Category: Sin categorizar

Siempre ha existido una relación directa entre recesión y aumento de empleos a tiempo parcial. Es lógico que en épocas en las que el empleo cae, se sustituyan trabajos de jornada completa por un difícil puzzle de empleos a tiempo parcial, que casi nunca llegan a generar los mismos ingresos que el anterior empleo de jornada completa.

En la multicrisis actual, ese fenómeno se está evidenciando de forma espeluznante, y no presagia más que una depresión muy aguda. Como vemos en el siguiente gráfico de los empleos a tiempo parcial en los EE.UU., la cifra ha superado ampliamente los picos de las recesiones de 1982-83 y del 1991-93. Su inclinación ascendente es digna de la madre de todas las burbujas. Y me temo que ésta no va a estallar, sino que deberemos desinflarla a base de duro esfuerzo y muchos años de penurias. Hasta que salga el sol de la expansión económica y comencemos a dejar atrás el dantesco escenario que nos rodeará.

Este fenómeno del aumento del trabajo a tiempo parcial se traduce implacablemente en una reducción sustancial de los ingresos laborales. Pero es que hay muchos trabajadores a jornada completa que, una vez perdido su empleo, difícilmente van a encontrar ni siquiera empleos a tiempo parcial. Bien sea por su edad, por sus condiciones físicas, por su capacitación profesional, por su localización geográfica (que vivan en una zona donde no existan alternativas laborales a tiempo parcial), etc.

En definitiva, tenemos ya ante nuestros incrédulos ojos a una sociedad occidental que se queda en la calle y que empieza a buscar desesperadamente fracciones de sueldos a tiempo parcial para subsistir. El problema es que esos ingresos laborales diezmados no sean suficientes (que en muchos casos no lo son) para que esas familias coman y puedan pagar el alquiler de un piso en el que apelotonarse. Pero otro gran problema es el endeudamiento que estas familias han acumulado durante la reciente era dorada, en la que los bancos y el Sistema les hicieron creer que eran de clase media. Y no hay trabajos a tiempo parcial que puedan soportar una hipoteca, un coche y unas vacaciones de las que todavía se debe la cuota correspondiente al todo incluido. Jamás podrán pagar sus deudas, y deberán centrar sus esfuerzos en trabajar a tiempo parcial exclusivamente para comprar comida y pagar el alquiler durante algunos años. Probablemente mucho más tiempo del que sería deseable y del que pueden soportar las entidades financieras.

La única prioridad ahora para este segmento mayoritario de la sociedad es conseguir engranar algunos trabajos a tiempo parcial para tener techo y comida. El resto de deudas están quedando ya desatendidas. Las entidades financieras se están convirtiendo en pseudo-inmobiliarias. En involuntarios cambiadores de dinero de todos, por gadgets y caprichos superfluos devaluados. Y con balances contables de muy difícil equilibrio a pesar de los presuntuosos beneficios que aún publican.

Empleos a tiempo parcial y morosidad son conceptos que van desgraciadamente de la mano en un escenario de abuso crediticio. Y la que hasta hoy llamábamos clase media se está reconvirtiendo trágica y apresuradamente en clase pobre o baja. Los sueños de millones y millones de personas se están haciendo mil pedazos al tiempo que pierden sus empleos, sus activos hipotecados o debidos, su solvencia y en muchos casos su dignidad. Y no sólo estamos hablando de inmigrantes, ni mucho menos.

Cuando la Economía se desmorona como lo está haciendo, el empobrecimiento social es tan sólo cuestión de tiempo en una tristísima cuenta atrás. Lamentablemente muchos viven ya a tiempo parcial.

Thanks to Marco Antonio Moreno's blog, Check on Neoliberalism, I have come to this Guardian article in which, in an interactive and highly visual way, the Ponzi scheme is evident to which we have taken our financial system. This is something we already sensed almost a year and a half ago., This is no longer in doubt. But let us reflect on the famous formula of the Quantitative Theory, classic, simple and as current as ever that this interactive article shows us in its last (8) click:

Being m = the amount of money in circulation; v = the speed at which it flows through the financial system; p = price of things; and q = the amount of output (GDP).

In the expansionary scenario we left behind, financial innovations strongly boosted the flow of money (virtual or real) into the system. But now we are in the opposite situation. The dryness of credit circulation causes consumption to collapse, thus feeding back into the very dryness of money flows. It is therefore inevitable that the velocity of money circulation (v) collapses. The million-dollar question is: What should we do to compensate for the decline of v and that the rebalancing of the formula does not relegate us to extreme poverty? Leaving aside the classical theoretical considerations and taking the rest as variables, we have several options, but all of them very mathematical and unfortunately not very human., as we shall see below:

1. Increase mCentral banks are on board. In discreet euphemisms, but they are doing their job. easings (suggestions for translation welcome) quantitative and qualitative by the bucketload. In other words, everyone against the fire. At the end of the article, I will give you the English definition of these two concepts
2. Increase pPrices (CPI) seem to be sinking or at best staying the same, despite the efforts to make them rise in terms of the prices set by the States themselves: public services, supplies, etc. In other words, demand is falling, but desperate efforts are being made to keep prices afloat so that the little formula does not collapse too much.
3. Increase qProductivity, divine treasure. Spain is the antithesis of what GDP growth should be. But it seems hard to imagine that global GDP can compensate for the formula at all, even if we keep hope in emerging countries such as China, India, Brazil, etc.

In short, given the dryness of the financial system, collapse can only be avoided by increasing the rest of the variables. until the restoration of the expansive equilibrium (or imbalance).. Global production can only be saved by the emerging countries. But with the first world (a creaky definition) in a deep depression, it seems very difficult for emerging growth to compensate to any great extent. They are our only hope, and yet double-digit growth is already history. Crisis, not collapse, is also hitting these countries. As for prices, those that can be set by governments will probably rise disproportionately. But falling consumption will drag prices down, and the average will hardly rise above the minimum required for bureaucrats and optimists to be able to boast that the recession is behind us. If it does happen, it will be intermittent, as in the 1930s at best. And as for the increase in money in circulation, one need only read the news. Central banks issue, exchange money for junk, buy sovereign and tainted debt, etc. Some voices even pointed to new modalities in the increase of the m, The central banks' own debt issuance, for example. For the first time in history, both qualitative and quantitative concepts are being applied at the same time.:

Quantitative easingIncrease in the size of the balance sheet of the central bank through an increase in its monetary liabilities that holds constant the average liquidity/riskiness of its asset portfolio.

Qualitative easing: Shift in the composition of the assets of the central bank towards less liquid and riskier assets, holding constant the size of the balance sheet, and the official policy rate and the rest of the list of usual suspects.

It will now be clearer to understand why I have said that the options for compensating for the fall of v in the formula are more mathematical than human. We are already living, even if many still want to think that in a year or two everything will be back to the «...".«normality«The "depressive spiral" is going to be very difficult to escape from without leaving behind many victims. Of all kinds. Both sides of the equation will be greatly diminished.. The question is whether we should continue with an inflationary growth model like the one we have been following. mv=pq, or, on the contrary, we can create wealth sustainably without reaching the absurd supra-generational loop of bubble-collapse-bubble. But just as a politician is unlikely to think of sacrifices and government decisions that will yield results beyond the terms of office in which he or she can be re-elected, we cannot be expected to devise economic systems that are sustainable beyond our own generations. If we are offered the possibility of patching up the known system, so that we and our children die of old age without living through a liquidity trap and a collapse of the Financial System, how many would gladly accept? My admiration for those who would prefer to purge all our guilt now and sow, sacrificially in the coming decades, a new system from which our grandchildren and beyond would benefit, but personally I confess that I find it difficult to think beyond the future of my children.

Only he who builds the future has the right to judge the past.
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

If you don't think about your future, you won't have one.
John Kenneth Galbraith (1908-2006)

«I'm looking for a job.» This is the phrase that is taking hold across the Western world, particularly in Spain. Jobs lost due to the economic climate – to put it mildly, the punishment we all deserve – will not be replaced by new ones. A job is rapidly becoming a true luxury that must be cherished like a treasure.

However For many, work is still a right that an evil, exploitative entity cruelly denies them in exchange for greedy profits, and for which we must fight through protest, threats and social pressure.

For the long-term unemployed, this inability to find a new job is an unmitigated tragedy. However, not everyone who still has a job realises that they hold a gem that is very difficult to replace, and very few make a substantial effort to boost their productivity in an attempt to keep their job. Nevertheless, such efforts do not guarantee job security either, and it is possible that the damage to the business is so severe that redundancies or closures will be devastating. The fact is that for many companies, any reaction in terms of labour productivity – if it occurs at all – comes too late.

The bar for securing new jobs in the near future – and indeed right now – is rising day by day. In other words, wages for highly qualified staff are falling, whilst competition for unskilled roles is fierce and candidates are disproportionately well-prepared for those tasks. Supply and demand, after all, but they turn into harsh realities accompanied by deeply personal tragedies.

In this setting, I read an article by Putabolsa with the straightforward title «Looking for work» which I would like to modestly highlight here. I find it a sincere and honest piece, though in my view somewhat overly defeatist, written by someone who is a leading figure in the world of stock market blogging in Spain. Yet another example of how a situation is unfolding that has long been on the cards. I recommend that you read it and don’t miss the nearly hundred comments of all kinds received on the post in question, some of which come from the most prestigious bloggers in this country. As for me, Cesc, I’ll repeat what I already told you in comment number 59 (although I know that isn’t the point of your article). All the best, and see you soon. I’ll leave you with a pithy quote from that article:

«If you're one of those who still have a job, whether it's a crap job or a a real treat »It's a really well-paid job – count yourself lucky, believe me."

Bitchbag.

Mucha gente cree que es una exageración macabra hablar de que en España, como en otros países de Europa, puedan verse disturbios callejeros más o menos generalizados en los próximos años o incluso meses. Algunos ni siquiera soportan oir hablar de ello a pesar de que no lo consideren exagerado. Simplemente prefieren seguir mirando, aunque sea ya desde muy lejos, hacia el añorado Disneyland en el que vivíamos hasta hace un año o dos. Algunos apenas empiezan a sufir en sus carnes (economías domésticas) los efectos de la depresión en sus múltiples formas: Paro, depreciación inmobiliaria, pérdidas en las inversiones financieras, pérdidas empresariales, morosidad, descenso drástico de los ingresos familiares, etc.

En Economía muy pocas veces el futuro es tan predecible como hoy, y menos cuando tratamos de adivinar lo que sucederá a nivel global. Esta vez es muy fácil. El paro va a seguir aumentando en el 2009 y más allá. Las familias van a disponer de menos ingresos y recursos. Se va a trabajar más horas a cambio de menos, y eso con suerte. La virtual clase media volverá al mismo orígen de donde surgió: La clase media-baja o trabajadora. Con sus duras dificultades y sus escasas perspectivas de progreso. Como antaño.

El otro día hablaba con un empresario acerca de este futuro social negro, y me decía: «En España no vamos a escarmentar, la clase media aguantará el chaparrón y seguirá con sus insanos hábitos de producir poco y endeudarse mucho.» Pero va a ser que no. Esa inercia sembrada en el Estado del Bienestar virtual se va a corregir a golpes. Ni la crisis social va a durar uno o dos años, ni vamos a poder subsistir sin cambiar radicalmente nuestra idiosincrasia a base de muchas, muchísimas bajas. Y cuando decimos bajas nos referimos a empresas que desaparecen del mapa, a patrimonios que se extinguen y a economías domésticas modestas que quedan literalmente en la calle. ¿Y qué va a pasar con estos millones de personas que quedan sin ningún recurso? No es difícil adivinarlo si no escondemos la cabeza debajo del ala. La Ex-clase media y media-baja a quien se le va a extinguir el subsidio de desempleo sin posibilidad de conseguir ningún otro ingreso, no va a tener más remedio que delinquir, emigrar (a dónde?) y al mismo tiempo protestar y evidenciar su malestar. Al principio en forma de manifestaciones y huelgas de todo tipo más o menos organizadas, pero al cabo de unos meses, esa situación de emergencia social de millones de personas va a derivar en disturbios callejeros e inseguridad ciudadana. La razón nos dice que no puede ser de otro modo el futuro inmediato que tenemos ante nosotros, a pesar de que tengamos querencia a mirar hacia otro lado.

El escenario va a ser un infierno inimaginable para la generación de jóvenes que todo compraban y tenían, gracias al crédito y a los ahorros de sus antepasados. Pero esa será su visión subjetiva y en realidad vamos hacia un escenario que en países centro y suramericanos conocen bien, o sea ni infierno propiamente dicho ni inimaginable. Una sociedad la de América del Sur que ha vivido desde hace muchas décadas sin apenas clase media, con una minoritaria clase bienestante y una mayoritaria clase pobre que lo pasa mal y se busca la vida (que no los lujos) de la mejor manera que sabe. Y ya no hablemos de la sociedad africana, que ni siquiera alcanza el estatus de sociedad. En oriente también podemos encontrar ejemplos de sociedades con dificultades que están lejos del estado del bienestar occidental que conocemos. Pero quizá es más fácil extrapolar nuestro futuro inminente mirándonos en el espejo latinoamericano.

En general en estos países del sur de América la seguridad ciudadana deja mucho que desear. Y no puede ser de otro modo en países donde una mayoría vive en precario. Podemos mejorar y suavizar la imagen que tengamos de esos países a nuestro antojo antes de compararla con lo que preveemos que va a suceder en España. Podemos pensar que nuestra precariedad se va a quedar a medio camino de la situación actual de cualquier país suramericano, que la recuperación llegará incluso antes de que lleguemos a ese medio camino. Pero la dirección que hemos tomado es esa y no otra.

Supongo que algunos comentaréis que es exagerado hablar de disturbios en España, pero los conatos iniciados por Grecia o Francia vamos a verlos en nuestras calles sin duda alguna. Es sólo cuestión de tiempo. Actualmente ya hay en España más de 1.000.000 de familias en las que todos sus componentes están en paro, con subsidio o sin él. Y sólo vemos la punta de un iceberg creciente todavía alimentado por subsidios públicos. Una macabra cuenta atrás para despertar de un sueño en el que muchos ya nacieron. Eso hace que desconozcan cualquier otro modo de vida, y que el shock vaya a ser mucho más traumático. Esas generaciones intentarán revolucionar el mundo inútilmente (disturbios) en busca de un sueño irrepetible, sin ninguna otra referencia de lo que fue el mundo del s. XX antes de que estos jóvenes nacieran. Esta generación empezará pronto a preguntarse: ¿Hay vida más allá del crédito? Y la respuesta es Sí, pero mucho peor queridos amigos. Bienvenidos al mundo real, se acabaron las píldoras azules.

El shock que causa esta depresión en los jóvenes de la generación del crédito no mejora las posibilidades ni el timing para la recuperación global, sino al contrario. Y los efectos de este escenario en los patrimonios medios y mayores se evidencian día tras día si realizamos honestamente y con rigor el cálculo de la evolución patrimonial en el escenario pasado, actual y futuro.

In the following graph from dshort.com We can see how the four most devastating crashes in the modern history of the global economy have unfolded over time. The chart shows four colours corresponding to the downward trends of:

1. The Oil Crisis from 11 January 1973 to 3 October 1974.
2. This is the dot-com crash, which lasted from 24 March 2000 to 9 October 2002.
3. The Crash of '29 and the Great Depression, from 3 September 1929 to 8 July 1932.
4. The collapse of the current credit bubble, from 9 October 2007 until an as yet undetermined date in the future.

It should be noted that the graph shows, on the vertical axis, the percentage decline from the benchmark index’s previous high. Meanwhile, the horizontal axis shows the duration of these falls, with the figures corresponding to trading days. It should also be noted that the Crash of ’29 is based on the Dow, whilst the other three are based on the S&P 500.

What conclusions can we draw from this chart? For example, we have now seen a 50% decline in as few trading sessions as occurred during the Crash of ’29, whereas the other two declines took many more weeks to unfold. In other words, the steepness of this fall is, so far, only comparable to that of 1929.

On the other hand, we must also bear in mind that the cause of the current crisis is not confined to a specific sector, as was the case in 1973, namely the energy sector (an interesting article from 1975 on the subject), or in 2000, technological (El Mundo’s 2000 Year in Review). As we have mentioned on previous occasions We are facing a multifaceted crisis involving deleveraging and a liquidity trap on an unprecedented scale. Moreover, in a world that is more globalised than ever before, and of course in no way comparable to what happened in 1929.

We should also bear in mind that the chart of the 1929 crash only depicts the main bear market cycle from 1929 to 1932. Under no circumstances can we limit the effects of the Great Depression to the 800 trading sessions covered by the chart, as we must remember that it represents the percentage decline from the previous high. But the harsh reality of the Great Depression lasted right up until the US entered the Second World War following the attack on Pearl Harbour. Therefore, if we compare the current situation with what we see in the 1929 chart, the current depression could last far beyond the 800 sessions shown. And I am not suggesting that we will see a continuous market decline like that of the 1929–1932 period (although we are well on the way to it), but rather that even with intermittent, slight and fleeting price recoveries, the period during which we will be traversing a desert of bullish financial investments may be even much longer than what we see in this simple chart.

Our current economic downturn is without parallel, and so this comparative exercise is highly speculative; however, we should bear in mind that the 800- or 1,000-session period shown in this chart represents nothing more than a single phase of the Great Depression of 1929. And as we have already said, the current crisis is underpinned by unprecedented factors that could make the depression even deeper and longer. However, the current wave of globalisation may have harmful effects by amplifying and prolonging the crisis, as has been the case so far, or, conversely, it may play a decisive role in bringing about a much swifter and more remarkable recovery. Only time will tell.

In the meantime, we should be highly sceptical of predictions of an imminent recovery based on absurd cyclical statistics, drawn from the past and/or recent times, from when the world was capitalist. Today we still do not know what to call the direction we are heading in, but it is something else, a new era where liquidity seems to be the only currency in circulation so far.

Traditionally, the currencies of economies under strain have depreciated against those of stronger countries facing fewer problems. This monetary policy has often come to the rescue in economic situations where countries were on the brink of collapse. It has served as a safety valve inbred when the pressure had become unbearable or highly dangerous. It was an unwritten rule for countries that had not behaved themselves, had not done their homework, or had simply been unable to keep pace with the growth and economic discipline of their neighbours, whose economies were more advanced and sound. Economy ministers have always known that: Before you go down the drain, you lose value but keep playing. In other words, what we would call today a downgrade of a country’s entire economy, but with a certain Outlook positive.

But that was in a bygone era, when every state had its own currency, its own ammunition to be detonated at the whim of its government. The rest—the real powers—heard the explosions in the distance, notched another mark on the handle of their economies, and carried on with their own business.

Today, globalisation has led us to a fully interconnected world, where there are only two major currencies (USD and EUR) and a couple of secondary ones (the yen and the pound). The rest are mere speculative sideshows (with apologies to the CHF or the Yuan and their artificial exchange rates). In this modern landscape, moreover, finance is more interconnected than ever. And we have seen this play out disastrously with the global spread of toxic assets. The global credit crisis has spiralled into a liquidity trap that it seems we will only be able to alleviate by inflating against the clock amidst a crushing depression.

At this point, I hear (read) some voices nostalgically calling for the peseta to be devalued, just as we used to do in the old days when things took a turn for the worse. The very Paul Krugman laments in his NYT blog that Spain cannot devalue. But doing so during a recession is not the same as doing so during an economic boom; it is not the same to devalue when debt levels are moderate as it is to do so unilaterally under the current circumstances M3, not at all (Note that the following chart covers the pre-crash period, i.e. up to June 2006). Who would want to invest in Spain by buying debt that could depreciate in an environment where that is not possible? And if that funding drain were to occur, Spain would be unable to finance itself at a critical moment. Improving our export capacity would be of no use whatsoever, because our economy would already be dead in the water.

Even so, some people recklessly lament the flexibility that a national currency offered in a 20th-century economy. But I don't think so, dit would no longer be feasible to assess, and not just because the euro has replaced the peseta or because it would deter investment. But also because if the EU as a whole were to devalue the euro, it would only make sense to do so against the $. Let me explain: to devalue a currency, it must be done in relation to others that serve as benchmarks – the currencies that lead the economy of the region. Nowadays, globalisation means we can no longer talk in terms of zones, regions or states; we must now adopt a global economic perspective. Therefore, when considering devaluing a currency, we must first identify at whose expense we are going to devalue it. And here we face the big problem: Which are the global benchmark currencies, the benchmark against which to devalue? Who is the dominant power, the driving force of the world today? We would never have thought that these questions might cause us to doubt, would we?

To those who believe that the world’s number one currency is the US dollar, and that the US economy remains the leading one, I would say that there are probably no better options than that, but that we arrived too late. The gradual devaluation – if we can call it that – that we have seen in recent months (and years) is that of the $ itself, particularly against the euro (and even cUsing the yuan as a strategy). And yet the US economic figures are still in freefall. The pound is also plummeting in the City, whilst the yen is paying the price for having been the whipping boy of the carry trade globally, particularly among investors in North American markets.

At this point, it is clear that both the USD and The GBP is depreciating de facto against the euro and the yen, thereby devaluing their currencies in the eyes of the EU. A Europe adrift economically in a scenario where its engine (Germany) has stalled and its transmission (Britain) has broken down; and also a Japan that is shedding a battered yen in a deflationary environment it has known all too well for two decades, and in which it knows how to navigate better than we do.

To speak, therefore, of devaluation, as this concept has traditionally been used, it is now obsolete in a world where The economy is supranational. Today, perhaps we should consider the ability of economic regions (as opposed to states) to devalue their major currencies at will. And in a situation as critical as the current one, we are faced with a kind of «foolish the last«. Others will prefer to see these falls in the USD and GBP as the fallout from the deteriorating state of the US and UK economies, as a form of collateral damage. But in reality, it is more a case of collateral benefit: a covert, new-generation devaluation underpinned by the EUR and YEN. And its effects are no longer as soothing as they were in the Era of Devaluations—far from it. But they will certainly be very harmful to the «the last fools» in this gloomy scenario.

The American Patient continues with prognosis uncertain whilst we Europeans remain at the foot of their bed. And some Spaniards look back fondly on those days of currency devaluations, when being the ‘tail-ender’ (Spain/Peseta) allowed us to make a reset in our beloved currency when we were up to our necks in water. But not now. Now we’re at the tail end of a lion (EU/€) that drinks from saucers of milk and licks the wounds of the American patient. The era of devaluation is behind us; today, it is the world that is losing value in a global ‘Corralito’.

No, BHO isn’t an acronym for any bank that’s been bailed out, nor for the latest scam or bankruptcy. We’re referring to Barack Hussein Obama.

It is rapidly turning into a storm. The whole world is pinning its hopes on the first black president of the US to pull us out of the economic mess we have got ourselves into. He is so much more than just the new president Made in the USA. It is the New Black Hope, multi-ethnic, part of a global and diverse world that strives for sustainability but lacks resources and is in freefall.

Even in his earliest decisions as president, he is encountering very little opposition. He has all the credit in the world (a paradoxical notion) to perform miracles that will likely prove disappointing in the long run, but which, for now, represent Hope with a capital H for countries rich and poor alike. Criticism, discord and conflict will come, but his enemies and natural opponents do not yet dare to tarnish his immaculate aura. In other words, Barack has not yet disappointed anyone. And he hasn’t, not only because there hasn’t been time, but because fans and opponents (both domestic and international) see in this man a different kind of US president, one who has had to govern under unprecedented and extremely difficult circumstances for the world. Logically, the first to shatter this global harmony will be, and indeed are, the fundamentalists: Islamists, Republicans and even Catholics (in fact, the Vatican has already been quick to criticise the decision to allow stem cell research, one of the first decisions taken by Obama’s administration), as well as other relatively marginalised minorities.

All these hardline voices that have been attacking—and will continue to attack—the Obama administration from the very outset and in a systematic manner, and who fail to see in this leader the only driving force capable of pulling the global economy out of a long depression, are irresponsible and short-sighted. They are unable to look beyond their religious beliefs, racial hatreds and political animosities, and/or are incapable of distinguishing the Bush era from the new world that is taking shape with this involuntary re-founding of capitalism. Fundamentalism, in all its diverse and harmful forms, is incompatible with the Big Picture, with a global and tolerant vision of humanity. Sadly, that is the way it is. That is who we are.

However, I am certain that the Barack Hussein Obama phenomenon will prove disappointing in the long run. It cannot be otherwise, since today he embodies the hope of a new world that we are unlikely to be able to reconcile with a global economy that has been dealt a fatal blow. But facing the bleak future that lies ahead of us without the hope, faith and enthusiasm for the Obama phenomenon would be far worse. Because the chances of getting through this with bearable suffering depend on believing, hoping and fighting for our future alongside a different kind of world leader, like Barack. I am not talking about the merits of Democratic policy over others, nor of the merits of the the American way of life with regard to European or non-Western lifestyles, not at all. I’m not even talking about politics. I just want to point out that globalisation has also reached the realm of global political leadership, and it has done so at a time when we need it most.

One indication of the scale of the Obama phenomenon is that his supporters in Facebook At the time of writing, they have over 4,442,988 followers. But what is truly spectacular is that this figure, growing at a constant rate, increases by more than one and a half followers per second whilst the US sleeps, and reaches almost 2.5 new followers per second when it is daytime there… Spectacular. Even its name Barack Hussein Obama, ... inherently embodies the global nature and diversity that it generates debate and controversy. The Obama-Facebook relationship is an example of concepts that did not exist until very recently, and further proof of the exceptional nature of the Barack phenomenon.

We are, regrettably, living through historic times in the financial system and the global economy. We are the only ones to blame. The road to recovery will be long and arduous, but the best way to set out on it is by drawing on whatever hope and conviction we have left for the near future. The BHO Effect It is something we should all be promoting, whether out of conviction, for the common good, or simply out of a basic instinct for survival. And, of course, by convincing ourselves that, even though many will fall by the wayside, we can achieve recovery and it is not a pipe dream: Yes We Can.

P.S. Just for fun: During the Bush era, the White House was living in the technological Stone Age, despite wanting to rule the world. As the saying goes Dans in his article: «…if the boss (Bush) doesn’t set priorities in that regard because he’s technologically illiterate, nobody takes any action…»

Ahí va otro artículo anónimo que nos ha llegado como comentario y en él vemos un caso real de un cuchillo cayendo. Lo que a nuestro juicio merece una reflexión es la posición del gestor/asesor a lo largo de todo el proceso de caída del valor:

«Llevo todo el día queriendo escribir un post sobre Cintra después de ver el castigo de los últimos días. Hoy ha cerrado con una caída del 9% y al final me he decidido a compartir con vosotros lo que pienso del valor. En realidad llevo hablando más de un año de Cintra a mis amigos. Empecé a seguirlo cuando en Diciembre de 2007, en una reunión de inversores organizada por Credit Suisse, el banco recomendaba invertir en bolsa y en especial recomendaban Cintra como valor «seguro». Aún conservo el papel con la recomendación del valor cuando cotizaba cerca de los 12 euros. Lo guardé por que estaba convencido de que se acercaba un ciclo bajista y quería comprobar las predicciones del banco. Desde entonces seguí preguntando regularmente a los gestores de CS por el valor. Cuando en verano el valor tocó los 6,5 euros, pregunté con tonillo sarcástico, si el banco todavía lo recomendaba. El gestor desplegó todas sus armas de buen vendedor para convencerme de que era un valor segurísimo, que el banco lo había recomendado en todo momento. Las palabras textuales fueron «lo recomendábamos cuando estaba a 8,5 y ahora que está a 6,5 mucho más». A partir de ahí empezó toda una disertación del gestor sobre lo bueno que es el negocio de Cinta, lo estable de los ingresos (yo esto no lo comparto pero bueno) y la conclusión era que la bolsa se estaba comportando de forma irracional y que Cintra volvería a su valor objetivo de 13,5 en breve. Mi contestación es que nunca le he pedido a la bolsa que se comporte de forma racional por que nunca lo ha hecho; y que prefería esperar otro año a ver que pasaba. Hoy Cintra ha cerrado a 3,76?. Si en Diciembre del 2007 hubiera hecho caso al banco perdería un 70% en un valor que era «seguro». Menos mal que apliqué mi criterio y no el del banco. Nunca me he alegrado tanto de no comprar una acción. Acabo de recibir un mail de Renta4 que proyecta caídas teóricas hasta los 2,3. Puestos así el suelo claro es el 0, pero seguro que se para antes.

Yo pienso que el suelo de Cintra está cerca aunque no sé decir dónde y creo que nadie lo puede calcular. Aún así todavía no me atrevo a comprar. La sombra de absorción por parte de Ferrovial es el principal motivo. También pienso que no hay que comprar un valor en caída libre pensando que se va parar por ciencia infusa. El caso es que la colocación de Cintra me recuerda demasiado a la salida a bolsa de Terra. No dudo que Cintra, a diferencia de Terra, tiene activos reales. Pero hoy por hoy lo que mas tiene Cintra es DEUDA! Creo que Ferrovial va a esperar a que Cintra caiga todo lo posible para reabsorberla y en esa operación dudo que se pueda ganar dinero si no tienes información de dentro de cuando y a que precios. Que alguien me diga que ganó dinero con la caída de Terra a los infiernos o en la absorción por parte de Telefónica.

Vosotros que pensáis? Seguro que muchos de vosotros a esos precios quiere comprar «activos tangibles» a buen precio. Por esto es un claro ejemplo de que la bolsa no se comporta de forma racional, ¿verdad? «

Independientemente de los comentarios que surjan sobre el valor en concreto, este texto me pareció un claro ejemplo de lo que es hoy el mundo del asesoramiento. Posiblemente las proyecciones de Renta4 sean tan inseguras como las que hicieron en su día los gestores de Credit Suisse, aunque su nivel de acierto sea distinto circunstancialmente. ¿O acaso pensamos que los asesores de Renta4 son más competentes que los de CS? Simplemente esta vez, en este caso concreto, les ha tocado a ellos acertar, y habría que ver qué recomendaban acerca de Cintra cuando estaba en 12 €. Y viceversa, porque lo mismo podríamos decir de los asesores de CS. Pero no debemos ver en estas recomendaciones un afán exclusivamente recaudatorio de comisiones (que también lo hay), sino que los asesores, brokers y gestores de entidades financieras, que se pasan el día frente a unas cuantas pantallas, que se acuestan y se despiertan con cotizaciones en la cabeza, realmente creen en la solidez de valores determinados. O sea, que no todo es prostitución de la recomendación (comisiones), también hay otros componentes como la incompetencia, the mala gestión del riesgo, the inexperiencia (juventud), la gambling addiction, etc…

Por supuesto, los mismos defectos podemos encontrar en la gestión propia de inversión en RV, suponiendo que podamos aislarnos de la influencia de asesores externos (amigos y conocidos, prensa, radio-tv, blogs financieros, etc…). Pero con una excepción: La prostitución de las decisiones de inversión a cambio de comisiones. La gestión Juan Palomo, no obstante, en muchos casos compensa fatalmente la ausencia de dicha prostitución con un incremento de la incompetencia. La autogestión tampoco está libre del resto de los peligros mencionados, pero en algunos casos como el de nuestro anónimo, ha conseguido presevar la inversión contra viento y marea.

No me resisto a recomendaros releer el artículo que publicamos en Septiembre 2007 y atención a los ilustres nombres citados: Alberto Espelosín (Dtor. de Análisis de Ibercaja Gestión) y Gustavo Trillo (Dtor. de Gestión de JPMorgan Asset Management España y Portugal) entre otros. De todos ellos dependen (dependían?) gran cantidad de vehículos e instrumentos de inversión que muchísimos ahorradores compraron a pies juntillas.

Dicho esto, hablemos de CINTRA…

Many are predicting that global rate cuts, even to zero, will do little or nothing to pull us out of imminent deflation. In fact, Japan's benchmark has shown that in its specific case this has been, and indeed is being, the case. And it should be borne in mind that Japanese deflation has taken place in an environment of global expansionary economies. In other words, it has been a persistent deflationary island in a global inflationary sea. This will certainly make a difference with respect to what can happen in a globalised deflation and depression (with the emerging countries' permission), where it will be even more difficult to emerge from the depression without growth benchmarks throughout the West. So if selling money at 0% has proved incapable of pulling Japan out of recession when it had the rest of the world on its side, growing and inflating strongly, it seems even more difficult to grow in a global recessionary environment. Yet some wonder how Japan's economy would be today if the yen rate had remained at the same level as the $ or €? We will never know... or we will.

Turning to the West, evidently current monetary policy is extrapolating the Japanese strategy to the rest of today's recessionary world, with the $ rate already below 0.25% and the € rate already at 2% and falling. At this point several scenarios could be expected:

1. That the near 0% cost of money reactivates world economies towards higher consumption, inflation and eventually positive growth. This scenario would of course be a long way off, and the main difference with respect to the Japanese failure would be the global recession. Common sense would tell us that if Japan has not succeeded in an expansionary environment, the West will be even less likely to succeed in this global multi-crisis depression. However, it is true that we are repeating the same failed strategy but in a different scenario. Worse. But even so, there is hope that some imponderable or butterfly effect could lead to a better outcome than the Japanese evolution.
2. That lending money for almost 0% not only fails to revive economies, but also harms and deepens deflation. Some theories are already out there (I recommend reading Marc Vidal) who argue that a lower cost of money will do little or nothing to improve consumption, while it will bring down costs. This lowering of costs will be passed on to selling prices, thus contributing to a further deepening of deflation. Thus, we would enter a dangerous vicious circle, which could only be stopped by a very strong constant growth in consumption (as a consequence of lower prices/recovery of purchasing power) and excessive public inflation. Note that in this scenario the post-deflation scenario would also be extremely complicated.

In addition we don't seem to be in a position to do so either to implement other strategies that, at present, we are not even able to theorise with any criteria. There is little described, empirical and referenced basis for deflationary developments, margins for manoeuvre and policies to be followed to correct a depression. There are no consensual resources, despite the fact that we have theorised at length about it. Nobody taught us to live in deflation. Capitalism was invented to grow, to overheat and correct excesses cyclically. With the misalignments we have seen in the last century. But a post credit-abuse liquidity trap multi-crisis in a globalised world goes beyond the macroeconomic fiction of the textbooks. the most imaginative eminences. A kind of Double-dip recession has come and no one knows how it happened.

Most of us probably remember the tales of yesteryear told by our grandparents, and even those our parents still tell us today. These stories often involved great hardship and difficult lives that shaped who our ancestors are or were. However, despite everything, the usual answer to the key question is that those times were also very happy. A happiness found in many ways but based on simple, austere things which, nevertheless, lit up their lives and still form part of the indelible memories they pass on to us.

Some of us listened intently and remember those heart-warming stories as a glimpse into a bygone world, very different from our own. Others may have forgotten most of those tales, or perhaps never even wanted to listen to them properly, probably out of sheer disinterest in an ancestral way of life that was unlikely ever to return for anyone. Ours is a world that is now globalised, modern, technological, interconnected, fast-paced, opulent, international, excessive, and so on… We can describe it with countless adjectives, all of them a world away from the tales of our ancestors.

These current, excessive conditions have pushed us to the limit. To the limit of capitalism in the First World, and yet to economic ostracism in the Third World. Nevertheless, it has also spurred the rise of emerging nations, which may well prove to be the West’s salvation in this Great Global Depression into which we have plunged through our own folly. But focusing on the First World, where we are fortunate enough to live, we may well have to endure a certain regression that would be all too familiar to our grandparents. We may once again see a homeowner as a wealthy family, just as in those days when everyone lived in rented accommodation, except for the rich or those from «good families». A time when the middle class was known as the working class and was the norm in a society where everything was in short supply and the future lay ahead.

Setting aside the differences in time and technological and other forms of progress, what is clear is that the consumerism that existed in the developed world until just a few months ago is now a thing of the past. It was unsustainable, at least within the current form of capitalism. And it was not sustainable for the class that, for the first time in Western history, has become the largest: the middle class. Never before had the developed world seen a majority social class that not only had no shortage of resources but also possessed such purchasing power. Perhaps because society has never had such a high capacity for borrowing, and perhaps also because the economies of developed countries broke historical records time and again, in a cyclical pattern, during the second half of the 20th century and up until 2006/2007.

Now it’s time to weed out the excesses, overheating, bubbles, fraud, inefficiencies, speculation, incompetence, abuse, debt, squandering, reckless consumption, and so on and so forth… We will return, albeit partially, to the hard work of our grandparents (let’s forget about the 35- and 40-hour working weeks), to massive rents, and to seeing the owners like the privileged minorities they once were. A a middle class that has been scaled back in favour of an expansion of the lower-middle class, or what our ancestors always called the working class. It will no longer be common for the middle class to go on holiday to the Caribbean, spending a year’s wages—which may well turn into unemployment benefit; or that any young person on a thousand-euro-a-month wage will buy a brand-new car with plenty of horsepower and air conditioning using the salary they will no longer earn over the next four years. But the problem is not losing one’s job and being unable to travel or buy a car (though that is part of it). The problem we have failed to identify during these years of expansive blindness is that we have consumed the wealth produced in the past (savings), present and future. We’ve squandered our future, wasted, I'd say. In the coming years Consumerism will come back to haunt us.

If we are optimistic, we might think that we are perhaps beginning the process of overcoming systemic problems (let us hope so), but society is only just beginning to feel the corrective effects of the destruction of wealth that accompanies every depression. A virtual wealth that we have foolishly consumed over the last couple of decades in pursuit of a deeply misunderstood pseudo-happiness. We may therefore, in the coming years, return to what the States of the pre-welfare, the pre-American dream. And let’s hope that this time we won’t have to wait for a world war to end before we can lay the solid foundations for new excesses.

A fool who recognises his own folly is a wise man. But a fool who thinks himself wise is, in truth, a fool.

Siddhartha Gautama ((563 BC–486 BC) Founder of Buddhism.