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A continuación os copio el comentario que nos ha enviado DJ sobre el artículo Changes. Creo que hace unas reflexiones muy interesantes que merecen ser leídas y comentadas en forma de post. Como siempre, será interesantísimo leer vuestros comentarios al respecto, y en el próximo artículo podréis leer nuestros comentarios al respecto:

«Nos habéis vuelto a hablar del problema, pero no de la solución ni de la estrategia para conseguirla. Imaginad por un momento que el Gobierno del Reino de España, o el G-20, recurriera a vuestros servicios como Family Office para solucionar esta crisis y lo que se avecina (el futuro) y pensad en el diagnóstico de la situación que haríais y lo qué le recomendaríais (otra cosa es que nos lo queráis decir).

Los problemas nunca se resuelven solos y ese es quizás el problema que tenemos aquí, que esperamos a que alguien distinto a nosotros haga o diga algo, que esperamos a que las cosas se hagan solas sin pensar casi en la iniciativa individual o colectiva. Como decía la canción: “vamos a pasar a la acción”.

Lo de proteger el patrimonio, ya parece más una posibilidad teórica que algo factible, al menos de forma absoluta y universal. De hecho, no conozco a nadie, pero a nadie, al que la crisis, esta crisis aún inacabada, no le haya pasado factura, ni siquiera a los que, en teoría, asumían un nivel de riesgo bajo o teóricamente nulo. Bien es cierto que a unos les ha ido mejor que a otros, aunque habría que estudiar si ha sido fruto de la casualidad, como en algunos casos en tiempos de bonanza, o fruto de un buen plan estratégico y del trabajo bien hecho.

El problema que presentan las economías domésticas, por lo general, es que no suelen llevar un registro contable de sus operaciones económicas ni realizan una valoración global de su patrimonio al cierre de cada ejercicio, como si de una empresa se tratara. Si así fuera, creo que tendríamos motivos para preocuparnos más de lo que lo estamos, de ahí que este hecho sirva de justificación, a mi juicio infundada, para no realizar un análisis de la situación patrimonial a lo largo del tiempo en muchas economías domésticas que viven al día, y así les ha ido en la mayor parte de los casos. ¿Qué fue de ellos después? Borrón y cuenta nueva, y volver a empezar.

Leyendo la prensa y algunos blogs esta semana, me he podido encontrar con visiones y puntos de vista tan contradictorios, que van del mayor optimismo al mayor pesimismo, que casi que vale la pena dejarlos a un lado y reflexionar de forma independiente sobre la crisis. Y lo peor de todo es que casi todos los que escriben lo hacen desde una perspectiva de muy corto plazo, en algunos casos tan corto, que mañana dirán lo contrario de lo que han dicho hoy, sin que muchos de sus lectores se den cuenta porque pecan de lo mismo, de una falta de perspectiva a medio o largo plazo, de mirar más al pasado que al presente o al futuro, de una falta de anticipación y de estrategia de medio o largo plazo y, en definitiva, de falta de previsión, quedando a expensas de lo que los analistas, los medios y los políticos les digan. Tampoco tendríamos que olvidar a todos aquellos que, en lugar de analizar la realidad, lo que buscan es vendernos algo (producto, servicio, teoría, entre otros), pero que lo adornan y nos lo muestran como si de una noticia se tratara.

Al menos, destacaría cuatro problemas, que afectan más a unos que a otros pero que están ahí, tienen solución (voluntad, acción) y que son: inexistencia de objetivos claros, falta de perspectiva, falta de rigor y falta de espíritu crítico. Sólo es mi opinión.»

DJ

Que los EE.UU. tienen un grave problema inmobiliario es un hecho. Un problema mayor que el de Europa en su conjunto. Pero la situación de España e Irlanda, con sus respectuvas burbujas inmobiliarias es, cuando menos, comparable. El hundimiento de precios es necesario, pero si consiguiéramos recortar el periodo de caídas y acelerar la reactivación de la demanda unos añitos, toda la economía de estos países con graves colapsos inmobiliarios mejoraría. Y con ello se conseguirían convertir los daños colaterales del desplome del sector, en beneficios colaterales que contribuirían espectacularmente a reducir los años de depresión económca que nos esperan a todos, especialmente a los más afectados por el colapso inmobiliario.

Pero ¿cómo podemos reactivar un sector que adolece de depresión y parece condenado a retorcerse en el fango durante muchos años? Pues por ejemplo aplicando soluciones radicales y sin embargo imaginativas, como por ejemplo la que plantean LeFrac y Schilling. Es decir, imponiendo condiciones a los inmigrantes que soliciten la residencia a los EE.UU.

Los EE.UU. autorizan un millón de nuevos ciudadanos norteamericanos cada año. Si esos permisos de residencia se otorgaran con la condición de comprar una vivienda en propiedad, muchos inmigrantes lo aceptarían gustosos. Se trataría de hacer un upgrade en el nivel económico de los inmigrantes a los que se les otorga la ciudadanía de los EE.UU. ¿Cuántas familias en todo el mundo aceptarían cambiar de vida y buscar su futuro en los USA, a cambio de comprarse una casa? Como contrapartida a su esfuerzo económico, esas familias tendrían su Green Card provisional y, pongamos en cinco años, una residencia definitiva en la primera potencia mundial y fábrica de sueños del planeta. Lógicamente, esos inmigrantes deberían acreditar buen comportamiento y solvencia ganándose la vida lo suficiente para sus familias. Pero recordemos que la vivienda ya la tendrían pagada y por lo tanto sólo deberían ganar lo mínimo para subsistir, pagar sus impuestos, gastos generales y seguros médicos. Inmigrantes del mundo entero harían cola para comprar sus viviendas en California o Florida. Y no olvidemos que hoy en día una familia de inmigrantes tendría una casa más que digna por tan sólo 100.000′- o 125.000′- $.

Imaginemos lo que le ocurriría a la economía de los EE.UU. si cada año se invirtieran en el país 125.000 millones de $ procedentes del extranjero. Y no sólo hablamos del precio de compra sino de los muebles, los coches y en general el consumo que generaría ese millón de familias inmigrantes con un poder adquisitivo medio. Estamos hablando de reservar la admisión de esa misma cuota de inmigrantes anual a una clase media con un mínimo poder adquisitivo para comprar una vivienda. Sería cambiar un millón de nuevos ciudadanos en los que hay muchos de clase baja, por clase media. Socialmente injusto, sí; económicamente interesante para los EE.UU, también.

Para conseguirlo debería legislarse, regularse, supervisarse y sancionarse meticulosamente, pero el fruto de ese esfuerzo sería espectacular. Quizá estaríamos hablando del motor necesario para volver a hacer crecer la economía de norteamérica y dejar atrás la depresión. Todavía hay muchas familias en el mundo deseosas de establecerse en los EE.UU. dentro de la legalidad, deslumbrados por lo que el American Dream todavía representa. Y no olvidemos que la depresión global actual acentuará ese deseo en millones de personas que verán empobrecer sus países de orígen dramáticamente: Europa del Este, Latinoamérica, Oriente, etc. y que no dudarían en abandonar un orígen sin futuro e ir en busca de un nuevo mundo, con los ahorros de toda la vida.

Y yo me pregunto: ¿No sería eso todavía posible en España? El hecho de poder residir en la UE, en un entorno Schengen, tiene y tendrá mucho valor. Quizá la UE no permitiría que un miembro del sur con problemas aprovechara esa situación, o quizá las fronteras españolas sean más permeables que las norteamericanas. También es posible que, a pesar de obtener la ciudadanía de la UE, el Spanish Dream no sea un incentivo suficiente. Pero el principal impedimento es que en «nuestra California y nuestra Florida«, las viviendas no valen 75.000 € (100.000 $).

Será que no estamos tan mal como en los EE.UU… o que estamos peor.

El responsable del Departamento de Estadística Regional de la Fundación de las Cajas de Ahorros (Funcas), Pablo Alcaide, parece ser el economista relacionado con la banca más clarividente y/o sincero y/o realista.

Entre sus declaraciones encontramos, por ejemplo, la de que a España le esperan muchos años de crecimiento bajo, que lo peor de esta crisis lo veremos en los próximos trimestres, o que el fondo de la economía española se tocará a finales del 2010. Quizá sean obviedades, pero resultan un ejemplo de sinceridad cuando provienen del mundo de los bancos y cajas de ahorros.

Tan sólo una objeción, cuando subrayó las ventajas de estar en la Unión Europea y el euro: «…aunque eso impida recurrir al uso del tipo de cambio, lo cierto es que si España no estuviera bajo el paraguas de la UE y de la moneda común, la crisis actual sería comparable a la del 29…» En mi humilde opinión la crisis sí es comparable a la del 29 cuantitativamente, aunque no cualitativamente ya que esta vez es el Sistema el que ha quebrado y no simplemente la bolsa. Y por otro lado, las nueva era de las devaluaciones se está produciendo, no sólo de forma oficiosa, sino que también se hace a costa de la moneda única.

Alcaide también abogó por la inversión pública, dada la incapacidad previsible de la inversión privada durante muchos años. Pero también, y esto es significativo, no debemos esperar ni pretender fomentar que el consumo privado reactive la economía, porque no conviene a las familias seguir con este ritmo de endeudamiento. El consumo privado ni puede ni debe apartarse durante más tiempo del ahorro. Y ese concepto choca frontalmente con los beneficios de bancos y cajas de ahorro.

A pesar de no compartirlas en su totalidad, en cualquier caso, bienvenidas sean estas declaraciones que se alejan de las mentiras políticamente correctas, aún proviniendo de la Fundación de Cajas de Ahorros. No obstante las malas lenguas dirán que jamás se miente en el lecho de muerte…

Mis respetos, D. Pablo Alcaide.

Few people are now unaware that the world is undergoing a complete transformation. But it is doing so with the inertia of an oil tanker; in other words, it is moving at such a pace that the violence and radical nature of the changes may well go unnoticed by many. If we had a time accelerator and could compress a month into a single day, we would see that in just three short weeks we have gone from the placidity of global growth and the proliferation of welfare states to a situation like the one we face today. And with every passing day—that is to say, every month—events are accelerating, leaving behind systems, forms of organisation and dogmas that have been exposed and to which we will never return. Something similar is happening to us to what we said in «The Death of the Frog» with regard to those who have lost money on the stock market. The forces of inertia are so powerful that few people are aware of the major changes we are currently experiencing and their significance.

They have fallen absolute truths as fundamental as confidence, the real estate market, leverage, consumption and economic growth. The solvency and security of banks—and even of states—have crumbled, revealing that many arguments we considered rock-solid are in fact nothing more than a house of cards. Dogmas of the calibre of the inappropriateness of market intervention and the nationalisation of banks—consequences of a neoliberalism that was the very essence of capitalism—have also fallen. The list is as long as it is unimaginable. The fundamental pillars on which we built our economy and our society—the global one—have vanished. We are left with only a few minor pillars still standing, and we will have to decipher the rest through trial and error in the immediate future.

Furthermore, the most visible aspect – the perception on the street and within society – has so far shown only the earliest signs of deterioration. Not even the tip of the iceberg. To date, the most significant changes have been systemic, fundamental and structural. The tsunami is still almost invisible, and yet it is inevitable. The changes that have already taken place are taking us away from the familiar, never to return, and only a few stand by in astonishment as they unfold day after day (or month after month). But for those who are unaware of the change—whether through an inability to analyse the world beyond the day-to-day, or through simple naivety—they need only imagine a snapshot of their life and their assets two years ago and today. And to consider that all around them, in every sphere, changes have also been taking place inexorably.

Change isn't inherently bad, not at all. But we must learn to walk and talk all over again. Throughout this traumatic process, we must also protect our assets. And this is only just the beginning.

I've posted four videos of the genius Bowie with his Changes in very different versions. Same artist, same song. In the same way, the world will remain the world, but with many changes.

For those of us who love this letter, These are unique and truly exciting times.

The US Financial Accounting Standards Board (US FASB) met on 13 March to discuss the possible adjustment of the valuation criteria Mark-to-Market (MTM or M2M) in illiquid markets such as the current one. In other words, a euphemism for allowing asset valuations to be manipulated to suit the balance sheets banking, which is what really gets under the System’s skin.

For a company, however large and influential it may be, to go into technical default due to a fall in the value of its assets is a sustainable crisis, since, after all, «only»It wipes out jobs. But when a major bank does this, it not only leaves its own employees out of work but also drags down other banks linked to it in this financial house of cards. Furthermore, these failed strategies undermine confidence both within and outside the banking sector, thereby making it impossible for the entire system to continue functioning.

It’s now been a year since we explained in this article the recipe for Paul Craig Roberts to put an end to what was then known as the subprime credit crisis. Simple, yet at the same time as effective and dangerous as we care to believe. Valuing assets at the desired market price virtually solves the problems posed by scenarios such as the current one. On the other hand, if we value them at real market prices, the cascade of bankruptcies is so extensive and affects such vital institutions as those that make up the core of the banking system, which could bring down the capitalist system itself. But beware, This virtual path takes us away from reality, perhaps never to return for generations.

The dangers of departing from real market prices in turbulent times are obvious and very serious. That is why, until now, there has been a reluctance to value assets at a price higher than that indicated by the market. The preference has been to maintain accounting rigour, the principle of prudence and the mark-to-market. The decision has been made to to intervene and/or rescue through massive cash injections to stabilise the balance sheets of those whose collapse would be unacceptable and dangerous. But what happens if the markets continue to fall and the book values M2M of the assets mean that even the bailouts most scandalous in history? Well, it seems we’ll have to review and make some allowances in our assessment criteria: On 10 March, Ben Bernanke he said that Regulatory practices and accounting principles should be reviewed to ensure that they do not lead to excessive volatility in the financial system and the economy. And let us remember that Bernanke was one of those who opposed the suspension of the M2M or MTM criteria, but he is now prepared to «improve them»and to develop new, reasonable methods of asset valuation that mitigate the harmful effects which in turn exacerbate market illiquidity. In short, it is a «No, but maybe yes»which is considering lifting the ban on a one-off basis and in a very controlled manner (let’s hope so).". Wherever a vital bailout cannot reach, the books will be balanced by force.

Is it a good solution? Certainly not. But as we haven’t been in a position to demand anything for a year and a half now, it may once again be a lesser evil, such as the socialisation of losses or the partial nationalisation of the financial system (and, paradoxically, we are not referring to the latest bluster (under Chávez). Such leniency will be a lifeline for many macroeconomic balances that are doomed to collapse unless a miracle occurs. But it means setting out on an extremely dangerous path, albeit one that has been familiar since 1938, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt It suspended the aforementioned valuation criterion. In 2007, the M2M was reinstated in the wake of the Enron scandal, which prioritised transparency over rigour. No one could have imagined that what we have witnessed over the past two years could happen, and that today the M2M could stifle the system. Are not the following also extremely dangerous? bailouts at everyone’s expense?

Here’s a «A history lesson on mark-to-market» from the Financial Times’ Alphaville blog. The most regrettable thing is that the debate over whether or not to maintain the M2M is being exploited for political ends at such a delicate time for the world as this.

Personally, I find it hard to guess how investors will value a company which has been allowed to record its assets on its balance sheets without reflecting their market value. But as we have already said, we may be in such a precarious situation that this might once again be the lesser of two evils. Come to think of it, if we nationalise banks, bail out governments and central banks buy up debt, why on earth should we be shocked if balance sheets do not reflect market prices? After all, there are few absolute truths left in the world as we knew it.

We can see it all, we can accept it all, we can believe it all. But we will never be the same again. There was a ‘before’ and there will be an ‘after’ to this global Great Depression, even though many people are concerned only with whether the stock market charts are more or less severe than the historical charts of the 20th century.

Nobel contra blah, blah , blah… Así lo ven algunos en You Tube:

This time it is the CHF that is depreciating against the other currencies, particularly against the long-suffering EUR. The movement has been so dramatic that the political decision behind it seems clear. Perhaps it is the Swiss government’s retaliation against the EU for having forced them to relax banking secrecy time and again; or perhaps it is simply the sheer necessity of an economy under pressure from this brutal crisis, which seems almost endless.

In any case, this is a clear statement of intent from the CHF, which is effectively devaluing the currency in full view of the public. Whether the market will allow this to continue in the future is another matter.

And so another one is added to the list of the clever ones in the new The Era of Devaluations. As we said in that article, the counterpart is always the same inflatable doll: the euro. A dirty, well-worn doll that’s been over-inflated. It would be highly advisable to deflate it properly to ease the strain on its peripheral seams, which are already threatening to burst.

The pound sterling has been taking a more low-key (yet highly effective) approach, but Switzerland has made its move loud and clear. Any political retaliation from the EU and/or the US will be minimal, if there is any at all. But such blatant moves provide ammunition to those who have systematically intervened in their currency on political grounds, disregarding market forces. We are referring, of course, to China, which we can hardly accuse vehemently and effectively of something that Switzerland itself is carrying out. Yet another name to add to the list of ‘clever ones’, providing interventionist and protectionist arguments to anyone who needs them to justify economic, political, nationalist and unilateral moves.

And what about the USD? Will it continue to act as a reliable counterpart, or will it return to the list of the clever ones at 1.65 $ per euro? Many would say that the euro cannot hold its own on its own, come what may. Anyone’s wrist would eventually give way….

It is interesting to track the trend shown in the chart depicting the four most significant market crashes of the last 100 years. As we mentioned in Poker of the Best Players, in the following chart from dshort.com we can see how these four most devastating moments in the modern history of the global economy have unfolded over time, or Four naughty bears. In it, we can see four colours corresponding to the downward trends of:

As we can see, We followed the path faithfully towards the elephant graveyard of the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Furthermore, the chart below shows that the current price of the S&P 500 has already fallen back to levels last seen 12 years ago.

But worst of all is that the current situation in the US is one of deep recession, as we can see from the following chart:

It shows the number of US states experiencing economic growth. In other words, virtually all states are in recession. Obviously, the rest of the Western world will follow the lead of the American economy, and against this backdrop of deep depression, the foreseeable trend indicated by the first two charts in this article is chilling. And we must not forget this exercise in analysing the economic environment, as it is very different to analyse current and future macroeconomic figures and forecasts for a foreseeable scenario expansive than for one person depressive.

We have all been born and raised in an environment of economic expansion, with its downturns, but expansionary nonetheless. Not even our parents and grandparents lived through essentially recessionary economies (except for the 1930s, which ended with the outbreak of war). We must therefore make a special effort to analyse the present and the future without forgetting that the breeding ground – the world before us – is unknown Apache territory which will severely hamper the known prospects of recovery.

In keeping with the original idea of Unience so that we financial bloggers can put questions to President Zapatero. Here’s ours:

As an additional guest at the meetings of the G20, Do you sincerely believe that the leaders of those countries, together with the various representatives of the economic bodies that make up the group, have the capacity to coordinate effective responses to the global financial collapse? Or, on the contrary, do you believe that an effective response will come solely from those countries that have the inherent capacity to recover? Perhaps we are simply faced with yet another ineffective political and economic bureaucracy. Although I would prefer to believe that the G20 meetings could give rise to the embryo of a future global governing body for the economic system – one that is far more dynamic, effective and capable of decision-making than the UN or the IMF.

I’m sorry for the delay, Vicente.

Below is a letter recently taken from lacartadelabolsa.com. It strikes me as an account of a situation that may be more common than we care to believe. At the end of the letter, I’ll share some interesting thoughts, and I look forward to hearing your views and comments. Here is the letter from Iñaki in Pamplona:

This is not about debating whether Mr Iñaki is right or wrong, or whether he will lose more or less as a result of his fund manager’s decision. What strikes us as telling is the radical shift in tone being adopted by some equity fund managers. These are changes typical of an impending stock market collapse, but we must approach them with the caution of someone treading on unknown and unexplored territory: the Great Depression of this century and a radical overhaul of the global financial and economic system. It is also curious to see how the manager’s rhetoric changes radically whilst the investor remains, at the very least, anchored in scepticism, a victim of the accumulation of so many optimistic statements from this manager and others who live off the commissions generated by trading Iñaki’s assets. For months on end, they have sought to justify the losses with optimistic and positive visions of the future. Then they continued with the wait and see… but wait inside. To many of us, these arguments seemed unbelievable and damaging, because so many investors believed them—and continue to believe them. To the point where they have acted in line with what they have been told over and over again, only to end up angry and confused when their fund manager gives in—not to the market, but to honesty. The anger is the least of it, because at the end of the day, Iñaki could buy back his entire portfolio today at even better prices. But what really outrages him, and rightly so, is feeling disoriented and duped when one suddenly realises that he was the only one who truly believed the arguments of his «trusted manager».

We don’t know what the stock market will do in the future, of course, nor whether that fund manager will get it right or not, having sold the equity portfolio to Mr Iñaki. To err is human. But at this point, it’s clear that their relationship hasn’t been transparent or honest enough. That’s why, all of a sudden, their paths have diverged completely, and the ground is shifting beneath the feet of an angry Iñaki. What do you think?