The scene is brimming with hope and a desperate need for good news to lift people’s spirits. Bear Stearns, Mac & Mae y AIG, are, to this day, the chosen ones for glory or rrising stars. On the contrary, for the time being, only Lehman Brothers features on the blacklist of fallen angels. Investment banks, unorthodox mortgage institutions that are difficult to categorise, insurance companies… various types of financial business models, but all with the same outcome: The public bailout or semi-public.
As for bailouts or private mergers and acquisitions, the criteria have naturally been commercial, that is to say, market-driven. There may have been some political influence in the form of personal commitments and/or non-commercial favours, but they have essentially been based—and will continue to be based—on commercial criteria. However, on the basis of what criteria have decisions regarding bailouts and public interventions been made? That is the million-dollar question, and it is likely that those responsible will take some of those criteria to their graves. 
Nevertheless, we venture to suggest that some are directly linked to the scale and severity of the consequences of letting the angels in question fall. In other words, depending on the damage this might cause to the System, the default or the bankruptcy of those companies, the Fed or whoever is in a position to prevent it will take the necessary action (in conjunction with the Fed). However, I must say that given the current economic climate, I refuse to believe that such decisions could have been influenced by personal interests, political considerations per se, or any other factor other than the pure pursuit of the best solution to the current financial crisis. I sincerely believe that the leaders in question are aware of the extreme gravity of the situation and are working tirelessly and without interference for the global good. That said, if the extent of the damage is the main criterion for deciding on the bailout, we can to jump to conclusions those institutions that find themselves in an extreme situation, such as investment banks, insurance companies, private mortgage lenders or commercial banks themselves. Let me explain. Perhaps the manoeuvres, overtures, flirtations and rumours of deals and rapprochements between private US financial institutions are not strictly motivated by commercial reasons. 
It’s possible that Wachovia isn’t actually in a position to acquire Morgan Stanley, and in fact nobody knows whether this is a takeover or a merger. Who’s buying whom? Who’s in a worse state? We might well suspect the same of the deal between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch. We’re back to the same old story Where the hell is Wally?, and I doubt the Fed knows for sure.
Perhaps not all the merger or acquisition deals we are seeing now, and will see in the future, will have
a viable plan at its core. Nor should they be based on corporate restructuring aimed at optimising resources that are already severely depleted. Perhaps some of these sudden infatuations are simply down to the fact that unity creates pressure, not strength. Under pressure to be rescued by an underfed and overwhelmed lifeguard.
Given the amplified damage caused by the collapse of a macro-entity comprising two or more entities (commercial and investment banks in the cases mentioned), it may be more likely that cries for help will be heeded which, on their own, would be lost in a sea of storms, as happened with the heart-rending cries for help from Lehman Brothers. Machiavellian? Yes, but also likely. And I would venture to say that, in a way, it is understandable given the situation of extreme desperation faced by the shareholder-director-owner, who sees a imminent extinction of its financial institution, with the resulting disaster for creditors, shareholders and bondholders.
With all this flirting and «UTEE”»s" (temporary partnership) strategic (businesses) let us hope that these false vultures do not hinder the work of the genuine ones, that they do not cause amplified tremors that exceed the structural and confidence-based capacity of the system, or the capacity for public bailouts. I will never tire of repeating it: only the public and private vultures can save the system.
Dollars: Those reckless American banknotes that come in different denominations but are all the same size.
Jorge Luis Borges (1899–1986) Argentine writer.