We look after your interests

(+34) 93 626 47 75

Torres Sarrià, Carrer de Can Ràbia, 3-5, 4ª Planta BCN 08017

(+34) 91 794 19 82

Pº de la Castellana, 93 2nd floor MADRID 28046

Cluster Family Office Blog

The downsides and dirty secrets of ETFs and index funds.

Index funds now account for more than 50% of the US equity fund market. And in Europe and the rest of the world, they are also gaining more and more followers. The main culprits for this are undoubtedly those pulling the strings of actively managed funds, whose mediocre net returns are driving disillusioned investors into the arms of passively managed funds. The reasoning of these disillusioned investors is simple: if we’re going to earn little, at least let’s pay low fees for it. But the fact that the majority of actively managed funds (between 8 and 9 out of 10) are mediocre and fail to outperform their respective indices does not mean that investors should settle for this and stop looking for that minority that outperforms them by a wide margin, as we explained in our article published on the COBAS website a couple of years ago. Here’s an example of the alpha in NET returns achieved by certain star fund managers, outperforming any index fund and with lower volatility:

Obviously, for investors who look beyond the products peddled by banks in Spain, there are gems like the one in the chart above, which outperform ETFs and other index funds by a mile. But what’s more, the comparisons are even more damning if we analyse in depth what is happening in the index fund and ETF industry. Let’s look at some of its shortcomings:

.

Just as a junk food manufacturer is a far cry from a good chef, those in charge of massive index funds such as those from BlackRock, Vanguard Group o State Street Corp They have nothing in common with good value fund managers. The former are only concerned with filling millions of cardboard boxes with something that looks like food, is cheap and appeals to shoppers. They couldn’t care less whether their customers end up with obesity, high blood pressure or any other health problems. All they care about is selling more and more volume every day at low cost. Similarly, index funds focus exclusively on pouring more and more millions into their portfolios, without caring in the slightest whether what they are buying are good or bad businesses, well or poorly managed, without caring about their fair value, let alone the long-term returns they will offer their shareholders. After all, why should they care, when more and more investors are turning away from expensive restaurants and resigning themselves to satisfying their hunger with cheap junk food?

What many people don’t realise is that these three giants of the index fund and ETF industry are responsible for keeping inefficient managers in the companies in which they invest. On reflection, the reasons may well be down to sheer carelessness, but if we scratch beneath the surface a little, hidden motives emerge, as we shall explain later. The fact is that its size is becoming such that their votes on the boards of directors are decisive to retain or replace management teams. The result is that not only do they invest indiscriminately in both good and bad companies (something inherent in passive or index-based management), but their votes also serve to keep poor managers in their posts. The million-dollar question is what interest these index fund owners could possibly have in retaining and paying out million-pound bonuses to inept managers. As always, the devil is in the detail.

.

A study carried out by Reuters through the company Proxy Insight (lower graph) shows that in the 300 worst Among companies in the Russell 3000 index where proxy votes were cast, BlackRock voted in favour of management in 931 out of 1,000 cases, Vanguard in 911 out of 1,000, and State Street in 841 out of 1,000. The study concludes that these three giants supported the management of the worst-performing companies only slightly less than that of the other companies in the index, in other words, without caring in the slightest whether or not the management was harming the profits and performance of their companies.

The litmus test is that the percentage of support given by large pension funds to management teams at poorly performing companies is falling significantly. Of course, pension funds do care about returns for their future pensioners.

.

Some might argue that active fund managers do not usually go against the management in place either, but the reality is that active managers no longer invest in companies whose management is performing poorly or with whom they disagree. In fact, that is the essence of active management: identifying good businesses run by good managers, whilst also taking into account their price relative to their intrinsic value, in the case of value investing (Compare these returns with those of any passive fund). What’s more, even if a mediocre, lazy or ill-informed active manager were to invest in a poor-performing company and, through their proxy vote, support a poor management team, the influence they would have on the vote would be infinitely less significant than that of a massive index fund or ETF.

.

Consequently, there is a very real risk that mediocre companies with mediocre management will continue to exist indefinitely, due to the proxy votes cast by giant shareholders such as ETFs and index funds. Why would those passive funds care about the performance of the companies in their portfolios if their aim is not to outperform the index but simply to track it? Why would they confront their incompetent managers, replace them or deny them a huge bonus, if their sole incentive is to grow the fund rather than maximise returns for investors?

.

Another reason – this one more Machiavellian and immoral – for not going against the bad managers of large corporations is that it is those very same executives who are promoting these passive investment funds to their thousands upon thousands of employees. How else can one explain the fact that Vanguard, State Street and BlackRock all voted in favour of doubling the salary of the CEO of the energy company PG&E Corp, just after its shares plummeted following indications that the company was liable for the California wildfires? Or that they approved astronomical bonuses for executives at the cosmetics company Coty Inc – including half a million dollars to pay for their children’s school fees– after the company had been reeling from its reckless acquisition of Procter & Gamble’s beauty division. They have also unanimously vetoed an attempt by the other shareholders to separate the executive powers of the CEO and Chairman of the Board of General Electric Co, following a decade of poor results, etc., etc., etc… Even in the few cases in the Russell 3000 study where shareholders managed to veto executive bonuses, in 601 of those cases BlackRock attempted to award them bonuses through its vote.

.

Bear in mind that the largest holdings in index funds and ETFs, just like the indices they track, are in very large companies – that is, those with the highest number of employees worldwide. This is a vicious circle, as those executives are, after all, fund managers in return for fund owners voting in favour of their million-pound bonuses at board meetings. A win-win for them, but a lose-lose for investors in ETFs and index funds, and for the economy as a whole.

.

As it is the investors in these funds themselves who are most affected by the poor quality of the portfolios, it might seem that this circle is finally closing with a certain sense of justice. But we must not underestimate the damage being done to the global economy, because every day the markets are channelling more and more millions into mediocre companies and teams, with no one seeming to care about this inefficient allocation of capital. Furthermore, Western central banks continue with their free-for-all of cheap money, and with these trillion-dollar injections, alongside those from passive investment funds, We are undermining Darwin's theory of evolution. In other words, propping up zombie companies and executives with money created out of thin air and from investors more concerned with saving on fees than with investing their money wisely.

 

Stop-loss in actively managed funds?

As Machado said, only a fool confuses value and price. From the point of view of the long-term investor, who buys shares in good companies at attractive prices relative to their present and future earnings multiples, it would already be absurd and foolhardy to buy and sell these shares in the short term without associating these decisions with the value of the respective businesses. But it would be even more absurd to do so. short term trading in a portfolio of actively managed mutual funds, The investor can also set up tempting automatic buy and stop-loss (sic) orders, with portfolios at the free will of their respective managers.

.

That is what ING offers to their clients, with the consequent benefit to the bank for this service, obviously. But as it is not as simple operationally to automatically buy and sell a fund at a pre-established price as it is for a share, what they offer their clients is a «warning» service when the fund's price reaches the marked price. It is then that the client will decide whether or not to sign a buy-sell-transfer order for these funds, which will usually take a couple of days to execute. Oh, and of course, this «service» is only available for ING brand funds, which means that everything stays at home.

.

In a review of the practice of share trading (including stop-loss), we have to say that it is the usual modus operandi of savers who are less qualified as investors. In other words, those who move away from long term investment by buying businesses whose good value/price ratio they know, and instead approach the mere bet on any ticker listed, regardless of the good or bad performance of the listed company's business. They are even oblivious to whether there are prospects and an adjusted valuation of a company's business, a commodity, an index or any derivative behind that ticker. For most of them, it is enough to have a ticker or a changing price to bet on more or less frantically, conveniently dressing up this practice with all kinds of trading courses, technical analysis and macros that disguise their gambling with a patina of expert investment.

.

However, generally speaking, an investor who knows the value of the companies in his portfolio will be more interested in buying them the more the price of their shares falls. Conversely, the more expensive the shares are in relation to the value of the company, the more interested he/she will be in selling them. In contrast, short-term stock trading is associated with completely ignoring the real value of the company. This is why technical analysis and other trading methods usually recommend buying stocks when prices are rising and selling them when they are falling. (Here we could make the exception of the very few quantitative hedge funds that have been making money for decades, but they would be the exception that proves the rule and would only be the exception that proves the rule. accessible to well-informed investors and with capital in excess of 300.000′- euro).

.

As we said, ING is now tempting its clients to carry out this trading practice also in their portfolios of actively managed funds. Active management is so called because the manager of each fund actively makes decisions by buying and selling stocks or bonds. From there, the net asset value of the fund will be the -usually- daily quotation of the entire portfolio at market price, after deducting the commissions and expenses of the active management itself and of the fund (on active and passive management you will be interested in the article that Cluster Family Office recently published on the website of COBAS AM, the manager of Francisco García Paramés: «Passive Management, Active Management»). Therefore, it makes even less sense for the saver to make decisions to buy or sell the fund when, not only does he not know the value of the businesses bought, he does not even know which businesses he has bought and sold. The manager of such a fund or the liquidity it accumulates on a daily basis. It would also not allow you to benefit from one of the key investment drivers that every value manager strives to achieve: co buy low and sell high, since such trading and stop-losses would completely detract from good active management.. Moreover, as fund trading is an absurd and rare practice, the saver would not even have the possibility to benefit from the self-fulfilling prophecy that technical analysis sometimes offers.

.

In short, yet another brainstorming strategy of the Machiavellian marketing department on duty, whose priority has never been and never will be the customer's benefit, but that of the financial institution itself. More wood to keep savers away from the right investment path.