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Via the ever-recommended newsletter from John Mauldin<\/a>, we have had access to an analysis \u2013 which we consider to be very interesting and revealing \u2013 by Louis-Vincent Gave, from Gavekal Research<\/a>, on the reasons that have led Russia to act as it is doing in the Crimea conflict. It also helps us to understand the key factors that may determine the course of this conflict and the broader geostrategic implications arising from it. We shall try to summarise the main arguments of this analysis for you, as well as offer some reflections on them:<\/p>\nAs the British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston said back in the 19th century, \u00abCountries have no permanent friends or allies, only permanent interests<\/em>\u00ab. And\u00a0<\/span>Russia has always been keen to gain access to a warm-water port such as Sevastopol. It is no coincidence that it fought for 160 years against England, Turkey and France for control of the Crimea. But today it has two further reasons to fight for that peninsula, which we shall explain below. We can refer to these two reasons as the reasonable paranoia<\/em> and the diabolical Machiavellianism<\/em>.<\/p>\n Reasonable Paranoia:<\/strong><\/p>\n If we look back 200 years, we can see how Russia has constantly struggled to defend itself against foreign invasions, beginning with Napoleon\u2019s attacks and continuing with those by France, England, Turkey and Germany during the two world wars. And if we look at the world map today, we can see that there is only one expansionist empire that is still voraciously annexing territories. Mind you, it does so using weapons other than conventional ones. That empire is the EU, which, despite being based in Belgium, is dominated by Germans and French \u2013 Russia\u2019s long-standing rivals \u2013 and is steadily encroaching on what were, just a few decades ago, Soviet republics. And that European dominance is drawing ever closer to Russia\u2019s own borders.<\/p>\n Of course, pro-European expansion can be presented as an improvement in living standards and as a neighbourhood that could be economically attractive for Russian exports. But let us not forget that the motivation behind pro-European sentiment is not only economic but also political. And furthermore, Pro-European sentiment is systematically accompanied by an expansion of NATO\u2019s geographical scope; this is no longer a matter of economics or politics, but of military dominance<\/strong>. How could Russia not view this subtle and relentless expansionism on the part of the EU\/NATO alliance as a threat? In recent years, NATO and European integration have advanced voraciously across so-called Eastern Europe, one former Soviet republic after another, right up to Russia\u2019s very borders. And from Moscow\u2019s perspective, these conquests are not dissimilar to those achieved by fire and sword by Napoleonic, British or German troops decades or centuries ago. Without violence and in a civilised manner (relatively speaking, since, as in any revolution, violence is often inevitable), but with the same expansionist aim \u2013 this time from the West. The straw that seems to have broken the camel\u2019s back has been the overthrow of Ukraine\u2019s pro-Russian government by yet another \u00abpro-European spring\u00bb, fuelled by Western interests and intelligence (sic). And all this comes on top of constant snubs towards Putin\u2019s regime, such as the scant coverage in the West of the successful Winter Olympics in Sochi, or the huge media coverage given to Pussy Riot and the homophobic incidents perpetrated in the country. Given all this, we can better understand why Putin and Russia as a whole have a somewhat paranoid perception of pro-European sentiment.<\/p>\n Diabolical Machiavellianism:<\/strong><\/p>\n Leaving aside Russia\u2019s reasonable paranoia and focusing on its long-term interests, we must bear in mind three important factors: 1) Putin is a former member of the KGB and a staunch nationalist. 2) The Kremlin is very much aware of Russia\u2019s long-term interests. 3) When oil prices are high, Russia is strong; when they are low, Russia is weak.<\/p>\n The most important point is undoubtedly the third one, in what could well be the start of the Fourth World War (let us remember that the Third World War was the Cold War, although many do not recognise it as such). And this Fourth World War, which may already have begun surreptitiously, involves Shia and Sunni Muslims, whose conflict has a direct impact on the price of oil. Undoubtedly, in the current conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims that has been raging for years in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere, the Sunnis control the resources (mainly thanks to the oil fields in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), whilst the Shias have greater control over the population. And this is where things get interesting for Russia. If we look at a map of the Middle East, we can see that the Saudi oil fields are surrounded by a Shia population, which over the years has reaped little or no benefit from these trillion-dollar operations controlled by the Sunnis. And the same could be said of the oil fields in Bahrain.<\/p>\n It should be clear to everyone that Iran has for years been infiltrating the Shia population of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in order to destabilise Sunni economic dominance, which, for its part, has been managing the conflict rather well thanks to the support of US military technology. But could this situation change in the future? Will we see an escalation and intensification of the existing internal and external civil conflicts in the Middle East?<\/p>\n At the very least, Putin is preparing himself thoroughly for that scenario, which \u2013 let\u2019s not kid ourselves \u2013 would greatly serve Russia\u2019s long-term interests. Undoubtedly, a new violent conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia would send the price of a barrel of oil soaring to $200\u2032- And Europe, Japan and China too would become even more dependent on Russian oil and gas, the price of which \u2013 doubled compared with current levels \u2013 would directly fuel the spectacular growth of the Russian economy \u2013 and its influence. Putin would therefore see this scenario as benefiting him both geopolitically and economically.<\/p>\n It would be such a positive scenario for Russia (and for others too) that the temptation to let events take their course \u2013 by selling them weapons, for example \u2013 is, sadly, enormous. And even more so because the Sunnis in the Middle East are by no means friends of Russia, given that the latter has financed rebellions that have directly harmed Moscow, as in Dagestan, Chechnya, etc. It is therefore all too tempting for Putin to strike back at the Sunnis by providing covert support to the Shias to incite them to rebel. Of course, for the escalation of the conflict between Sunnis and Shias to be sufficiently effective, he needs to sell arms to the Shias, but he also needs to be able to supply them on a continuous, secure and uninterrupted basis. And This requires ships and a port<\/strong>. Hence the paramount importance of controlling Sevastopol, in order to be able to freely link the route between the Crimea and the port of Tartus in Syria (30 km from Lebanon and opposite Cyprus), where Russia maintains its last naval base outside its borders, built during the Cold War.<\/p>\n However, in the simplistic view of most analysts, the conflict is limited to the possibility that Putin may wish to extend his annexation of Russian-speaking Ukrainian regions northwards from Crimea in order to protect the integrity of the Russian-speaking communities from centralism in Kyiv. It is true that these areas are already highly conflict-ridden and unstable as a result of the recentralisation carried out by the new government in Kyiv (let us recall that the first thing it did was to ban the official use of the Russian language) and because of the sponsored self-determination of Crimea. And the coexistence of pro-European Ukrainians with pro-Russian Ukrainians in the east of the country is certainly under threat. It is therefore a reasonable fear. But we must not forget two maxims that have historically guided the Kremlin\u2019s decisions: a) Absolute priority is given to strategic access to ports in temperate waters. b) The welfare of the Russian population is subordinated to any other priority. We could therefore say that Russia\u2019s interest in the annexation of Crimea is likely to stem more from the first principle than the second. And that the current conflict does not mean that Putin will seek to absorb Russian minorities in the rest of Ukraine, wherever they may be and whatever their circumstances. The main question is whether Russia will use the annexation of the port of Sevastopol to stoke the conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims via the Russian base in the Syrian port of Tartus. And whether, in doing so, it will indirectly cause oil prices to soar, to the benefit of its own economy and global leadership.<\/p>\n After all, it is a reasonable strategy, given that the West has laid its cards on the table regarding a potential fall in the price of crude oil in the medium term: Increased US production, the new Iranian president\u2019s rapprochement with the West, the revival of Japan\u2019s nuclear policy, the generalised and cyclical fall in all commodity prices, coinciding with the slowdown in global growth, and the prospects of a more stable future in Iraq or Libya. It is therefore reasonable that Putin, following his experience in the late 1990s, should want to avoid a fall in oil prices at all costs by exerting his influence in the Middle East. And to this end, the Crimea\u2013Syria route is of paramount importance.<\/p>\n Furthermore, the timing is right, given that Obama is severing some ties with his Saudi allies and improving his relationship with the Shia. Russia therefore finds itself in a better position than in the past to achieve its objectives. In this regard, the annexation of Crimea may be the prelude to a resurgence of the Sunni-Shia conflict, which will lead to an increase in arms orders from France (which has remained the Saudis\u2019 sole supplier following the Americans\u2019 withdrawal from that market). Consequently, the annexation of Crimea may herald forthcoming rises in the price of crude oil.<\/p>\n However, in the short term, the opposite effect could well be seen, as the main producers might agree to counteract this price rise and drive prices down, whilst also releasing strategic reserves of millions of barrels (the US has already announced a upcoming release of reserves<\/a> (last week). But if the US continues to distance itself from its involvement in the Middle East, Russia \u2013 following its recent annexation of Crimea \u2013 could well supply the Shia with weapons and intelligence on a massive scale in order to secure oil at sky-high prices by fuelling conflicts with the Sunnis.<\/p>\n Therefore, those who believe that the US State Department has the situation under control may stand to benefit in the short term by investing in risky assets such as stock markets in the developed world. On the other hand, those who believe that Putin\u2019s Machiavellian tactics will succeed in destabilising the region may well see good returns in the short to medium term by investing in Russian oil companies, which, incidentally, due to the Crimean conflict, are trading at price-to-earnings ratios of just 3 or 4 years\u2019 profits, as we previously noted in \u00abFrom Russia with (More) Courage\u00bb<\/a>. <\/strong>Notice to navigators.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" A trav\u00e9s de la siempre recomendable newsletter de John Mauldin, hemos tenido acceso a un an\u00e1lisis, a nuestro juicio muy interesante y revelador, que realiza Louis-Vincent Gave, de Gavekal Research, sobre los motivos que han llevado a Rusia a actuar como lo est\u00e1 haciendo en el conflicto de Crimea. Y tambi\u00e9n nos ayuda a comprender […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[45,42,39,40,37,55],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3734","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-asesoramiento-deportistas-artistas","category-estrategia","category-crear-mi-propio-family-offices","category-gestion-financiera","category-reflexion","category-necesito-un-family-office"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/clusterfamilyoffice.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3734","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/clusterfamilyoffice.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/clusterfamilyoffice.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clusterfamilyoffice.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clusterfamilyoffice.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3734"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/clusterfamilyoffice.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3734\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/clusterfamilyoffice.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3734"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clusterfamilyoffice.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3734"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/clusterfamilyoffice.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3734"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}