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Therefore, we are going to focus on the solutions so that a smaller Spanish investor can access the best American and Asian hedge funds on the planet without suffering, on the one hand, double taxation for investing in their funds aimed at local investors, and on the other hand, the tax penalty for investing in their feeders or offshore mirror funds aimed at international investors. There are two absolutely legal and transparent ways of doing this:

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  1. By having a european investment vehicle, within which these funds can be subscribed for foreign investors (we explain this in The advantages of investing from Luxembourg).
  2. Investing through a AIFMD fund of funds which in turn contains those offshore funds (we explain in Funds that make inaccessible funds accessible).

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This second option solves in one fell swoop the 3 problems encountered by the ordinary Spanish investor:

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First of all, the first insurmountable problem for most investors is the minimum investment requirement. And the fact is that The best funds in the world often lack retail classes and require prohibitive minimums of $500,000, $1 million or even $5 or $10 million or euro equivalent. Moreover, without going any further, funds such as those of the aforementioned Renaissance not only require a minimum investment of 5 million, but they also select the institutional investors they like the most, and can be rejected even if they exceed this minimum investment (Cluster Family Office had to pass this filter to be approved as investors in Renaissance, considered the best fund manager in the world for several decades). Well, these AIFMD funds of funds that contain large institutional funds 125,000 minimums are usually as low as 125,000 eur.

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Secondly, it avoids the tax penalty that offshore investments suffer from, as explained above, as they are funds domiciled in Luxembourg and under the AIFMD label. Therefore, Spanish regulation and legislation considers their capital gains to be as deferrable over time as those of any Banco Santander or La Caixa fund.

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And thirdly, by investing in them from accounts in Luxembourg banks, it avoids the restrictive reading of the Spanish regulator to qualify as a professional investor, This makes it de facto impossible for ordinary investors to subscribe to these funds from Spain. These Luxembourg funds are marketed exclusively to well-informed investors (or qualified or professional investors, depending on the nomenclature of each jurisdiction). In other words, a Spanish retail investor cannot invest in them from a bank in Spain, as alternative management is considered a complex product, even though it bears the European AIFMD stamp. Therefore, according to Spanish regulations, these AIFMD funds can only be marketed in Spain for professional investors, which implies very restrictive requirements that are impossible for ordinary investors to comply with. Moreover, the only way for a retail investor to explicitly request to renounce his status and be allowed to invest in these funds from Spain as a professional is to comply with the following requirements at least two of the following requirements according to Spanish regulations:

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  • That the client has undertaken transactions of significant size in the relevant market in the financial instrument in question or similar financial instruments, with an average frequency of 10 per quarter over the previous four quarters.
  • The size of the customer's portfolio of financial instruments, consisting of cash deposits and financial instruments, exceeds EUR 500,000.
  • The customer holds or has held for at least one year a professional position in the financial sector that requires knowledge of the operations or services envisaged.

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It should also be noted that it is the Spanish marketer or bank itself that must check and demonstrate to the regulator that these requirements are met, and that it will obviously prefer to sell this client its usual catalogue of own and external retail funds with its juicy implicit or explicit fees, rather than consider him eligible to buy alternative funds that are outside its marketing agreements. It is obviously de facto impossible for most Spanish investors to access such funds from accounts in Spain.

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By contrast, Luxembourg's regulation is much less restrictive and much more friendly with alternative investment funds for junior investors, as it is sufficient to be considered as a «well-informed» investor. The regulation reads as follows:

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To qualify as a «well informed» investor you must be either:

  • An Institutional Investor
  • A Professional Investor
  • Any other investor who has confirmed in writing that they adhere to the status of a «well informed» investor and who:
    • Either invests a minimum of EURO 125,000 in the specialised investment fund;
    • Or who has an appraisal from an EU bank, an investment firm or a management company certifying that they have the appropriate expertise, experience and knowledge to adequately understand the investment made in the fund.

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In other words, that 125,000 is sufficient for any investor to apply to be considered as an investor in Luxembourg. well-informed and therefore eligible to invest in an AIFMD fund. It is therefore advisable to open accounts with Luxembourg banks in order to be able to invest in these funds. Another thing is that banks require a minimum amount to open accounts for new clients, which is unfortunately often the case. That is why it is also essential to work with a professional who has a sufficient number of clients with these banks, i.e. who has influence on them to persuade them to accept new clients with accounts as small as 125,000 euros.

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In short, thanks to Luxembourg's less restrictive legislation, any Spanish investor with a minimum of 125,000 euros can invest in a completely legal and transparent manner in AIFMD alternative funds that contain the best alternative funds and hedge funds in the world, despite having very high minimums and being domiciled in jurisdictions only suitable for large institutional investors with complex investment structures and vehicles.

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The drawback obviously is that a fund of funds is commission on commission. It is therefore necessary to look very carefully at the historical NET returns obtained by the fund, and whether or not these are clearly higher than those obtained by each individual in their UCITS investment portfolio and Spanish banking universe..

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In the tables above you will see the historical performance of 3 world-renowned hedge funds - which some of you may recognise - with minimum investment levels of half a million, one million and 5 million. And finally, below these lines, the performance of a Luxembourg fund of funds AIFMD, therefore accessible to any investor. well-informed with an account in Luxembourg from $125,000, containing a dozen international funds (including the 3 above) plus a few listed stocks (Berkshire Hathaway...), so that you can compare it over the long term with your own portfolios.

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And finally, for those who still think that the limitations of the UCITS environment are worth it because of the possibility of investing only in transferable funds, here is an article entitled «Is it worth holding on to an upgradeable investment in exchange for further deferring accumulated capital gains?«. The results of the calculations you will find in that article are devastating, as just by improving the return by 0.21% per annum, the benefits of 20 years of capital gains deferral are outweighed by the average return of the last quarter of a century. More importantly, once the sold portfolio has been taxed, in addition to being free to invest at a higher yield in any hedge fund in the world, you can also defer taxation forever, either with your own investment vehicle or through a fund of funds AIFMD, as explained in points 1 and 2 above.

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Having said all this, for those who do not have that €125,000/$ minimum, there are honourable exceptions in the limited and mediocre UCITS environment. World-renowned Spanish value managers such as AZ Valor, Magallanes or Paramés himself (although his COBAS has yet to make headway) may be the best way to invest a small portfolio in an easy and simple way.

The Paradox of Active Management.

Following on from our article entitled «The shortcomings and dirty secrets of ETFs and index funds«, in which we explained that not all that glitters is gold when it comes to passive management – which is so fashionable these days – we’re going to summarise and discuss the an interesting study carried out by Alexey Panchekha, CFA, on the blog CFA Institute’s Enterprising Investor. In this study, this specialist and researcher in mathematical applications for risk management – who has worked for Goldman Sachs and Bloomberg, amongst others – explains what he has termed the The Active Manager’s Paradox. Let’s see what he is referring to and how the findings of his study might be useful to the average investor.

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The million-dollar question is: Is the reason why active management has lost ground to passive management over the last decade down to the high fees they charge, the fund managers’ lack of skill, or some other factor?

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What is needed to answer this question rigorously is not a thoughtless, speculative or emotionally charged response from fans of one management style or another. That is why this study is based on facts regarding the decisions made by active fund managers. As the saying goes, you can hardly manage what you cannot measure.

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Panchekha has analysed how active managers generate alpha with their selection of companies. They have carried out a multi-year study covering 114 US investment funds belonging to 57 different fund families, and have evaluated more than 400,000 one-year periods of returns (details of the methodology used in the study can be found at the end of this article). Taken together, the study’s sample represents 2 trillion (US trillions) in assets under management.

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The key lies in the managers’ level of conviction. In other words, the level of certainty that fund managers have regarding each sub-group of companies in their portfolios. To determine this, the study distinguishes between overweight and underweight positions rather than simply the absolute volume, which could be distorted by the mandatory weightings in their respective benchmarks. The study therefore distinguishes between three types of shares in portfolios:

  1. Those with a higher weighting or where there is greater conviction
  2. Those that are underweighted or where conviction is lower
  3. The neutrals

The components of these three categories are identified by measuring their portfolios and weightings on a daily basis, with each group being rebalanced every 14 days. The data was obtained from the Hercules database, provided by Turing Technology Associates. The results, shown in the chart below, illustrate the success rate of each category compared with its respective benchmark indices over successive one-year periods, as well as the annual alphas achieved during those periods.


The Impact of High-Conviction Overweights, Excluding Fees


The Impact of High-Conviction Overweights, Net of 85 basis points’ Fees


As can be clearly seen, overweight or high-conviction positions – comprising the fund managers’ best ideas – are the only category that actually generates alpha in excess of the indices. In 84% of cases when looking at gross returns, and in 74% of them when considering net returns with an average of 85 basis points in fees paid. By comparison, both underweight (lower-conviction) and neutral positions generated a gross success rate of 50% (pure beta), which would fall below that threshold after paying those same fees.

Warren Buffett, Letter to Shareholders, 1966.

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High-conviction overweight positions – that is, those in which fund managers have the greatest confidence and certainty – are the only parts of their portfolios that generate returns in excess of their benchmark indices. Therein lies the paradox: although active fund managers demonstrate an ability to outperform the indices when selecting their preferred shares, they lose that ability when designing the rest of their portfolios in their eagerness to round them off, diversify them, balance them or reduce their «risk», once again confusing risk with volatility. In some cases, it is a lack of courage, a lack of conviction, or simply that many of them have their hands tied by the ratios and indices which, according to their prospectuses, they are required to follow in a certain way. The reason doesn’t matter. What the study shows is that only overweight holdings and those with high conviction manage to outperform the market. Any other asset allocation will reduce returns.

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But that’s not all. Furthermore, according to the study, the average fund manager self-sabotages their returns by reducing their high-conviction positions to a meagre 55% of their portfolios. The corresponding allocation to underweight and neutral assets, accounting for almost half of their portfolios, therefore amounts to a beta ballast unbeatable. To illustrate this, Panchekha gives an example from American football, but the equivalent here would be as if the Barça manager only fielded Messi for 55% of the 90 minutes of play.

Of course, there is a reason why fund managers choose to carry this beta burden. For example, adding a market-neutral component reduces the fund’s tracking error relative to its benchmark – something that is surprisingly valued by the sector and some investors. It also reduces the likelihood that the fund’s performance will be exposed to the competition, which is out to poach clients from one another. But in any case, the study shows that all these «risk management» measures – which are of such concern to the industry and to poorly advised investors – inevitably come at the expense of returns, and are acts of cowardice or, at best, of insecurity.

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The result of this combination of a lack of conviction (in the quality of their analysis) on the part of active fund managers, their lack of courage to set themselves apart from other fund managers, and the regulatory and corporate constraints they face, leads them to manage «risk» in a way that is – paradoxically – risky which causes them to lose everything they have gained and more. The following graph illustrates the harsh reality, Most active fund managers do not deserve the fees that investors pay them to outperform the market, since almost half of their portfolios fail to do so, and the costs do the rest. The problem is that the statistics do not distinguish between diversified and concentrated portfolios. In other words, portfolios in which 90 or 100% of the shares are high-conviction picks, compared with portfolios where, according to the statistics, only 55% of the shares are high-conviction picks.

 


Actively Managed Large-Cap Mixed-Asset Mutual Funds vs. the S&P 500


Whilst it is common practice in the financial industry to blame high fees for the poor performance of most actively managed funds, Panchekha’s study reveals that fees are only a secondary factor. In other words, Diluting the sole source of alpha in portfolios to levels of 55% has a far more devastating effect on returns than the fees paid. Returning to the football analogy, whilst Barça fans are blaming the team’s mediocre form on the exorbitant bonuses the manager receives (or on the condition of the pitches, or the weather, or injuries, or the referees, etc.), they should instead be criticising him for systematically leaving Messi on the bench for almost half of the matches. Panchekha states, and I quote:

«Whilst it is standard practice in the industry to attribute these outcomes to higher fees, our research suggests that fees are only a secondary factor. Diluting the sole source of stock-selection alpha to a minority component of a portfolio has a far greater structural impact than higher fees.»

The now legendary underperformance of most actively managed investment funds relative to their benchmark indices has led US investors to withdraw $1.3 trillion (US trillions) from these funds and invest it in the growing passive fund and ETF sector, according to data from Morningstar.

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The study presents averages and samples of funds without distinguishing between concentrated and diversified portfolio managers. If we separate the wheat from the chaff, that is to say, if we select managers of small portfolios, composed entirely of shares in which they have a very high degree of certainty and conviction, we will find a great deal of alpha and very little drawdown, despite their fees which, as we mentioned in the previous article, tend to be quite high. The NET returns of these star-manager funds, with boldly concentrated portfolios and an in-depth understanding of the businesses in which they invest, clearly and consistently outperform their respective benchmark indices over time, regardless of their TER. Or does any Berkshire Hathaway shareholder really care about Buffett’s salary or that of any of its current executives? And if, at any point, the returns on that holding company were to decline alarmingly, shareholders should be looking more closely at whether its management is beginning to compromise the quality of the holding company – for the first time in decades – rather than at whether Buffett or his successors are receiving high or low salaries.

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For the sceptics and others groupies When it comes to passive funds and ETFs, the study carried out by Panchekha should be the litmus test: The main reason for the mediocrity of active fund managers is their limited ability and/or lack of courage to concentrate their portfolios 100% on their «best ideas» or high-conviction companies. And this is, after all, an open secret that the world’s best value investors have always proclaimed: Why would you invest in your twentieth-best idea when you can invest in your first, second and third? The only answer is a lack of conviction, a fear of making a mistake, or corporate or regulatory obligations. High management fees are merely the final nail in the coffin for portfolios that are overly diversified and lack conviction and quality. How else could one explain the fact that active funds with the best NET returns on the planet (many of which are already closed to new investors) have fees significantly higher than the average of 85 basis points cited in the study? Let’s look at some examples of spectacular alphas in terms of NET returns in US dollars over the last few decades, the first against the MSCI China Index, the second against the Russian RTS Index and the third against the S&P 500 itself:

Finding funds that overcome the Active Manager’s Paradox is key for investors. But it is also crucial for the active fund industry that more and more managers overcome their fear of standing out from their competitors, that they overcome the self-imposed limitations in their prospectuses, and that they stop viewing concentration and volatility as risk factors. The real risk faced by most active managers who are content merely with not being the worst in their class is that they will eventually become extinct. And their extinction, whilst well-deserved, will increasingly favour the growth of index funds with portfolios that select companies in a far simpler and more superficial manner. Passive funds that behave as if a flat buyer were to decide to go to the solicitor simply by taking a few superficial ratios into account, without fully understanding the property’s condition, its energy efficiency, its building specifications or the neighbourhood, to give just a few examples. Obviously, it is better to buy a flat by taking a few superficial ratios into account than simply buying on a friend’s recommendation or at random, of course. But that is not the way in which our investments will perform adequately in the long term.

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In short, the good news is that active fund managers as a whole create value. The bad news is that the vast majority of them lose it before it reaches their investors. Investors therefore have two options: To do sufficient research to be able to identify the fund managers with the greatest conviction and concentration in their portfolios; or simply to blame the mediocre performance of active fund managers on the fees paid, and throw themselves into the arms of even more diversified portfolios with less conviction but with low-cost fees. For those who choose to select the active funds they feel most strongly about for their portfolios, it is almost essential that expand their investment universe to include 100% of the world’s existing funds and don’t just settle for the 10% model sold in Spain.

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Below are the details of the study’s methodology:

 


Research Design and Methodology

This analysis is based on a proprietary database of daily fund positions and portfolio weights compiled and maintained by Turing Technology Associates Inc. The specific funds included in the research dataset comprise 114 unique US equity mutual funds, from 57 fund families, representing $1.996 trillion in assets under management (AUM).

Fund Selection Process

The funds selected for use in the research were drawn from the set of mutual funds included within a series of investment portfolios known as Ensemble Active Management (EAM) Portfolios. Turing licences a series of proprietary technologies to clients to support their creation of such EAM Portfolios. Each EAM Portfolio is typically constructed from a set of 10 to 15 underlying mutual funds with a corresponding industry benchmark. As of early August 2019, Turing had 24 client-designed EAM Portfolios in live production.

All 114 funds used in the study were selected by Turing’s clients or prospective clients in connection with the design of an EAM portfolio. As Turing’s clients selected the underlying funds and the corresponding benchmark, the fund selection process remained independent of the researchers.

Each pair of a fund and a benchmark is the subject of the analysis. The benchmarks included the S&P 500, Russell 1000, Russell 2000, Russell 1000 Value and Russell 1000 Growth. The time periods used were either January 2014 to July 2019, or January 2016 to July 2019, depending on the data available.

Source of Daily Fund Positions

To access daily fund holdings, Turing applied its proprietary fund-replication technology known as the Hercules System. Hercules is a machine learning-based platform that processes a vast amount of publicly available data, with the core concepts behind the approach having been in use and under development for more than a decade. Hercules is not a regression-based approach. Daily estimated positions are generated by the Hercules System, with the out-of-sample portfolios rebalanced every 14 days. 

For reference, the Hercules estimates of fund holdings and weights for the funds used in this study typically generated a tracking error of less than 1%, and a correlation with actual fund returns of more than 99.7%.

Isolating the Manager’s Conviction

The aim of this research was to analyse the impact of manager's conviction in security selection, and so we incorporated two key design elements into the study. Firstly, securities were categorised and evaluated on the basis of their portfolio weights relative to the benchmark. Rather than focusing on actual portfolio weights – which are heavily influenced by benchmark weights – the emphasis was placed on a manager’s decisions to overweight or underweight securities and the scale of those overweight or underweight positions. Second, we divided each fund into multiple, non-overlapping sub-portfolios determined by the level of manager conviction involved, and evaluated their performance separately. Each sub-portfolio was rebalanced every 14 days and treated as a distinct model portfolio. The three sub-portfolios analysed were:

  • High-Conviction Overweights: A sub-portfolio comprising the fund’s largest overweight positions in equities. The sub-portfolio was selected to cumulatively represent 80% of the portfolio’s aggregate overweight positions relative to the benchmark.
  • Underweights: A sub-portfolio comprising the fund’s largest underweight positions in shares. The sub-portfolio was selected to cumulatively represent 80% of the portfolio’s aggregate underweights relative to the benchmark.
  • Neutral Weights: A sub-portfolio comprising overweight securities that are not included in the Overweight sub-portfolio and underweight positions that are not included in the Underweight sub-portfolio.

All sub-portfolios reflect distinct choices made by a fund manager. The dynamic portfolio weights for each sub-portfolio are proportional to the original fund weights, normalised to 100%. Securities not included in the benchmark were excluded as they cannot be properly assessed against a benchmark. All performance data was calculated both gross of any fees and after factoring in a hypothetical 85 bps fee. Neither result reflected transaction costs.

The performance data presented consists of rolling one-year data (daily intervals), which was analysed to determine the percentage of rolling periods in which each sub-portfolio outperformed the corresponding benchmark (Success Rate), and the average excess (or negative) relative return.

A sub-portfolio comprising securities included in the benchmark but not held by the mutual fund (i.e., zero weights) was constructed and analysed. This fourth subgroup was not included in the research results because the only way to capture any potential alpha would be through a 100% short portfolio, which is not permitted in a traditional mutual fund. For reference, the Zero Weight portfolio underperformed the benchmark by 78 basis points, on average. Unfortunately, even a frictionless short portfolio of Zero Weight securities would not be able to generate enough returns to cover the fees of even a standard long-only mutual fund.

The downsides and dirty secrets of ETFs and index funds.

Index funds now account for more than 50% of the US equity fund market. And in Europe and the rest of the world, they are also gaining more and more followers. The main culprits for this are undoubtedly those pulling the strings of actively managed funds, whose mediocre net returns are driving disillusioned investors into the arms of passively managed funds. The reasoning of these disillusioned investors is simple: if we’re going to earn little, at least let’s pay low fees for it. But the fact that the majority of actively managed funds (between 8 and 9 out of 10) are mediocre and fail to outperform their respective indices does not mean that investors should settle for this and stop looking for that minority that outperforms them by a wide margin, as we explained in our article published on the COBAS website a couple of years ago. Here’s an example of the alpha in NET returns achieved by certain star fund managers, outperforming any index fund and with lower volatility:

Obviously, for investors who look beyond the products peddled by banks in Spain, there are gems like the one in the chart above, which outperform ETFs and other index funds by a mile. But what’s more, the comparisons are even more damning if we analyse in depth what is happening in the index fund and ETF industry. Let’s look at some of its shortcomings:

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Just as a junk food manufacturer is a far cry from a good chef, those in charge of massive index funds such as those from BlackRock, Vanguard Group o State Street Corp They have nothing in common with good value fund managers. The former are only concerned with filling millions of cardboard boxes with something that looks like food, is cheap and appeals to shoppers. They couldn’t care less whether their customers end up with obesity, high blood pressure or any other health problems. All they care about is selling more and more volume every day at low cost. Similarly, index funds focus exclusively on pouring more and more millions into their portfolios, without caring in the slightest whether what they are buying are good or bad businesses, well or poorly managed, without caring about their fair value, let alone the long-term returns they will offer their shareholders. After all, why should they care, when more and more investors are turning away from expensive restaurants and resigning themselves to satisfying their hunger with cheap junk food?

What many people don’t realise is that these three giants of the index fund and ETF industry are responsible for keeping inefficient managers in the companies in which they invest. On reflection, the reasons may well be down to sheer carelessness, but if we scratch beneath the surface a little, hidden motives emerge, as we shall explain later. The fact is that its size is becoming such that their votes on the boards of directors are decisive to retain or replace management teams. The result is that not only do they invest indiscriminately in both good and bad companies (something inherent in passive or index-based management), but their votes also serve to keep poor managers in their posts. The million-dollar question is what interest these index fund owners could possibly have in retaining and paying out million-pound bonuses to inept managers. As always, the devil is in the detail.

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A study carried out by Reuters through the company Proxy Insight (lower graph) shows that in the 300 worst Among companies in the Russell 3000 index where proxy votes were cast, BlackRock voted in favour of management in 931 out of 1,000 cases, Vanguard in 911 out of 1,000, and State Street in 841 out of 1,000. The study concludes that these three giants supported the management of the worst-performing companies only slightly less than that of the other companies in the index, in other words, without caring in the slightest whether or not the management was harming the profits and performance of their companies.

The litmus test is that the percentage of support given by large pension funds to management teams at poorly performing companies is falling significantly. Of course, pension funds do care about returns for their future pensioners.

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Some might argue that active fund managers do not usually go against the management in place either, but the reality is that active managers no longer invest in companies whose management is performing poorly or with whom they disagree. In fact, that is the essence of active management: identifying good businesses run by good managers, whilst also taking into account their price relative to their intrinsic value, in the case of value investing (Compare these returns with those of any passive fund). What’s more, even if a mediocre, lazy or ill-informed active manager were to invest in a poor-performing company and, through their proxy vote, support a poor management team, the influence they would have on the vote would be infinitely less significant than that of a massive index fund or ETF.

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Consequently, there is a very real risk that mediocre companies with mediocre management will continue to exist indefinitely, due to the proxy votes cast by giant shareholders such as ETFs and index funds. Why would those passive funds care about the performance of the companies in their portfolios if their aim is not to outperform the index but simply to track it? Why would they confront their incompetent managers, replace them or deny them a huge bonus, if their sole incentive is to grow the fund rather than maximise returns for investors?

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Another reason – this one more Machiavellian and immoral – for not going against the bad managers of large corporations is that it is those very same executives who are promoting these passive investment funds to their thousands upon thousands of employees. How else can one explain the fact that Vanguard, State Street and BlackRock all voted in favour of doubling the salary of the CEO of the energy company PG&E Corp, just after its shares plummeted following indications that the company was liable for the California wildfires? Or that they approved astronomical bonuses for executives at the cosmetics company Coty Inc – including half a million dollars to pay for their children’s school fees– after the company had been reeling from its reckless acquisition of Procter & Gamble’s beauty division. They have also unanimously vetoed an attempt by the other shareholders to separate the executive powers of the CEO and Chairman of the Board of General Electric Co, following a decade of poor results, etc., etc., etc… Even in the few cases in the Russell 3000 study where shareholders managed to veto executive bonuses, in 601 of those cases BlackRock attempted to award them bonuses through its vote.

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Bear in mind that the largest holdings in index funds and ETFs, just like the indices they track, are in very large companies – that is, those with the highest number of employees worldwide. This is a vicious circle, as those executives are, after all, fund managers in return for fund owners voting in favour of their million-pound bonuses at board meetings. A win-win for them, but a lose-lose for investors in ETFs and index funds, and for the economy as a whole.

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As it is the investors in these funds themselves who are most affected by the poor quality of the portfolios, it might seem that this circle is finally closing with a certain sense of justice. But we must not underestimate the damage being done to the global economy, because every day the markets are channelling more and more millions into mediocre companies and teams, with no one seeming to care about this inefficient allocation of capital. Furthermore, Western central banks continue with their free-for-all of cheap money, and with these trillion-dollar injections, alongside those from passive investment funds, We are undermining Darwin's theory of evolution. In other words, propping up zombie companies and executives with money created out of thin air and from investors more concerned with saving on fees than with investing their money wisely.

 

The Keynesian Era shifts the focus of global investment to emerging markets.

Ya lo dijo Mark Mobius, ex-chairman ejecutivo de Templeton y fundador de Mobius Capital Partners en un artículo del mes de Marzo: Hay que invertir en las bolsas de los aún llamados países emergentes. Y esta vez es el think-tank financiero Gavekal Research quien publica un informe titulado «Wealth transfer to Emerging Markets» que no tiene desperdicio. En él se dice que la era Keynesiana, es decir, de represión financiera, de facilidades cuantitativas (QE) o en definitiva la Era en la que los principales bancos centrales del mundo (FED, BCE, BoJ, etc) reducen el precio del dinero para reactivar el crecimiento anémico de las economías Occidentales del planeta, son chutes de crecimiento económico directamente en las venas de las economías Emergentes.

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Cuando el rendimiento del Oro supera al de las principales divisas desarrolladas del planeta, el mundo entra en lo que llaman una Era Keynesiana. Si a ello le añadimos una acción coordinada de los bancos centrales de las economías desarrolladas, las políticas actuales de quantitative easing y tipos por los suelos son la eutanasia del rentista. La cuestión es, ¿quién se beneficia de esta muerte anunciada? Los mercados Emergentes, sin duda. Y comprobaremos esa clara transferencia de dinero desde los mercados desarrollados hacia los emergentes en este gráfico núm 1:

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El eje inferior determina el crecimiento del PIB per capita (a precio de USD constante) desde el fin del patrón oro. Vemos como, tanto en épocas Keynesianas como en épocas Wicksellianas (por Knut Wicksell, que abogaba por unos tipos siguendo la corriente del crecimiento económico y no como herramienta correctora), el crecimiento es el mismo si tomamos el mundo en su conjunto. Pero fijaos que si distinguimos los países emergentes de los desarrollados, la cosa cambia radicalmente. Ahí el crecimiento de las economías emergentes se ve claramente favorecido por las épocas Keynesianas, justo al contrario de lo que sucede con los países desarrollados. Y también al contrario de lo que en principio se pretende con la política Keynesiana.

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¿Por qué sucede esto, cuando intuitivamente parecería que las políticas monetarias laxas en divisas occidentales debieran favorecer el resurgir precisamente de las economías de los países desarrollados y no las de los emergentes? La primera razón es que los emergentes, muchos de ellos exportadores de materias primas, aumentan sus beneficios debido al aumento de precios de sus exportaciones. Y es que los activos reales (commodities) tienden a encarecerse cuando las divisas occidentales se deprecian respecto al resto de activos y divisas, cosa que ocurre en las Eras Keynesianas de bajos tipos.

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Lo vemos muy claro en el gráfico núm. 2, donde, por el contrario, las épocas Wicksellianas son poco menos que la ruina de los exportadores de materias primas.

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La segunda razón es que la deuda externa en USD de las empresas de países emergentes se abarata con los tipos bajos de las eras Keynesianas, lo cual genera beneficios adicionales a dichas empresas. Muy especialmente de aquellas que pertenecen a países con economías saneadas, poco endeudadas y muy productivas, donde sus divisas se mantienen estables o incluso se aprecian.

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El gráfico núm. 3 mide el exceso que pagan los depósitos en moneda local respecto al USD. Dicho de otra manera, el coste de financiación que esas empresas ahorran respecto al coste que tendrían en divisa local durante las eras Keynesianas. Concretamente el exceso de coste de moneda local está entre el 4% y el 12% anual en los países BRICS. El ahorro es muy significativo para los mercados emergentes, tanto como lo es a la inversa para los desarrollados, que a su vez se beneficiaran de esa era Keynesiana al colocar su capital en economías emergentes asumiendo el riesgo divisa local. O sea, que el capital vuela hacia las economías Emergentes por diversas vías en estos tiempos de dinero gratis en Occidente. Entre otras razones porque es un dinero gratis que en el propio Occidente no hay donde colocarlo para que rinda lo más mínimo.

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Además, TrackMacro confirma que a fecha de este mes de Septiembre 2019, el ranking de riesgos de poseer acciones de empresas en los diversas economías mundiales es el que podemos ver en el gráfico núm 4. Es decir, que los países exportadores de materias primas empiezan a hacer su Agosto desde el pasado Agosto, liderando  el gráfico en los últimos 5 meses. Notad que en el grupo de «Developing Asia» se excluyen los asiáticos exportadores de materias primas, que se computan como «Commodity exporters».  Por tanto, obviamente no todos los países emergentes gozan de estos flujos de dinero, del mismo modo que tampoco podemos considerar al mismo nivel la economía alemana y la griega, a pesar de que ambas sean «desarrolladas europeas».

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Para acabar de reafirmar la conveniencia de invertir en ciertos Mercados Emergentes, TrackMacro también publica que de acuerdo a los indicadores macro fundamentales, los principales exportadores de materias primas como Rusia o Brasil disfrutan de una atractiva relación valor/riesgo. Si a todo ello añadimos las medidas en la buena dirección que están tomando distintos gobiernos emergentes, como por ejemplo la bajada de impuestos de sociedades en India, que les permite su bajo endeudamiento y una demografía productiva, la recomendación es aún más potente. Hay que invertir en economías de paises emergentes con la naturalidad, la confianza y las mejores perspectivas, como antaño tenían los mercados desarrollados. Pero eso sí, haciéndolo a través de los mejores gestores de fondos de inversión locales, que conocen perfectamente no solo las empresas de su país sino también sus intríngulis legislativos, contables, fiscales e incluso culturales.

Invertir con el viento a favor de los mercados Emergentes y evitar los vientos en contra (endeudamiento, demográfico, recesión, escasa productividad, etc.) va a ser la clave en los próximos años. Para los tenedores de las típicas carteras de acciones españolas ahí va un dato demoledor: Hoy el Ibex35 está al mismo nivel que en 1998, la bolsa alemana se ha multiplicado en ese mismo periodo x2,5, la de USA x2,7 y la de India x10,5. Pero lo peor para unos y lo mejor para otros está por llegar.

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Conclusión: Las políticas Keynesianas en las principales economías desarrolladas deberían en teoría luchar contra las inercias deflacionarias, estimular el crecimiento local y fortalecer a las compañías occidentales ante los competidores de países emergentes. Pero el resultado de dicha política de facilidad cuantitativa y tipos bajo cero puede ser exactamente el contrario. La depreciación de las divisas occidentales conduce a una inyección de ingentes masas de dinero hacia las economías emergentes (que por otra parte son de por sí imanes para la inversión natural, aún sin medidas desesperadas en Occidente). Los inversores hoy en día sufren una situación asimétrica, donde sus divisas principales han dejado de ser valores refugio a causa de los tipos bajos. Esta Era de los Bancos Centrales favorece a priori el oro, los activos reales y las acciones de empresas emergentes, y lo hace en detrimento de las economías desarrolladas, la deuda soberana y las acciones de empresas occidentales.

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Como bien decía Mark Mobius en el artículo citado, a finales de los años ochenta las economías emergentes tan sólo pesaban un 5% del Mercado global, pero ahora suponen más de un 40%, y subiendo rápidamente. En esos años los inversores no podían invertir en más de media docena de bolsas, y sin embargo ahora tenemos más de 70 mercados abiertos a la creciente inversión extranjera, perfectamente dotados de los medios técnicos más punteros y supervisados por reguladores de alto nivel profesional. Esto permite en la actualidad una enorme diversificación y seguridad, y nos marca el camino a seguir: Es el momento de invertir en determinadas economías emerging - or already emerging donde se está produciendo una tremenda recuperación y crecimiento económico.Además, la guerra comercial USA-China no es más que oportunidad de oro para hacerlo a precios moderados. Y quien siga vendiendo el miedo a invertir en los mercados emergentes está desinformado y obsoleto, o bien obedece órdenes de sus superiores para vender un pescado deflacionario, recesivo y que huele muy mal ya desde que los bancos centrales abrieron el grifo para mantener en pie economías y empresas zombies.

 

Flight of Spanish athletes and brains to US universities.

Recently the newspaper Public has interviewed several Spanish sportsmen and women who decided to study at universities in the USA to perfect their careers, both academic and sporting. This drain of talent is not only being suffered by our country at a sporting level but also at an academic level, as any student of medium or medium-high level has a place in the American university system.

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Let's look at the motivations that lead sportsmen and women and «simple» students to pursue their careers at American universities. For sportsmen and sportswomen, the fact of studying there means obtaining a university degree that they would most probably not get here, as it would be very difficult for them to combine their sporting career, training and tournaments with classes and exams. The result is that very few Spanish athletes have a university degree when they finish their more or less successful sporting careers. In the USA, sporting success is not only compatible with, but necessarily goes hand in hand with the university world. The compatibility of training and competitions that will lead them to professional sport with classes, studies and exams is total and absolute. In addition, the facilities, sporting level and quality of coaches in the sports areas of the university system in the USA is a dream, as their budgets are light years ahead of those of any sports club in Spain, unfortunately.

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In short, a 16-18 year old athlete who decides to stay in Spain has only one card at stake for his or her future: whether to be sufficiently successful as a sports professional or to be relegated to being, for example, a mere coach without a university degree. In the best case scenario, they will have to retrain academically when they throw in the towel on their professional career, late and badly, in order to get a job. On the other hand, an athlete who goes to an American university, even if he or she is not successful enough as a professional, will at least have a university degree (often linked to the world of sport) that will allow him or her to make his or her way in the post-sport world with the same possibilities as any other graduate. In addition, you can even obtain your masters or postgraduate degrees while continuing your sporting career.

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Estela Pérez-Somarriba from Madrid, a student at the University of Miami, and NCAA champion (the most competitive college tennis league in the world), explains it perfectly in the interview:

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“I was right to look at the long term. I wanted to play tennis professionally, it had always been my dream and it still is. But when I finished high school, I started to weigh up the academic, tennis, economic and personal aspects. I didn't know if I wanted to live in Madrid all my life, I needed to mature, I couldn't afford to travel and pay a coach to take the professional leap, and in the United States I could combine sport with a career”.

Estela is studying Economics and Sports Management, and she couldn't be happier with her decision. Her goal now is to jump to the women's professional circuit (WTA) as soon as she graduates, which she will also do on a scholarship from start to finish by the university itself:

“The physical and medical resources, the facilities, the advisors and teachers help you a lot. My day-to-day life is tough, but we are top-level athletes and if you want to be the best in your sport and get a degree, it is always going to be a challenge. But here I have a lot of facilities that I didn't have before.

But it is not only athletes who have their way open to the university world in the USA. Every day, more and more students who do not play any sport are studying at the more than 2,000 universities across the country. And the fact is that prices are not so abusive as a priori many families might think. Nor do they the academic standards required are so high. Any student of average level has a place in an American university. The prices do not have to be higher than the costs of a private Spanish university. And living expenses, i.e. flat and meals, within the university campus itself cost the same as sending our children to study in Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Bilbao or any other Spanish city. You can see the details of the costs and price ranges in our article: «Can I send my children to study at a university in the USA?«

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Furthermore, let's not fool ourselves, a degree from an American university will open more professional and employment opportunities for our children than a Spanish degree. Whether they return to Spain to look for work, stay in the USA or go to live in any country in the world, having a university degree from any American university under their arm will make a difference for life. What better inheritance can we leave them than that?

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Although it may come as a surprise to many, the process of preparing for admission to an American university must be done at least one and a half years in advance. and appropriate expert advice. In other words, as we have already explained here, The time to start the process is between the end of the 4th year of ESO and the first half of the 1st year of Bachillerato.

In this Público article you can find other stories of Spanish sportsmen and women who cleverly decided to develop their careers in the USA.

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In short, families with children aged 15-17, whether or not they are athletes, whether or not they are bright students, explore the academic and scholarship possibilities offered by the American university world. It will make a difference in their lives, and yours.

Farewell to the Sovereignty Standard. Infinite money is the new standard.

Although most investors have never looked beyond the Solvency Standard, we must not forget that it is now 48 years since the US monetary authorities decided to abandon the Gold Standard – that is, the pegging of the dollar’s value to that of the precious metal. The practice of pegging money to a commodity that conferred intrinsic value upon it was widespread not only in ancient times but also throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and so its abolition in the early 1970s caused considerable unease amongst US savers, who were accustomed to sleeping soundly in the knowledge that they could exchange their bank notes for a proportion of gold. The difficulties faced by issuers in maintaining the value backing for their currencies were in crescendo, with the result that the proportion of intrinsic value in the money issued gradually decreased, thereby allowing the money in circulation to increase beyond the limit originally set by material wealth (commodity) itself.

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From that point onwards, intrinsic value began to be gradually and more or less subtly replaced by confidence (fiat) in the issuer. In fact, in some countries such as China, parts of what is now Canada, and other European countries and kingdoms, this path of no return towards fiat money began centuries ago. The new fiat money standard quickly took hold in the West during the 20th century, driven by the economic pressures resulting from the world wars, thereby placing the value of money entirely in the hands of (fiat) in the states, which were, unsurprisingly, delighted by the opportunities for political manipulation of money that this afforded them. With the end of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971, the US definitively buried the intrinsic value of its currency, and fiat money became the global standard – in case anyone still had any doubts. From then on, obviously, some states fared better than others – take, for example, the US versus Argentina, Venezuela or the ‘banana republics’ and their hyperinflation. But even for the top performers, the confidence of most savers in their respective governments has not been enough to prevent a loss of purchasing power over the years.

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The fiat money system is here to stay, clearly, and we will never again see our money pegged to any real asset. It is simply too tempting for governments to have the power to create an infinite supply of electronic (formerly printed) money. But despite this endless possibility, which hyperinflationary ‘banana republics’ have been abusing, That Fiat standard was self-imposed, based on a criterion that has been key for almost 50 years: solvency. In this way, by linking the ability to create an infinite amount of money to the limits of solvency for repaying debts, Fiat money has, in fact, been the replacement of the gold standard with the solvency standard. In other words, trust in the state had a limit, which was none other than its actual ability to repay its debts and balance its books between public spending and tax revenue from the population without causing inflation to spiral out of control. For this reason, for decades there have been countries whose currencies depreciated against others due to mismanagement, forcing those states to cover their budgetary excesses with new money or public debt, which in turn fuelled inflation. This public debt had to be considered attractive enough for private capital from domestic and foreign investors to finance it. Investors who, consequently, demanded in return an interest rate commensurate with the risk that that state would be unable to pay its debts without printing banknotes, and that inflation would therefore erode its purchasing power. In other words, interest rates which in turn placed a price on the currency issued by each state, based on its ability to balance its books and its inflation rate, that is to say its Solvency.

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We therefore had a system whose insolvency was self-regulating, since anyone caught in an unstoppable spiral of debt at rising interest rates and galloping inflation would default within a few years, dragging their economy and that of their ill-advised fellow citizens into ruin. But as politicians have never known how to steer the economy, the abuse of debt – even in countries that kept their inflation under control – began to bubble up. Until the debt crisis of 2007 struck, followed by the crash of 2008. By then, excessive debt was so widespread and insolvency so high that the risk of default by insolvent parties was systemic, starting with the entire Western banking system. Solution: Draghi’s famous phrase, «whatever it takes«In other words, central banks will generate as much money as is needed to turn the insolvent into the solvent and thus save the system. Because with infinite liquidity, the insolvent party never goes bankrupt; they simply extend and roll over their debts to infinity and beyond, allowing creditors to avoid having to set aside provisions for bad debts beyond what their balance sheets can bear. It’s a bit like the ostrich that buries its head in the sand.

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The new standard is therefore that of fiat money, but for the past decade it has also been infinite by decision of the world’s most powerful central banks. In other words, The money needed to keep banks, large systemic companies and the states themselves afloat is being created and will continue to be created, as is the case in the southern part of the eurozone, by adding zeros to its debt and with negative interest rates (we already discussed this 6 years ago in financial repression). Some of the obvious drawbacks are that we are allowing zombie companies – inefficient and up to their ears in debt – to survive, as they repay their maturing debts with new money created by central banks in exchange for their worthless IOUs. Another fatal drawback is that sub-zero interest rates not only keep insolvent public and private entities afloat but also provide even greater incentives for private borrowing. For all these reasons Solvency is no longer a ratio to be taken into account. It will also be chaotic that all these ultra-low-yield instruments are sweeping aside anyone who has made income their modus vivendi or modus operandi – that is to say, private rentiers, pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds and other sources of capital seeking to avoid stock market volatility. To date, we have only A decade of zero interest rates, but the damage that quantitative easing will cause in the medium and long term is devastating for the sustainability of funded pension schemes (just as the ageing population we are also experiencing is for pay-as-you-go pension schemes).

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However, the most curious thing about the current situation is that it may be surprisingly sustainable, as it has advantages such as the fact that we can kick the can down the road when it comes to mass bankruptcies for decades – who knows, perhaps even for generations. We simply need to get used to the idea (and we’re already doing so) that sovereign debt, for example, far exceeds 100% or even 200% of GDP. After all, what does the debt-to-GDP ratio matter if solvency is a problem that central banks have left behind with their new «Infinite Money Standard»? Thus, we see how states keep themselves and their banks solvent by creating money without it entering significant circulation, since the vast majority of these flows do not leave the debt circuit perpetuated between central banks, private banks and state-owned, quasi-state-owned or systemic companies. In a word, we are living in the paradise of ‘too big to fail’. Under this new system of infinite liquidity, the effects of the dreaded ‘austericide’ – championed by the German hawks – can be mitigated, as it fosters inefficient and anaemic economic growth whilst keeping inflation at rock-bottom levels and also warding off the dreaded deflation. But the short-sighted benefits do not end there; in this vicious cycle, politicians can secure re-election without having to make bold decisions or think beyond one or two parliamentary terms – which is their usual intellectual horizon.

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So what are the risks of this infinite liquidity? Well, as well as providing the perfect breeding ground for the inefficient allocation of money whose price is close to zero, hyperinflation would be another factor that could ultimately cause this new system to implode. But as we saw 10 years ago in «The illusion of wealth and the Quantitative Theory«An increase in the money supply without a corresponding increase in the velocity of circulation is not sufficient to drive up prices. And the tap controlling the speed at which money flows through the veins of the population – that is, the so-called real economy – is entirely controlled by central banks, governments and private banks.”.

We are therefore entering a profound era in which the Solvency Standard has become obsolete, and in which infinite liquidity will keep zombie companies, banks, states and governments afloat, whilst also giving them an air of normality to which we are already becoming scandalously accustomed. So let’s put the low volatility aside and the comfortable life of the rentiers of yesteryear, the natural selection of the insolvent and inefficient, and a reasonable cost of capital.

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Infinite Money is the New Standard, and we must learning how to make ends meet in this new era that is set to last for several decades (we’re already a decade into it). Just look at the chaos that ensued as soon as attempts were made to turn off the tap in 2018 (chart at the top of the article). As a result of the market turmoil, central banks have begun to backtrack, reopening the tap in 2019 and 2020. Rentier investors and conservative investors (sic) who still believe they can beat inflation with low volatility are being misled by their financial advisers and/or bankers. In this environment of zero interest rates and excessive debt, neither today nor for many years to come will it be possible to generate solid, sustainable returns that outpace inflation without taking on enormous risk. And that risk is none other than lending our money to issuers of debt and structured products – whether guaranteed or otherwise – and other forms of financial engineering, which are effectively ‘zombies’ kept afloat only by an endless supply of money.

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The million-dollar question is whether we can throw the savings of the most conservative investors into the arms of virtually zombie banking products, trusting that the era of infinite money is here to stay. The answer is that many have been doing so for a decade and it has worked out relatively well for them (although they have hardly kept pace with real inflation), given that no deposit, guaranteed product or fixed-income portfolio has gone bust under the leadership of Draghi, Yellen or Bernanke. But the fact that a political decision has been taken to keep insolvency afloat does not make those investments solvent. Therefore, barring a very few exceptions involving alternative income-generating assets – such as life settlements or certain segments of the US mortgage market, which exhibit moderate volatility but offer quarterly liquidity and selective access – the most conservative investors would do well to accept the volatility of the stock markets countries whose economies are still growing and will continue to grow for at least a decade. And to invest in those growing assets and markets, they must look for the best funds in the world, without the huge restrictions imposed by minimum investment amounts or marketing regulations in Spain.

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In this era of infinite money, which is here to stay – as the famous soap opera used to say – one could say that without volatility, there is no paradise.

If your children have finished ESO, now is the time to start preparing their way to US universities.

Most parents are surprised to find out that if they want their children to be able to study at an American university They have to start the process a couple of years before finishing their baccalaureate. Therefore, in many cases, by the time they make the family decision to explore the possibilities of their children studying in the best university system on the planet, it is already too late. The correct timing is to start the process at this time, when they have finished the 4th year of ESO or at the beginning of the 1st year of Bachillerato. That way, you can take advantage of the summer and the academic year to do some extracurricular activities that will substantially improve your transcript and CV for the university application process. Yes, it is true that it is also possible to start the path to an American university at the end of the 1st year of Bachillerato, but if we do so then all the steps will have to be taken with greater haste, which will be more stressful, and above all it will allow us fewer attempts to achieve good grades in the various exams that must be taken in the official centres designated in various Spanish cities. However, even in the 2nd year of Bachillerato, we have already achieved make express applications, However, the best thing to do is to apply for the following year, taking advantage of one or two sabbatical semesters to improve your English or to attend a Spanish university without any pressure.

It surprises most families to learn that it is not necessary to have excellent grades, although of course it helps to get into better universities, but any student with an average of 6 also has a chance if he or she does well in the entrance exams. Many parents are also surprised to learn that The costs may be much more affordable than they thought, and very similar to what any family sending their children to study at a private university in any Spanish or European city would have to pay. Below are the annual costs we published in our previous article: «Can I send my children to study at a university in the USA?«. As you will see, there are excellent university options with costs equivalent to those of private Spanish universities. In addition, there are possible scholarships and grants that substantially reduce costs, especially in the more expensive ones, depending on the student's academic merits and family economic needs. The following annual costs are gross, i.e. possible scholarships and grants should be deducted:

  • Tuition fees:
    • Between €10,000 and €55,000 depending on the prestige and quality of the university.
  • Cost of room and board:
    • Between 8 and 15 thousand €.
  • Books, materials, travel and miscellaneous expenses:
    • Between 2 and 3 thousand euros
  • Health insurance for international students:
    • Between €1,000 and €2,000

The process of gaining admission to US universities is long and complex for students and their families, and can be very stressful. Therefore, the chances of success without the advice and support of professional consultants and coaches are slim. As we said in the above-mentioned article, at Cluster Family Office, we have been helping many families to achieve their American dream for several years now. Our advisory service includes the entire process from beginning to end, from the moment the candidate is finishing secondary school until they are almost at the door of the plane that will take them to the universities in the USA that best suit their academic and economic potential in each case. We advise and accompany them throughout the process, including the selection of a list of universities to apply to, the Essays, letters of recommendation, scholarship applications, visa, residency and other family logistics, etc. In that final list of between 8 and 12 universities to which each candidate applies, we will include 3 or 4 Universities that meet their needs and where it is practically certain that they will be admitted; another 3 or 4 where they will have certain chances; and finally 3 or 4 more where the chances of access will be low (which we usually describe as the letter to the wise men and women), but that sometimes the flute may play and they may end up being admitted to a dream University, even though their percentage of acceptance is very low.

The main difference between American and Spanish universities is obviously the economic resources available to them in the USA. These million-dollar resources are converted into spectacular facilities, highly prestigious teaching staff, budgets available for research work for both postgraduates and new students, first-class student residences and canteens, and in short, money for students to give of themselves infinitely more, both academically and personally. The great American public and private universities are like real cities, with spectacular facilities for all kinds of sports, stadiums bigger than those of many Spanish first division football clubs, shops, banks, cinemas, theatres and even the university's own police force. All within the university campus. With these facilities, it is clear to no one that the student life of a student who stays in Spanish universities is radically different from the experiences during the university years in the USA.

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Here are a few links to give you an idea of the flatsrooms, facilities and of the environment The experience of families who have gone through this process and receive the news of the final admission to the university of their dreams. And at the end of «Study at a university in the USA»You will also find a number of videos of what university life in the USA is really all about.

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You can ask us for an interview in Madrid or Barcelona without obligation to assess the possibilities of your children through info@clusterfamilyoffice.com.

 

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