A lo largo de nuestras vidas hay momentos en los que nos toca sufrir situaciones no deseadas como un despido, una separación, un nuevo ambiente laboral, que ponen a prueba nuestra capacidad de sacrificio y superación. Estas travesías en el desierto son duros viajes que nos enfrentan no sólo con el entorno que nos rodea, sino también con nosotros mismos, pero que tienen una luz al final del túnel, una salida para el que supera las adversidades y logra llegar a la meta.
Durante el trayecto, el viajero tiene que superar multitud de escollos, pasará hambre, sufrirá por encontrar agua, se helará por las noches, el sol abrasador del día terminará por agotarlo… pero los oasis le ayudarán a no languidecer y renovarán sus energías.
El vencimiento, al fin, es cuestión de fe en uno mismo y en unos valores que lo ayuden a uno a soportar lo que se le ha venido encima: orden, disciplina, capacidad de sufrimiento, saber esperar y saber continuar.
Es bueno atravesar un desierto, o varios, a lo largo de la vida. Las dificultades pasadas dieron tiempo a pensar, a conocerse a uno mismo en profundidad, y lo que es más importante, a superarse con cada nuevo reto y acabar venciendo.
Me gustaría usar este texto como analogía del periodo que nos va a tocar sufrir en España. Hasta hace bien poco sacábamos pecho y nos creíamos a la cabeza de Europa con esos crecimientos espectaculares del 4-5% frente a los míseros 1-2% de Francia o Alemania, pero de repente, como si de un sueño se hubiese tratado, nos hemos despertado y sólo vemos una vasta extensión de arena a nuestro alrededor, un enorme desierto del que será difícil salir, pero no imposible. Algunos, los que están cerca de los oasis, aún siguen pensando que todo es perfecto.
España debe mentalizarse de que los años venideros van a ser duros, agudizados por nuestra baja productividad y por la muerte de los dos modelos en los que se sustentó el crecimiento en la pasada década, el turismo y la construcción. Sólo aceptando que los modelos del pasado fueron incorrectos podremos sentar las bases para que nuevos crecimientos futuros tengan lugar.
Tomemos como ejemplo el caso de Italia, por ser prima hermana nuestra, aunque juegue en otra liga. Italia tiene un poder exportador del que carece España, no en vano se sitúa entre las 8 potencias mundiales exportadoras, aunque su balanza comercial sea también negativa. Las mayores exportaciones italianas las podemos situar en los campos del motor, la industria petroquímica, la armamentística o la eléctrica, pero, sin duda, lo que proporciona a Italia una ventaja respecto de España son sus industrias clave, aquellas mundialmente conocidas y que gozan de prestigio a nivel internacional como son la industria alimentaria, la industria de la moda y la industria de coches de lujo. En este caso el Made in Italy la dota de un seguro de vida frente a posibles competidores y salvavidas en una época como la actual.
España, por contra, aún teniendo unos embutidos exquisitos, unos vinos que hacen gozar a cualquier paladar, unos quesos o aceites que recogen premios mundialmente (aquí siempre fuimos muy aficionados al buen comer), no consigue que sus productos sean vendidos en establecimientos corrientes de medio mundo, como sí sucede con los italianos. Da rabia estar en un restaurante de nivel medio en el extranjero, hojear la carta de vinos y observar cómo, entre la cantidad de botellas italianas, francesas, californianas y australianas, apenas hay un par procedentes de España, y a veces ni siquiera eso. Y éste es sólo un triste ejemplo de la escasa fuerza del Made in Spain.
España tiene que aprovechar esta dura época que se avecina para sentar las bases de un crecimiento futuro, hacer una apuesta clara por algunos sectores con los que se puedan lograr ventajas competitivas (como las tiene Italia actualmente) en el futuro. Si ésta travesía en el desierto no nos sirve para abrir los ojos, conocernos en profundidad e intentar superarnos en el futuro, el crecimiento español estará abocado a la presencia de burbujas de distintas índoles que cada vez que se pinchen no harán sino hundirnos más en las arenas movedizas del estancamiento y la recesión.
Lo primero que quiero deciros es que lamento la extensión de este artículo que podríamos haber dividido en al menos dos partes, pero creo que será más claro y conveniente si lo leemos de un tirón que tener que releer la primera parte cuando se publique la segunda. Allá va, pues, el artículo completo:
Últimamente estamos detectando a través de nuestras entrevistas con potenciales nuevos Clientes, una mentalidad difícilmente compatible con una perspectiva de recesión y depresión como la que tenemos ante nosotros. Muchas familias e inversores están convencidos de que no es momento para vender sus inmuebles en España, de aflorar sus pérdidas en renta variable o de vender por debajo de la par acciones preferentes y estructurados varios que les vendieron aquí y allá.
Esta estrategia, si se le puede llamar así, es la que se solía adoptar en periodos de corrección de mercados, donde un mercado alcista venía seguido de otro bajista en el peor de los casos. Cuando los ciclos se sucedían con una irregularidad conocida y en un entorno expansivo y de crecimiento de las economías prácticamente continuado desde la II Guerra Mundial. En aquellos ecenarios, a los inversores más pasivos y menos ágiles les bastaba con atrincherarse durante estas correcciones cíclicas y esperar tiempos mejores para recuperar el crecimiento patrimonial perdido temporalmente, promediando a largo plazo una progresión alcista de sus activos inmobiliarios y/o financieros. Sólo los que daban bandazos estratégicos inconexos en su política inversora podían sufrir pérdidas importantes en sus patrimonios a largo plazo, y a éstos los bautizamos ya en algún artículo anterior como «I’m leaving, I’m off there«. Unos y otros venían enfrentandose con diverso éxito a un entorno cíclico, cambiante pero conocido.
Sin embargo el escenario actual es recesivo y creemos que estamos ante una larga depresión global. Por tanto los ciclos difícilmente pueden repetirse tal y como los veníamos adaptando a nuestros patrimonios. Como ya hemos dicho anteriormente, estamos ante un orden desconocido al que de momento sólo le podemos llamar caos. Como anécdota os contaré que un amigo de avanzada edad y multimillonario nos comentaba hace unas semanas: «Con cada crisis he disfrutado y he ganado mucho dinero. Cuando peor estaban las cosas, más y mejores negocios he hecho y más he disfrutado. Pero ésta, chico, por más vueltas que le doy… ¡no sé por dónde coño cogerla!»
En ese escenario depresivo, hoy por hoy sólo tenemos una referencia: Japan. Una economía donde los inmuebles no han dejado de bajar de precio y cuyo índice bursátil ha descendido desde casi los 40.000 puntos hasta los 8.000 durante dos décadas. Hoy las mayores empresas de ese país cotizan en bolsa a los mismos precios que 25 años atrás. Toda una vida inversora, sin duda.
La pregunta que cabría hacerse es: ¿Los occidentales vamos a sufrir una recesión tan grave como la japonesa? No, peor. Espero con todas mis fuerzas equivocarme, pero la capacidad de sacrificio y producción de la sociedad japonesa está a años luz de la de occidente, especialmente de la latina. La Eurosclerosis es endémica, y afrontar con esta y otras graves patologías productivas una Great Depression, the big one es como intentar correr una maratón con anemia. Por eso pensamos, tal y como dijimos en USA vs Europe, que el timing de la recuperación, o mejor dicho, la travesía del desierto va a ser ligeramente menos dramática para los EE.UU. que para Europa, aunque muy penosa en ambos casos.
Por lo tanto, aunque nuestro anclaje en Disneylandia no nos permita aceptar una realidad tan cruda y unas perspectivas tan prolongadamente negativas, la estrategia de mantener los inmuebles y las carteras de RV, estructurados y preferentes con graves afectaciones en sus cotizaciones puede ser la puntilla que le faltaba a nuestro patrimonio para claudicar ante el multicrack global que estamos sufriendo.
No existe bienestar social que pueda soportar el escenario actual de crisis inmobiliaria, bursátil, energética, de crédito y liquidez global. Por lo tanto, si nos centramos en el valor inmobiliario, no mal vender en la actualidad, probablemente suponga vender peor en el futuro. Desde nuestra perspectiva profesional vemos a diario como aumenta vertiginosamente el número de propietarios de inmuebles que, a pesar de no considerar el momento como apropiado para vender, no tienen más remedio que colocar sus propiedades en el mercado. Es cierto que muchos todavía no tienen esa necesidad porque sus economías son todavía holgadas. Para algunos les quedan sólo semanas, para otros meses, incluso años, pero para la inmensa mayoría de propietarios de inmuebles no es más que una fatal cuenta atrás. Los ingresos empresariales y/o laborales se revisarán a la baja en mayor o menor medida en este escenario de crisis, y las rentabilizaciones mediante alquileres que ayuden a pagar las hipotecas pendientes también se están viendo y se verán muy perjudicados con la crisis social que hoy tan sólo se inicia. El resultado será implacable en los próximos años: Millones y millones de multipropietarios se verán obligados a poner en el mercado inmuebles en venta, de forma paulatina y masiva. Y cuando la oferta aumenta, los precios sólo pueden ir en una dirección, pocas cosas son tan seguras en este mundo económico. Por tanto la recuperación de precios inmobiliarios no sólo está muy lejos sino que muy probablemente sigan perdiendo valor durante muchos años, tal y como nos evidencia nuestro único referente recesionista nipón. En este punto volvemos a recordar la frase: No malvender hoy puede obligarnos a vender peor en el futuro, ya que nuestra vida inversora no es inmortal ni el patrimonio de la mayoría de multipropietarios suficientemente gigante como para soportar en la trinchera una Gran Depresión, the big one. Pero no estamos proponiendo que los inversores se queden sin inmuebles, ya que no concebimos hoy por hoy un patrimonio equilibrado sin ellos, sino que deberíamos deslocalizar nuestras inversiones inmobiliarias hacia zonas con mejores perspectivas que las españolas o incluso las europeas, tanto las especulativas como los blindajes de patrimonio en inmuebles prime.
En cuanto al patrimonio financiero arriesgado en RV, estructurados o preferentes perjudicadas, podemos decir algo parecido, pero con la salvedad de que los mercados de variable son mucho más impredecibles. Los flujos especulatorios pueden volver a los mercados de RV mucho antes que a los inmobiliarios. Aunque sea de forma irracional, temporal y en un escenario recesivo. No obstante si volvemos a mirar hacia nuestro único referente veremos un gráfico histórico del Nikkei escalofriante, especialmente en este final de 2008.
En cuanto a las acciones preferentes compradas (y vendidas) como renta fija cuya cotización se ha visto tan perjudicada como la mismísima RV, a nuestro entender son la gran incógnita. No tenemos ningún referente anterior de una crisis crediticia de este calibre. Muchos inversores compraron estas emisiones de preferentes y perpetuas antes del estallido de la crisis de crédito casi a la par, como alternativa de inversión (o directamente confundiéndolas) a los bonos con vencimiento, por tan sólo unas décimas más de rendimiento anual. Después del mes de Agosto 2007, algunos incluso han venido especulando con las abultadas caídas de estas emisiones perpetuas, como si de una cotización de variable se tratase. Algo jamás visto, aunque no por ello necesariamente desaconsejable si se tiene bien presente que el riesgo implícito en esta práctica es de imposible calibración, dado que jamás habíamos visto semejante colapso en la financiación corporativa ni bancaria. Muchos de estos inversores, tanto los que compraron antes del estallido de la crisis crediticia casi a la par, como los que lo han venido haciendo de forma especulativa después, ni siquiera lo han hecho comprendiendo bien sus infinitas variables respecto a la letra pequeña ni las circunstancias de cada emisión (acumulables, callables, subordinadas, posición y valor ante un credit event, relación del emisor real con la entidad subyacente, etc.). Precisamente estas variables menospreciadas habitualmente en tiempos de bonanza y confundidas con un simple bono con vencimiento (además de otras variables más oscuras e imponderables), están suponiendo la radical diferencia en plena crisis de crédito entre una deuda corporativa sólida, un vehículo de inversión especulativo o un puro papel mojado. Sólo el tiempo dirá, está diciendo, cuál es cuál.
Cuando escuchamos las explicaciones que nos dan algunos potenciales clientes respecto a la inoportunidad de salir ahora de los mercados mencionados (RV, estructurados varios o deuda perpetua o acciones preferentes), nos parece oir las mismas palabras pronunciadas por sus respectivos gestores de banca. Son sus mismos discursos que repiten hasta la saciedad a todos sus clientes desde hace ya algunos meses. De 8h a 14h, de lunes a viernes, y sábados alternos. «Ahora no es momento de realizar pérdidas puesto que serían muy cuantiosas», «estamos ya tocando fondo», «ahora es momento de comprar más y mejores acciones (estructurados o emisiones) muy baratas» y otros tópicos por el estilo.
Lo curioso es que en épocas alcistas nos decían: «ahora no es momento de realizar beneficios puesto que la fiscalidad de las plusvalías sería muy costosa», «ahora es momento de comprar más y mejores acciones (estructurados o emisiones) con muy buenas expectativas» y otros tópicos por el estilo acompañados además por resultados históricos que reflejaban el símbolo del € en nuestras dilatadas pupilas.
O sea que los banqueros y asesores «gratuitos» en general, nunca nos recomiendan que salgamos del mercado. De ninguno, jamás. Obviamente salir supondría un lucro cesante para dichos asesores que no están dispuestos a sufrir. Ellos no. A lo sumo, en un arranque de ética que no debe servir de precedente podríamos oir algo parecido a: «Wait & see…BUT WAIT INSIDE!», eso sí, en un correcto, amigable y paternalista castellano, es decir: «Ni se te ocurra vender con esas minusvalías que estamos en el peor momento, trae más pasta que está todo muy barato»,«Hazme caso que yo esto ya lo he vivido otras veces». Dicho por alguien con corbata que jamás soñará con poseer ni una décima parte de nuestro patrimonio, y como si no vendiendo perdiéramos menos. El caso es que cuando nos dicen lo que queremos oir, se lo ponemos muy muy fácil a los comisionistas. Pero, si no recomendaríamos a un inversor que se haya mantenido en liquidez (haberlos haylos) entrar ahora al mercado y comprar nuestros productos financieros de RV, estructurados o perpetuas, a precios actuales, ni tampoco comprar a precios de hoy nuestros inmuebles, ¿por qué c… los mantenemos nosotros en lugar de trasladar nuestro patrimonio hacia activos con igual o inferior riesgo que tengan potenciales crecimientos en los próximos años racionalmente mucho más probables? Veamos nuestras posiciones de riesgo en RV, estructurados varios y deuda perpetua o acciones preferentes perjudicadas, bajo la perspectiva de una larga depresión sin precedentes y nos daremos cuenta de que nuestro patrimonio se verá muy perjudicado si le aplicamos el «Wait & see… but wait inside» que nos recomiendan los que viven de nuestras comisiones.
Mantenerse a la expectativa hasta que vislumbremos una estrategia clara es prudente en los tiempos que corren, pero debe hacerse fuera de los mercados. Y a pesar de ser una obviedad nos sorprende ver cómo muchos de los tenedores de inmuebles o de activos financieros de riesgo mantienen sus posiciones. Pero lo peor de todo es que no sólo su patrimonio sigue correlacionado al 100% a los mercados bajistas, sino que probablemente tenga un gran coste de oportunidad al no invertir estos activos en inmuebles con mucho mejor potencial, y también en activos financieros con riesgo muy inferior que convertirían nuestros rendimientos negativos en positivos, incluso en una estrategia de «wait & see». Sólo debemos esperarnos financieramente fuera de dichos mercados y trasladar nuestros inmuebles hacia países con mejor perspectiva que España o Europa. Llevar a cabo dichas estrategias no sólo es psicológicamente complejo para una Familia, sino que también necesita un apoyo logístico y profesional para hacerlo de la mejor forma, siguiendo una hoja de ruta que debe estar diseñada a medida del Cliente. Un Family Office debe acompañar en ese camino y solucionar los problemas que vayan surgiendo a medida en que el patrimonio se va adaptando a la estrategia y las necesidades diseñadas.
Si por el contrario, pensáis que la crisis va a ser corta o pasajera como tantas anteriores, olvidad este artículo.
Perhaps it was the effects of the mid-August heat and the Summer Red between one screenshot and the next, but as we put it so elegantly at the time: «»Everyone, without exception, is blatantly looking out for their own interests’. Let’s remember that EVERYONE recommended a minimum of between 30 and 45% of stock, with the sole exception of Atlas, which proposed 20%. It would be interesting if Expansion be reissued today the article in question, based on an approximate recalculation of the losses that everyone would incur potential clients who might have followed the advice of those eight organisations. In fact, their published recommendations (and even more so their day-to-day advice) undoubtedly influenced thousands of investors, given the reach and prestige of that newspaper and of the organisations in question.
Some of those names already sound to us like nationalised bankruptcies, such as Dexia or Lloyds. Could it be that, because of their precarious situation, they recommended investing in the stock market when the world was already in tatters? I’m afraid not. Their recommendations – and those of everyone else – were always geared towards profit-making, regardless of stock market cycles. Some organisations have gone down fighting, even though the State brings them back to life on the third day; but what’s more, the rest continue to fire at will. They’ll never learn, neither the financiers nor the speculators. Well, these last ones have certainly learnt their lesson: Losing out. But they will soon forget their mistakes and return to the arms of those who have squandered their wealth. Whether it is the power of their ties, the pompous air of the institutions, or even the greying temples of some of them who are merely awaiting early retirement, the reality is that any banker enjoys enormous, surprising and outrageous credibility amongst their clients. Even from those long-suffering clients who are saddled with very substantial losses through the bankers’ fault, in a paradoxical Syndromein StockholmFinance.
The recommendations made by these eight financial institutions are like eight doctors prescribing, via the press, various very expensive slimming pills (commissions and brokerage fees generated by the asset allocation of the eight institutions), which not only fail to help people lose weight but have actually caused ALL users to put on a great many kilos. Furthermore, the side effects of these extra kilos are incalculable (ranging from a loss of savings for old age, to a drastic change in the family’s standard of living, to depression at having squandered, in just seven weeks, much of a lifetime’s hard work). However, these «medical professionals» They continue to prescribe investment strategies on a daily basis which, whether they prove successful or not, have only one clear and inescapable objective: to generate commission for the firm. Proof of this is that Not even in the height of August, when the outlook and the current situation were already looking very bleak, did any of the organisations consulted recommend staying out of the markets. It’s true that everyone recommended being in moderate liquidity, but through money market funds and bonds, both of which incur fees and brokerage charges that drive returns significantly below 5%!!! The exception – albeit a rather dubious one – was once again provided by Atlas Capital, which recommended a 50%, just a 50%, of the total volume in the form of pure deposits, offering a better return and little or no commission for the institution in question.
In the current dire situation, maintaining liquidity at 1.5 or 2% above monetary policy rates – or short-term bonds (which significantly increase the burden of their brokerage fees) – is the difference between a good strategy and a bad one. Given the current state of affairs (and as is always the case), is the difference between an honest and a dishonest professional recommendation. Furthermore, we must deduct the losses incurred by the ‘RV butchers’, which have meant that, for the most part, they have not abandoned the markets due to their eagerness to collect stock market commissions, including their eagerness to collect success fees and their endless variations. The result: Devastating.
Perhaps some people will learn the hard way for a while, but their memory will still be very short.
P.S. Once again, *Expansión* published an article on 1 November (a terrifying day) an article (a terrifying one, too) by M. Martínez, in which he argues that, due to falling share prices of listed companies, their dividends are more attractive than bank deposits – and even more so when compared with sovereign fixed-income securities. Of course, the sources cited all have vested interests in asset management firms that thrive on the commissions generated by stock market investors. Our madness has reached such extremes that one can now confuse the risk of fixed-income investments and bank deposits with that of equities and publish it in a prestigious newspaper such as *Expansión*… Unabashedly peddling the residual dividends from our recent past of a bubbling boom, whilst we are in the midst of being engulfed by the perfect storm, which will swallow up not only the dividends of these listed companies but the companies themselves, whole and unchewed. ¡Leave, Ladies and gentlemen, a boring deposit at 6% – go and buy me that «Dividendus» hair growth treatment…! Keep it coming, it’s war!… We’re in a really, really bad way.
The number of wrongdoers does not justify the crime.
45 years after his famous speech, Luther King’s dream has been realised with the election of a black man as president of what is still the most powerful nation on the planet. The Republican bid was doomed from the start due to its historical tensions with Bush. McCain was never a serious contender against Obama. He was there because it was his turn, and there was no way for the Republican establishment to prevent it. Some voices see shady dealings which they claim were necessary for Obama to be elected, but in fact some voices see conspiracies everywhere and all the time. Be that as it may, the costly campaign is now history, and the present and the future belong to a black Democrat.
The situation facing the new president is shockingly unprecedented. Barack Obama will obviously go down in history as the first black president of the US, but also for the times in which he has had to govern. Only history will tell whether or not Obama rose to the occasion. A devastated global financial landscape in freefall is what awaits the new president, who, together with the world’s other leading figures, is expected to devise a new form of capitalism.
The G20 summits and their various offshoots will take place over the coming months. A long and uncertain process that would have been derailed by McCain and the Republicans under the pretext of protecting the free market in a fundamentalist manner. Obama supports the death penalty, is anti-abortion, and attends mass almost daily, yet he is still the progressive option who may be more receptive to the The Reformation of Capitalism. But let us be responsible, G20 leaders: without proposals or agreements that are surprising and groundbreaking, we will not find a solution. And only Obama and his team would be able to accept and work on drastic proposals; McCain would not.
What will these proposals be? There is much speculation, but it is nothing more than that. However, it seems logical to assume that preparations for the forthcoming summits – at least for the first one on 15 November – are likely to be very intense. All the heads of state involved in the G20 in one way or another are set to experience moments of glory for their own self-importance. Unfortunately, some will not be up to the task, but these incompetents can rest assured that no one will ever find out. For the time being, the mere fact of acknowledging that the future of the global economy – that is to say, the future of the planet – must lie in the hands of some twenty countries, including states with per capita income of just 1.000$ is already a great achievement for humanity. This simple yet magnificent organisational success – unimaginable amidst the frenzy of the welfare state – is a sign that our leaders (everyone’s leaders) have grasped the significance of the moment. And the G20 leaders and their respective teams represent us all, even if there are not 21 or 22 of them. Only if we see it this way – those who are included and those who are left out – will we be securing the future of humanity.
Now, G20 leaders, surprise us with your proposals. It won’t be McCain we can blame for the failure of the measures to be taken, but Barack Obama, the first black president in US history. Gimme Hope, Obama, Gimme Hope…
This is the current list of G20 members: Germany, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the United States, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Russia, South Africa, Turkey and the European Union.
P.S. If, against all expectations, McCain wins, we’ll be writing about it shortly Gimme Hope, Obama, Gimme Hope (Part 2).
A spectacular article by Investorsconundrum: «How much is a bank worth today?». I think it’s worth mentioning, by way of memes, all of us who work in this field and write about it should give some thought to the possibility that the global financial solution may lie in minimising the stock market value of banks. The dichotomy between a capital increase and the state plugging financial holes could be the difference between a fall in value for shareholders or for depositors (customers). But beyond this dichotomy of future solutions—whether viable or not—let us reflect on some factors affecting the valuation of banks in the current situation.
The first thing I’d like to do is congratulate Marc Garrigasait for daring to write an article like this. For being radically consistent with a line of reasoning in which he firmly believes (so much so that he has written off his exposure to Koala Capital SICAV (in banks). Hats off to them, whether you agree or not.
I hope that, following on from Marc’s post and this or other memes, various bloggers will also share their views and discuss the future value of banks and their impact on the crisis. Some have already done so brilliantly, such as Gurusblog. And it would also be very interesting if Echevarri, Marc Vidal, Fernan2, FuturFinances, Unience… (to name but a few who are still active), and a long list of other illustrious figures, both well-known and lesser-known, did the same. Now let’s get on with our thoughts on the matter:
If banks are worth whatever someone is willing to pay for them, then clearly they are not worth zero today. Obvious, yet unsettling. The market – that is to say, we – generally cannot, at present, conceive of a world without banks unless we make the (futile) effort to imagine how our great-grandfathers lived when they were courting our great-grandmothers. And that very difficulty in imagining a world without banks already increases their value, whether calculated on an accounting or fundamental basis. We are prepared to pay more for them than they deserve because of our anchor in a multi-generational system that is inconceivable without the banking sector. Is the value we mentally ascribe to it irrational, or is it irrational to think that its real value is zero?
We can also attribute a different kind of value to them. For example, the fact that always have managed to reinvent their business for as long as anyone can remember (with banks, of course). This argument is literally priceless. To explain what I mean more clearly, let’s watch an extract from the following video: Jurassic Park in which, even though rationally speaking the chances of the dinosaurs reproducing uncontrollably within the park’s controlled environment were nil, as the mathematician played by Jeff Goldblum says: «Life finds a way». In this case, we could say that ever since the financial system as we know it came into existence, and despite the various difficulties, «the banking sector has managed to forge ahead».
For various reasons that are probably beyond our understanding today, traditional banking will be restructured in such a way that it manages to endure over time as a strategic and dominant sector. Therefore, if we agree on this, that resilience – or ability to rise from the ashes like the Phoenix, has an intrinsic value that may keep bank share prices above reasonable levels in the near future.
«When the time came for him to die, he would…’ nest spices and aromatic herbs, he added just one egg, which it incubated for three days, and on the third day it burst into flames. The Phoenix was completely consumed by the fire and, as it turned to ashes, the same Phoenix—always unique and eternal—emerged from the egg. This happened every five hundred years.»
It seems quite reasonable to me that the near-total collapse in the value of bank shares could be a solution for absorbing the global shortfall over time. But it is not the only solution, and perhaps not the least traumatic one either. That is another possible reason why they might remain significantly above zero. We do not need banks to fall to zero or near-zero value whilst governments – that is, all of us – retain a certain capacity to absorb shocks, deficits and toxic assets, or simply the ability to postpone the problem through inflation (Rescue Me) and «credit revival».
Not only is that scenario unnecessary, but our view of the banking sector is not objective. In other words, most of us are directly or indirectly involved in banks’ balance sheets, either through assets or liabilities. Our assets are their assets, and will remain so for at least a generation. The credit excesses that caused the bubble – which in turn have led us to consider whether the value of banks should approach zero – have left us up to our necks in debt to them, and it could not be otherwise. We can therefore hardly have the objectivity to value them that we might have with any other listed asset, such as a factory (KO o AAPL) or a distribution company (WMT). With these companies, we can indeed aim to determine their intrinsic, fundamental value and compare it with the value currently assigned to them by the market. And even then, only the privileged They make money from it on a sustained basis. In contrast, our money, most of our property and our hopes and dreams depend on the banks. And that could well be worth a subjective overvaluation, whether conscious or unconscious. At this point, we are reminded once again that: If banks are worth whatever someone is willing to pay for them, then clearly they are not worth zero today. Obvious, yet unsettling.
Another possible reason why banks retain a value higher than they might rationally deserve is the fact that they deal in something that the whole of the First and Second Worlds need: Money. Let’s say they sell, market and – I would say – often traffic in an item whose market share is 100% across the entire planet, with the exception of the Third World, where hunger and destitution shamefully take the place of money. Only in that extreme case of poverty are the inhabitants not potential customers of the banking sector. The rest of the world certainly are, without exception. And we become even more dependent the more wealth we create, whether it be virtual or real. That, then, together with the other arguments we have mentioned in this article, is the goodwill by far the largest on the planet(«a set of intangible or non-material elements of a business that represent value to it»).
Furthermore, the political decision for us all to work together to revive the financial institutions that are already wandering the globe looking like zombies in the truest sense of the word Thriller, is taken. The damage caused by the death of Lehman Brothers was the catalyst for a firm, global political decision: Never Again. Without that political decision, the price set by the banks – by all of them – would probably be no more and no less than that of LEH, which, in peacetime no Take a breather. That’s half a dozen $ cents per share. The difference between its share price and that of the other banks should not be sought so much in their balance sheets – all of which are infected by the same virus – but rather in political decisions and arguments such as those we are setting out in this post. Intangible, abstract, irrational arguments that are difficult to grasp… call them what you will, but their effects are evident to this day. Would it not be reckless to ignore factors such as those mentioned when assessing how much a bank is likely to be worth in the near future?
It is also worth noting that all these considerations are based on a scenario without panic; for if panic were to set in, bankruptcy would set in even before share prices had time to hit rock bottom in their free fall.
Perhaps we simply need to give it time to see the banking sector’s market capitalisation drop to zero, and to regret not having been able to capitalise on the opportunities that would have arisen had we analysed events rigorously, as Investorsconundrum does. But if we accept that The current situation is more chaotic than it was a year and a half ago, all these arguments – which are difficult to assess – must be given greater prominence in our feeble and endemic attempts to predict the future. My first instinct is to agree with you, Marc. But if we are to write, reflect and offer our readers something more, I believe we must not underestimate the arguments mentioned.
Congratulations, Marc, on your courage. It’s clear that you’ve made us think and write about something that many of us had vetoed on grounds of liability in the subconscious. That’s all I have to say. Now it’s over to you to decide and have your say.
Do your best to keep up appearances, and the world will give you the benefit of the doubt on everything else.
«Feelings, nothing but feelings»—that’s how the song by Morris Albert. And today we’re going to talk about emotions as they relate to economics.
Already during the 2005, 2006 and, above all, the first half of 2007, a sense of unsustainable, effervescent euphoria began to take hold among some investors. These privileged visionaries acted accordingly, exiting the property market and equity markets well before they reached their peak. This minority was vilified by those around them who continued to make money, deluding themselves into believing Masters of the Universe immortal. But this sense of unsustainable easy money, which was evident everywhere—including in the form of credit—became increasingly apparent to many during the first half of 2007. The overheating was already obvious, and a breakdown of any kind was more than predictable.
At August 2007 arrived the evidence that the dysfunction had occurred and the causes were beginning to be explained in an understandable way for the majority who were still living in a fantasy world. Some hysterical voices were proclaiming the end of the world, whilst others of us tried to keep calm in the face of events that, even back then, seemed to us like a black swan with its feet and beak covered in soot. In October 2007 we all already had the details of what was happening and we were aware of the pathological nature of a system that was already a far cry from Wonderland, even though politicians and the public continued to use euphemisms, whether consciously or not. The stock markets remained largely oblivious to the underlying problem, but the feeling For some, it was already a matter of living through something unprecedented and, at the very least, comparable to the crash of '29.
Fasten your seatbelts was the title we used when we published in September 2007 the sudden realisation that some (still only a few) had when they realised that something serious and far-reaching was happening to the economy: «…The global economy is going through a period of turmoil, much like the passengers on a plane when the pilots detect problems mid-flight. The calm of a journey where comfort had made the passengers and crew forget they were at an altitude of 10,000 metres, travelling at a speed of 950 km/h and with an outside temperature of minus 25 degrees, has suddenly been abandoned…»
As early as the the first few days of 2008, our feeling was from a clear and imminent perfect storm meticulously and menacingly orchestrated. We immediately saw a mini stock market crash, which we described at the time as Coitus interruptus, as our feeling The view was that the stock market should have fallen much further than it actually did at the time.
In the month of April 2008 The divergence between bond spreads and equity markets that remain sky-high led us to write: The Unstable Chemistry of the Economic Molecule, which showed that this instability would soon have to find a balance. At that point, our feeling y hope was that the RF would stabilise in favour of maintaining equity market levels, although we noted that the opposite movement was, unfortunately, the alternative. It was clear that the situation at the time was unstable and needed to find its equilibrium quickly. Just six months on, the stock market has plummeted and we still have no indication of when it will bottom out.
At this stage, we can say that the balance between debt spreads and stock markets has been restored. We can also say that the most serious social consequences of this global multi-crash are only just beginning to emerge. That the political decisions to save the System and the global banking sector are firm. That the schedule of meetings designed to lay the foundations and regulations for the future of capitalism has already been set in motion, etc. In other words, we have the diagnosis (which remains Forecast: Undecided), the global policy decision has been made, and despite the fact that the recession is already affecting more than 40 countries and the social outlook is extremely bleak, we are beginning to see the feeling that the mistrust it may start to ease off slightly shortly.
We must not confuse an incipient easing of mistrust with an improvement in the situation, or even with a brighter outlook for the future. The road ahead remains bleak, and the macroeconomic figures and the worsening situation are far from having bottomed out. But the mistrust seems to have been largely priced in by now. If this feeling we have turns out to be true, how will it play out and how can we capitalise on it? We come, as usual, to the million-dollar question.
The situation, akin to a house of cards collapsing, is so serious and widespread that it is difficult to predict where we might capitalise on even the slightest easing of mistrust. Perhaps the extremely high volatility near a floor will create a mirage which, between technical indicators and fundamental analysis, will lead us to enter an equity market that is doomed to a flat line for many years of recession. Something akin to what is known as stagflation, but with the concepts of stagnation and volatility: Stagnation, volatility? On the other hand, perhaps a slight recovery in corporate debt liquidity will leave us in the hands of giant companies with a future built on shaky foundations. The much-heralded «credit revival»—perhaps necessary for the survival of the system and of millions of people and businesses—may lead us to mirages in fixed income and equities, fuelled by a slight recovery in confidence. But we must not forget that the fundamentals of this The Great Depression: The Big One There are more films than ever before.
Despite everything, our gut feeling is that mistrust is set to ease, the effects of which could be highly beneficial, but also highly dangerous. We have spent so many months with the ground constantly shifting beneath our feet that we will be inclined to cast aside our mistrust at the slightest sign of improvement. We will therefore be overreacting positively just as we head straight into the eye of the storm. But even as we head into the heart of the storm, doing so with greater confidence provides a great deal of stability. Especially for the financial system, at least as we know it so far.
Our most significant thoughts are those that contradict our feelings.
There is a lot of talk about whether or not it is time to abandon liquidity and start investing in the stock market, although for many, it was liquidity that abandoned them some time ago. It is true that today many companies are already trading at a good price or even at a low price. ridiculous prices as my friend Pepe (a great manager if ever there was one) told me a few days ago. Buffet and other greats already proclaim to the four winds their greed to buy good companies. There are also voices arguing over whether the famous claudication has already taken place or not.
Many have traditionally thought, and even more do so in times of crash, about entering or exiting equity markets on the basis of the Switch Mentality. We have given it this name because it only contemplates two radically different positions: On and Off. In other words, we are up to their necks in it o nwe keep you in liquidity. However, we must bear in mind that, even at these two extremes, there are those who remain liquid with small percentages in stocks that were left up there, such as a mountaineering anchor that was put in place with the intention of making progress but is waiting alone for the market to one day approach it and make it useful again as an investment. And at the other extreme, there are also those who are not only up to their necks in the stock market, but also owe mortgages or even loans they took out to take advantage of the bargains with PER's as low as 25 or 50.
Most of them, however, have a Switch Mentality that only contemplates the simplistic patrimonial strategy of in or out of the stock market. As we explained in Circumstances vs Return/Risk, Our wealth is much more than the money in the bank. Moreover, within what is cash, we must be clear about how much of it we can risk in the stock market, and be aware that this money may not only not generate income for us, but may also be lost to a large extent. All this, within the framework of a Vital Balance which is the roadmap of our life and heritage. For all these reasons, the Switch Mentality is not only simplistic, but also extremely dangerous, as it only has a chance of success if we can guess the exact moment of the market floor. And even then, depression can condemn our longed-for liquidity to a despairing market. flat for many years. Most forget that, even in a non-depressive era, the Dow Jones barely rose by 10% between 1965 and 1983.
We must therefore be aware of the need to forget simplistic strategies and of the need for a moreafé for all. Our heritage is complex and multifaceted. And our circumstances are even more so, and very changeable over time. Therefore, our stock market investment strategy must also be complex and multifaceted.
When we think of the timing When it comes to investing the part of our assets allocated to equities, we must also be clear about the extent to which we are doing so. We must be aware that investing our entire stock market buying power in a few weeks is a gamble. Without the capacity to react to a probable error, either because we are wrong at the time or in the specific assets we are buying. Even if we get the tempo We may need this room for manoeuvre due to a sudden change of scenery or a substantial change in our assets, among many other possible reasons.
I know that many of you will say that with very small assets, the amount to be invested in equities allows little room for manoeuvre. And that is reasonably true, even if, depending on personal circumstances, the percentage of total assets that are susceptible to risk is higher. But for the middle and higher heritage, the switch mentality is one of the most serious mistakes that can be made, as it has only one and only one chance of success. as mentioned above.
Obviously this mentality must be incompatible with a long-term investment that seeks value in our purchases. But it is also reckless to rush in and out of the market even for investors who rely on technical analysis, as they still have only one chance of success even if some figures are highly reliable. Mistakes and/or technical exceptions, with this mentality, can have even more serious consequences than for the investor. value.
In recent days, the United States and the European Union have proposed a series of world summits on the financial crisis, which began after the US presidential elections on 4 November. The credit crisis that has hit the markets has led the United States and its European allies to seek ways of mitigating the impact on their financial systems. At first glance, it may seem that the recession that is palpable in the air will affect both sides equally, and there are even those who believe that the United States is faltering as the world’s leading power, but we are probably a long way from such a scenario…
It is true that the current crisis will have repercussions and take its toll on the country’s economy, but it is no less true that the United States has all the necessary ingredients to remain a global economic powerhouse – quite unlike the situation in Europe, where crises tend to be more painful and protracted.
Between 1973 and 1982, the United States experienced one of the most damaging periods of inflation in its history. As measured by the Consumer Price Index, prices more than doubled during that decade. In 1979 alone, inflation reached 13.3%, paralysing the economy with the phenomenon that became known as “stagflation”, which led many commentators to doubt whether the United States could compete on the world market. Jimmy Carter delivered a famous speech in which he warned of “the existence of a crisis of confidence that was affecting the very heart, soul and spirit of the national will, and which threatened to destroy the social and political fabric of the United States”. Also during that period, major Japanese multinationals bought some of the country’s most iconic buildings, and it was even thought that the United States would be unable to compete with Japan’s efficient economy. The outcome is well known to all.
One of the factors that should be of greatest concern to Europe in relation to the United States is its lower competitiveness compared with the US economy. Taking the aforementioned crisis as a starting point, the differences that currently exist can be clearly seen. Between 1983 and 1984, the unemployment rate in the United States rose to over 10%, whilst that of countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom and France exceeded 12%. From those peaks, the United States began a rapid economic recovery, with unemployment falling whilst GDP rose, whereas European countries were left severely affected and stuck at much higher levels of unemployment, even as their economies picked up.
There are two concepts – which I shall not dwell on at length – that explain the United States’ rapid recovery compared with Europe and its current competitive advantage. The first, known as Eurosclerosis, discusses the lower competitiveness of European labour markets, due to unemployment benefits, relative bargaining power over wages – which entails higher dismissal costs and higher minimum wages – and lower competitiveness in the goods and services market, which we will address in greater detail later. The second concept is the Hysteresis, which explains how, despite the fact that European markets and their institutions were more efficient during periods of strong growth such as the 1970s (and unemployment rates were lower than in the United States), following severe disruptions, these institutions proved incapable of responding to such shocks and did little to resolve the problem of unemployment, instead acting as a brake on recovery. Thus, a persistently high unemployment rate leads to a rise in long-term unemployment and a loss of skills amongst the unemployed, creating a vicious circle that is difficult to break.
In business terms, the differences between the United States and EU countries are also striking. On the one hand, if we look at the largest companies in various sectors, we can see that US firms occupy the top spot in the rankings, if not the entire podium. Companies such as Google, Johnson & Johnson, Intel, Microsoft, Apple, Oracle, Walmart, Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble and a very long list of others are a clear example of this.
Furthermore, and even more noteworthy than the fact that it is home to the world’s largest companies, is the large number of small and medium-sized enterprises, on which job creation largely depends, and the much higher proportion of entrepreneurs compared with Europe. Ultimately, those small start-ups that survive will become the medium-sized or even large companies of the future. The well-known ‘American dream’ is not merely a cliché, but has its counterpart in real life.
Finally, although the American public education system leaves much to be desired, the major private universities provide a breeding ground for business start-ups and for training the best leaders – something that is hard for other universities around the world to match. The University of California, Harvard, MIT and Stanford, for example, are veritable meccas of scientific knowledge and technological innovation. By contrast, government control and regulation of universities by European authorities constitute an objective restriction on their freedom of action. It should also be noted that public universities in the United States receive only a portion of their funding from federal and state governments, unlike the situation in Europe. Consequently, the ongoing pursuit of both private and public funding acts as an incentive to maintain the highest standards of excellence by recruiting the best talent, regardless of their background. These individuals subsequently show their gratitude to the university that nurtured their professional development, by substantial donations which enable the school to carry out major projects and continue to attract talent from around the world: Cluster effect in its purest form.
Facebook, a recent mass phenomenon, was invented by a group of Harvard undergraduates, for example.
In short, the United States’ ability to respond to this multi-crisis we are facing suggests that it will be greater than that of Europe – unfortunately for us – and, with that in mind, we prefer to invest on the other side of the Atlantic, given that the investment opportunities are comparable.
La primera reunión para Refundar el Capitalismo ya tiene fecha y lugar: Nueva York a finales de Noviembre 2008. Se ha querido que se comience a discutir el futuro del Sistema en el mismo lugar «donde empezó el problema» según palabras del mismo Sarkozy. Coincidiendo con la presidencia rotatoria, éste se ha erigido como Estadista líder de la UE, a pesar de que tenga que llevar de paseo junto a él a Barroso a quien sólo le piden que sonría ante los fotografos y que sólo abra la boca para leer discursitos oficiales escritos por el equipo francés. De hecho Sarkozy va siempre acompañado en sus tareas de salvador de Europa por su ministra de Economía Lagard, mientras que Barroso les lleva las maletas. Y no me parece mal.
En Bretton Woods (New Hampshire 1944) se sentaron las bases del capitalismo moderno, después de una II Guerra Mundial convulsa que situó a los EE.UU. en cabeza del mundo económico. De allí salieron el Banco Mundial and the IMF. The Banco Internacional para la Reconstrucción y el Desarrollo (IBRD), se creó ad hoc para superar la pobreza y la destrucción de la II Guerra Mundial en Europa. La reunión de 1944 duró 22 días y esperemos que en la prevista para el próximo mes en NY no se vaya con prisas. Los citados son por el momento el G8 más otros elegidos como Australia, Corea del Sur, Arabia Saudí y los llamados BRIC: Brasil, India y China.
Allí se deberían cortar cabezas en el más solemne, exhaustivo y trascendente sentido de la palabra. Desde regulaciones muy restrictivas a prohibiciones de prácticas y productos financieros que se han demostrado o tan sólo sospechado perjudiciales. También cabezas físicas: Del FMI y de los responsables de aquellos países que no estén aplicando correctamente las medidas de emergencia adoptadas hasta hoy y las que se tomen hasta la misma cumbre. Espero por el bien de todos que se haga justicia también con las Calificadoras de Riesgo, y que se determine cuando menos la «castración química» de los calificadores que titulizaron a martillazos hipotecas NINJA (No Income, No Job or Assets) con flamantes etiquetas con muchas A.
Personalmente pienso que el caso de dichas calificadoras es el más flagrante. Pero lo más escandaloso es que siguen calificando desvergonzadamente. Sin ir más lejos, sólo al día siguiente de que el gigante UBS fuese trasfundido por el Estado suizo, se le degradó su rating y outlook. En cambio su tambaleo era ya evidente a ojos de todos desde que se reconocieron graves efectos detructivos de la caída de Lehman Brothers en sus balances. Lo dicho: Castración química y una temporadita en Guantánamo no sería un castigo muy desproporcionado, ya que la mayoría de los presos allí recluídos jamás perjudicaron tanto a los EE.UU. ni al Sistema financiero mundial como estos trileros con corbata.
Vamos a ver cómo evolucionan estas determinaciones de regulación aparentemente sólidas y los escarmientos públicos y privados. Esperemos que la asistencia sólo presencial de Bush, al que acompañará ya el equipo del nuevo presidente (previsiblemente Demócrata), no impida reformas profundas que hoy por hoy encuentran una gran oposición Republicana.
Se habla ya de la toxicidad de Hedge Fuds y de paraísos fiscales, aunque de éstos últimos sólo sea criticable la opacidad para domiciliar sociedades emisoras de títulizaciones. Es decir, no se recrimina la baja o nula fiscalidad de estos paraísos, sino su falta de regulación que permite emitir titulizaciones de deuda bajo un aparente, y sólo aparente, paraguas de entidades solventes. Así, muchas grandes empresas han emitido deuda a través de pseudo-filiales domiciliadas en paraísos fiscales, que a la hora de la verdad han dejado caer por tratarse de sociedades emisoras con mínimos o nulos vínculos legales con la multinacional que puso en su día imagen y nombre. En esta práctica, durante años no fue necesario declarar públicamente la ausencia de vínculo legal firme entre la sociedad emisora y la multinacional que ponía el nombre y la imagen, ya que era impensable un evento de crédito, pero en los últimos meses y me temo que durante un tiempo todavía: Tonto el último.
Ante esta práctica de juzgado de guardia, deberían demonizar a la pseudo-matriz y por supuesto a la matriz de facto, y no al paraíso fiscal. Es indudable que regulando mejor la transparencia legal de estos países será más difícil repetir estas malas artes. Pero los paraísos fiscales, como lo que su propio nombre indica, siempre serán convenientes en un entorno a menudo sobrefiscalizado. Siempre que colaboren contra el blanqueo de capitales y contra las prácticas fraudulentas de titulizaciones, aunque como ya hemos dicho, esa responsabilidad debe depurarse en la multinacional que realmente se beneficia de esa emisión domiciliada en un paraíso fiscal. ¿Se hará? Deberé verlo para creerlo, pero necesitamos creer en los políticos que van a ocuparse de intentar salvarnos.
Sarkozy, Brown y Obama tienen la oportunidad de pasar a los libros de Historia con un peso específico digno de los Grandes Nombres como De Gaulle, Churchill o Lincoln. Para los de la era de Bretton Woods, siempre nos quedaba París… Esperemos que a partir de ahora siempre nos quede New York y que Guantánamo por fin tenga un sentido global.
El carácter es la virtud de los tiempos difíciles.
Espero que en breve empecemos a ver movimientos corporativos de lo que se podría bautizar en el futuro como Banca Sostenible. Es decir unas entidades de nueva creación, participadas muy probablemente por bancos tradicionales, o digamos de la era anterior. Quizás también participen en estos nuevos Bancos Sostenibles algunas grandes corporaciones hasta hoy al margen del sistema financiero, o incluso, por qué no, algunos Estados.
La incógnita es cómo se van a regular estos nuevos bancos para garantizar su sostenibilidad a largo plazo. No sólo debe ser sostenible la entidad como empresa, sino que el sistema de financiación global (persona, empresas e incluso Estados) debe modificarse sustancialmente. Sarkozy parece tomar las riendas de una UE que parece un patio de colegio, pero eso sí, con colegiales atemorizados y más dispuestos que nunca a dejar las travesuras aparcadas. El susto ha sido tal que no se habla de regulación más estricta sino de The Reformation of Capitalism, y curiosamente ese mismo concepto ya lo publicamos hace un mes, después de la aprobación del plan Paulson. Al menos en la UE, con Sarkozy al frente y la complicidad de Brown, esa es la hoja de ruta. Pero ahora faltará ver si Obama la comparte o por el contrario los lobbies americanos siguen viviendo en Disneyland y presionan para que el escenario cambie sólo lo imprescindible, o sea, más de lo mismo hasta el próximo estallido.
Desde nuestra ignorancia actual del futuro, podríamos intuir que la Banca Sostenible debe multiplicar varias veces su coeficiente de caja (2%), que se debe volver a los orígenes más primitivos de la banca. Quizás veamos pronto nuevos bancos sostenibles que remuneren nuestros depósitos a los tipos oficiales y no al euribor. Y además que lo hagan al tipo menos, en lugar de al euribor más como se está haciendo hoy.
Debemos tener presente que la situación actual nos ha llevado a poder colocar con aparente normalidad grandes cantidades (25 o 50 millones de €) en las siguientes condiciones: Los dos grandes BBVA y BSCH pagan actualmente por estos grandes depósitos aprox. 6,75% anual, mientras que las entidades de segunda linea pero de gran prestigio como La Caixa, Popular, Bankinter, etc… llegan hasta el 8%. Ni que decir tiene que las entidades de tercera como pequeñas cajas y bancos, superan de largo ese 8% para depósitos de esas cantidades a un año.
De hecho las grandes bolsas de dinero son remuneradas de forma proporcional al coste de los CDS’s respectivos. Pero lo más alarmante, si es que aún mantenemos la capacidad de alarmarnos por algo, es que ya nada importa el diferencial del precio del dinero pagado y el cobrado, es decir entre las operaciones de activo y el pasivo del banco. Eso a ningún banco le importa ya, y remuneran desvergonzadamente los grandes depósitos muy por encima de las escasas operaciones de crédito que realizan. Para los que todavía no lo hayan adivinado, la razón por la cual hacen esto es que poco importa ya el diferencial que debe generar su core business, sólo importa tapar agujeros. Achicar agua de forma burda y desesperada.
Por eso la Banca Sostenible debe volver a su estado primitivo, donde probablemente no tengan manera de generar los grandes beneficios de estas últimas décadas. Pero sin duda, hoy captarían una avalancha de dinero aunque ofrecieran sólo un euribor menos 1,5% para los depósitos a un año. ¿O es que alguien con dos dedos de frente preferiría prestarle su dinero a Bancaja o a CAM al 6%?
Esperemos ver en breve la nueva cara de la Banca Sostenible, porque personalmente prefiero no ver las viejas caras conocidas que, aunque estén lavadas y aseadas por papá Estado, cada día están más demacradas y dan más miedo.
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El vencimiento, al fin, es cuestión de fe en uno mismo y en unos valores que lo ayuden a uno a soportar lo que se le ha venido encima: orden, disciplina, capacidad de sufrimiento, saber esperar y saber continuar.
España, por contra, aún teniendo unos embutidos exquisitos, unos vinos que hacen gozar a cualquier paladar, unos quesos o aceites que recogen premios mundialmente (aquí siempre fuimos muy aficionados al buen comer), no consigue que sus productos sean vendidos en establecimientos corrientes de medio mundo, como sí sucede con los italianos. Da rabia estar en un restaurante de nivel medio en el extranjero, hojear la carta de vinos y observar cómo, entre la cantidad de botellas italianas, francesas, californianas y australianas, apenas hay un par procedentes de España, y a veces ni siquiera eso. Y éste es sólo un triste ejemplo de la escasa fuerza del Made in Spain.
España tiene que aprovechar esta dura época que se avecina para sentar las bases de un crecimiento futuro, hacer una apuesta clara por algunos sectores con los que se puedan lograr ventajas competitivas (como las tiene Italia actualmente) en el futuro. Si ésta travesía en el desierto no nos sirve para abrir los ojos, conocernos en profundidad e intentar superarnos en el futuro, el crecimiento español estará abocado a la presencia de burbujas de distintas índoles que cada vez que se pinchen no harán sino hundirnos más en las arenas movedizas del estancamiento y la recesión.
A spectacular article by Investorsconundrum: 
