Las políticas de tipos cero que se han venido sosteniendo desde los Bancos Centrales del mundo más desarrollado para evitar el colapso de la deuda, han distorsionado por completo el sistema financiero. Los efectos colaterales de regalar el precio del dinero y la barra libre para evitar que los hiperendeudados (todo el mundo desarrollado) quiebren, son letales para los que deben generar rentas. Es un escenario amable con los insolventes pero muy hostil para los inversores, que se ven abocados a prestar su dinero a cambio de míseros rendimientos ofrecidos por emisores cada vez más peligrosos e insolventes.
A medida en que el dinero de los inversores se desplaza hacia la deuda más insolvente buscando desesperadamente unos puntos de rendimiento, la burbuja en los precios de toda la deuda, tanto desarrollada como emergente y en toda su curva, se hincha más y más. Los emisores más solventes o con bancos centrales dispuestos a comprarlo todo, tienen buena parte de sus curvas de tipos ya en negativo, o sea que los inversores deben pagar por prestarles su dinero. De igual modo los emisores menos solventes viven en una nube de liquidez que les permite endeudarse más y más pagando tipos como si fuesen grandes nombres multinacionales solventes. (more…)
Banco Madrid is the first bank that the state and its regulators have let fall in this galloping debt crisis. In fact, technically speaking, it has not been allowed to fall, i.e. it has not fallen due to the absence of a bailout with state funds, as other insolvent institutions have been rescued in recent years, but rather, forceful measures have been taken to liquidate it due to its -still- alleged money laundering. What is paradoxical is therefore that the reason for the intervention and the swift liquidation of the institution is not, at least originally, due to the feared insolvency but to criminal practices of great significance.
Perhaps for those of us who are professionally engaged in it, the answer may seem obvious. Especially for those of us who have suffered for decades in our own flesh the miseries and shortcomings of private banking. It is no coincidence that, in addition to being advisors, we were, are and will continue to be essentially investors, and as such, our interests are still, unfortunately, at the antipodes of those of the banks and their misnamed advice. Having said that, let us now analyse the transcendental decisions that every investor should take to advise on the correct management of their assets.
With central banks and their QE, the debt situation in the developed world has reached a surrealistic level worthy of study. Not only because of the unprecedented size of the balance sheets of the FED, ECB, BoE, BoJ, SNB, etc., but above all because of the manipulation of accounts, which has become a macabre and dangerous norm.
